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Despite the waning prominence of the vast and diverse literature on globalization, the debate 
remains unresolved, as globalization’s logics continue to buttress neoliberal economics (Hay & 
Smith, 2013; Smith, 2005). As Cameron and Palan posited thirteen years ago, “the spread of 
globalization in practice continues unabated” (2004). Of importance herein is how neoliberal 
globalization is understood, as a concept and in material terms (Marsh, 2009), as well as how it 
has spread spatiotemporally (Peck & Tickell, 2012). Contributing to constructivist globalization 
scholarship, this thesis argues that ideas are central to how “material reality” or “globalization in 
practice” is shaped and understood (Schmidt, 2013). Henceforth, it interrogates the space for 
alternatives to globalization’s logics by focusing on the ways ideas shape policy and normative 
understandings by (respectively) examining the IMF-Argentine consultations (1976-2006), and 
the discourses of the financial press (1997-2006). The methodology builds on Broome and 
Seabrooke’s (2007) historical content analysis. The findings show that in both cases ideas 
entertained came from within globalization’s logics, resulting in policies and a discourse that 
reflected and reinforced these ideas. Ultimately, this thesis shows the centrality of ideas to “real 
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Globalization and Argentina: an introduction 
 
JENSEN: You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples.  There are 
no nations! There are no peoples!  There are no Russians. There are no Arabs! There 
are no third worlds!  There is no West!  There is only one holistic system of systems, 
one vast and immane, interwoven, interacting, multi-variate, multi-national dominion 
of dollars! Petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars!, Reich marks, Rubles, Rin, 
Pounds and Shekels! It is the international system of currency that determines the 
totality of life on this planet! That is the natural order of things today!  That is the 
atomic, subatomic and galactic structure of things today!  
 
… It has been since man crawled out of the slime, and our children, Mr. Beale, will live 
to see that perfect world in which there is no war and famine, oppression and 
brutality— one vast and ecumenical holding company, for whom all men will work to 
serve a common profit, in which all men will hold a share of stock, all necessities 
provided, all anxieties tranquilized, all boredom amused. And I have chosen you to 
preach this evangel, Mr. Beale. 
 
BEALE: (humble whisper) Why me? 
 
JENSEN: Because you're on television, dummy. Sixty million people watch you every 
night of the week, Monday through Friday. 
(Excerpt from the movie Network, 1976) 
Although the movie Network was a critique of the trajectory of our economic order, it is 
interesting to see that, as far back as 1976, there appeared to be an acute awareness of the 
normative struggle taking place between the ideological remnants of the quasi-Keynesian, 
Bretton Woods system and the resurgence economic liberalism, being presented in a “globalist” 
wrapping. This forty year old movie’s monologue was also able to presage the problematic logic 
behind the positivist, pseudo-scientific theories that— despite relying on media and politics for 
their acceptance— buttress and advance a neoliberal policy paradigm. While the academic 
debate on globalization was still 20 years away, the 1970s was a period wherein Western states 
grappled with the reconfiguration of the Bretton Wood’s system. Precisely, it was during this 
period when demand-side policies based on Keynesian economic theories lost their primacy to 




paradigm of present (Harvey, 2007; Hay, 1996, 2010; Helleiner, 1993; Konings, 2007; Lucas, 
1981).  
Herein, the relevance of the movie Network is found within its awareness that this 
neoliberal project would inevitably face political resistance, especially to its rigid and austere 
policies. In turn, the relationship between Jensen and Beale, personifies the dynamic between 
neoliberal economics and the discourse or “logics of globalization” (Hay, 2013; Hay & Watson, 
2003). In other words, neoliberalism can best be understood as the current or orthodox policy 
paradigm, while globalization can be seen as a discursive social construct that attempts to 
rationalize the use of these supply-side policies. Thus, a key point of interrogation herein is in 
understanding how these “social constructs” are deployed in practice.
 
 
Taking this further, Hay and Smith’s concept of “neoliberal globalization” itself leads to 
a potential dialectical dynamic between neoliberalism and globalization, and what it results in.
1
  
Ultimately, the central task of this thesis is not just to show that ideas matter, but rather, how 
ideas matter, in what ways have they been used within different spaces, and lastly by whom? In 
order to accomplish this objective, this thesis interrogates how the ideas and discourses of 
globalization function in practice. Precisely, this is accomplished within the thesis’ empirical 
analysis, which examines how globalization’s logics work within institutional structures, as well 
                                                          
1
 For Hay and Smith, globalization can be understood as a discursive logic, which can be deployed in order to set 
“clear limits on what is possible in economic, social and political terms” (2013). Moreover, globalization in this 
form becomes “irredeemably neoliberal” (2013). The concept of “neoliberal globalization” itself can be 
operationalized via the contents of the ideas within the discourse. Herein, neoliberal globalization not only 
rationalizes the use of austere fiscal policies, but it can also promote neo-monetarist policies, such as those in favor 
of central bank independence, as well as the liberalization of financial markets (Hay & Smith, 2013). More broadly, 
globalization [in this sense] is deployed as a “logic of external economic compulsion” that not only rationalizes the 
above-mentioned policies, but instills “a profound confidence in the superiority, all things being equal, of private, 
market or quasi-market mechanisms over collective, public or state action or intervention – they are all, in other 
words, neoliberal” (Hay & Smith, 2013). Nevertheless, the key difference is that neoliberalism represents a supply-
side focused policy paradigm, while globalization (neoliberal globalization included) represents a discursive 




how these logics work their way through the public discourse. Within these spaces, it gauges 
how and to what degree these logics are deployed to promote or rationalize neoliberal ideas and 
policy outcomes by measuring their ability to crowd out the space for alternatives. Specifically, 
this thesis empirically examines how the logics of globalization are deployed within international 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Stiglitz, 2002; Woods, 
2006), as well as in national economic discourses (Hay & Watson, 2000). 
The 2018 World Economic Forum’s annual meeting, which emphasized the need to 
support globalization, both as a political and economic project has brought the concept back into 
the discursive forefront (World Economic Forum, 2018). More proof of its enduring saliency can 
be found in the bourgeoning, decade long backlash in the West, wherein states have not only 
challenged its efficacy, but have begun to raise the question of deglobalization (Buti & 
Pichelmann, 2017; Bello, 2017; Rodrik, 2016). In the West, economic conditions in Greece have 
been the harbinger for the deglobalization movement, which despite austerity measures and the 
gamut of supply-side initiatives— mostly as a result of concessions with the IMF— remains 
mired by chronic economic failures and political flare-ups (Bello, 2013). Moreover, recent 
elections within G7 nations such as, the US, the UK, France and Italy— essentially states behind 
globalization’s initial thrust— have shown the rise of right-wing populism (Buti & Pichelmann, 
2017) partly in response to lingering economic (Bello, 2017; Rodrik, 2016) and political 
frustrations (Stoker & Hay, 2017) with the “global” order. 
Yet, despite the characterizations of the mainline press, which discount protests as 
xenophobic and reactionary demands for balkanization, scholars see this growing discontentment 
as “an opportunity to redress the imbalance between global markets and national responsibilities” 




failure (or “neoliberalization”) of left wing parties— who have traditionally represented the more 
egalitarian or demand-side focus of the post-war Keynesianism— to engender change on its 
professed terms. Case and point herein is the work of Colin Hay on the British Labour party’s 
embrace of “third way politics” via the deployment of neoliberal globalization’s externalizing 
logics (see Hay, 1999, 2004; Watson & Hay, 2003). Despite the ostensible space for 
convergence, clear ideological differences, which are accentuated and capitalized on by the press 
(Davis & Dunaway, 2016), continue impede the formation of a truly bi-partisan consensus 
against neoliberalism (also see Mason, 2015). Therefore what all this dissonance suggests is that 
the globalization debate remains unresolved.  
Perhaps the movie Network was ahead of its time as the “official debate” on 
contemporary globalization did not take off until the 1990s, 15 years thereafter. Since then, a 
vast and highly contested literature on globalization has been amassed (Bylth, 2003; Cameron & 
Palan, 2004; Cerny, 2006; Dicken, 2015; Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; 
Ohmae, 1996). Despite this, international political economy (IPE) now appears to emphasize 
issues of global capitalism or neoliberalism itself. Nevertheless, globalization’s core logics 
continue to rationalize, both the efficacy and continued use of policies derived from neoliberal or 
neoclassical economic thought, as well as the position of privilege held by high finance. Or as 
Cameron and Palan posited thirteen years ago, “the spread of globalization in practice continues 
unabated” (2004). Despite the waning prominence of the academic debate on globalization, 
many of the issues remain unresolved especially in practice, as “neoliberal globalization’s” 
logics continue to buttress, both neoclassical theories and the neoliberal policy paradigm (Hay & 




Issues with the globalization debate and the “waves” typology:  a measurable phenomenon 
or a complex, non-linear reality? 
Within the globalization debate, the “hyperglobalist” as well as its “business school” 
variant are two of the most faithful promotors of neoliberal and neoclassical, market clearing 
doctrines (Hay, 2007; Hay & Marsh, 2000; Smith, 2005).
2
 Authors that ushered in the concept of 
globalization cited the end of the Cold War as its advent (Ohmae, 1996; Yergin and Stanislaw, 
2002; Razu, 2006; Robinson, 2014) while others have emphasized technological advances, in 
order to highlight the ease of global communication and transportation (Friedman, 2006; Nye & 
Donahue, 2000, Porter, 1990). Altogether, the hyperglobalist argument is that in order for states 
to compete within this new world order they will need to further liberalize their economies 
(Ohmae, 1990; O’Brien, 1992; Reich, 1991). However, the overarching thesis of this dominant, 
hyperglobalist position is that the global economy is inexorably caught in a race to the bottom, 
wherein nation-states are obliged to attract footloose capital by liberalizing its tax, fiscal, labor, 
regulatory and monetary policies. Ultimately, this rigidly neoclassical framing precludes or 
severely limits the space for the prior Keynesian or heterodox economic policies. 
However, scholarly critiques on the subject of globalization now span two decades. And 
despite the various theoretical contributions, such as those coming from so-called “second” and 
“third wave” theorists, the concept of neoliberal globalization continues to play “an important 
role in shaping institutional manifestations,” and has ultimately retained its “extremely 
influential” position within “…business and policy-making communities” (Cameron & Palan, 
2004: 28; also see Thrift, 1998). For Cameron and Palan this disconnect (between practice and 
theory) is precisely why the popular “waves” typology is problematic as it is drawn in a manner 
                                                          
2
 The hyperglobalist thesis’ overarching message posits that in order for developed, Western states to compete in the 




that suggests that there has been a sort of evolutionary progression (Cameron & Palan, 2004: 29, 
41). In other words, just like the inherent incongruities at the ground level (e.g., rationales 
animating rebukes from both the ideological left and right) different “narratives of globalization 
particular to specific communities,” can exist in mutually exclusive ideational spaces (2004:29). 
While the “wave typology” traces back to Kofman and Youngs (1998), as well as Held, Et al. 
who delineated the bodies of globalization literature via the terms: “hyperglobalist”, “skeptics,” 
and “transformationalists” (Held & Mcgrew, 2001; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999; 
also see Michael, 2003).
3
 This thesis in particular is inspired by and updates the typology found 
within Nicola Smith’s organization of the globalization literature, which ultimately emphasizes 
the importance of ideas in relation to these abovementioned positions (2005).  
The initial response to the hyperglobalist thesis came from the skeptics, which 
empirically contested the notion of globalization by gauging the level of integration (Hirst 
&Thompson, 1998; Rugman, 2001; Wade, 1996). Their findings suggested that the Pre-WWI 
economy was actually more globally integrated, and that the current level of interconnectivity 
was much more indicative of regionalization.
4
 In contrast, transformationalists saw globalization 
as actually occurring, albeit in a much more non-linear, multifaceted manner (Giddens 2015, 6; 
Held 1999, 14-15; Scholte 2003, 85). Yet, these positions had little effect on each other or the 
hyperglobalist view, as they by and large existed as “different narratives of globalization 
                                                          
3 The most prominent version of the Waves was set up by Held, who delineated the three waves as: the 
hyperglobalist, skeptical, and transformationalist (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 1999). Constructivists, like 
Hay and Marsh have also taken to the “three wave typology;” however, substituting the transformationalist position 
with their own, third wave, constructivism (1999).  Martel notes there are multiple iterations of the wave typology, 
as well as those claiming to occupy the “third wave”.  
4
 The concept of regionalization itself, which stemmed from these earlier, “skeptical” works continues to be 
developed within the academic literature (See Hirst, Thompson, Bromley, 2015; Keating & Loughlin, 2013; 




particular to specific communities, and different voices through which they are articulated” 
(Cameron & Palan, 2004).  
For Martell, the broad scope of the globalization literature, as well as the problematic 
configurations of the “waves” typology, requires works to specify the area of engagement in 
order “to ensure greater depth of analysis” (Martell, 2007; also see Tomlinson, 1999; Pieterse, 
2004). This quasi-compartmentalized dynamic resulted in vast swaths of loosely— if at all 
connected— “globalization” literature, which also branched out into studies of cultural dynamics 
and class struggles (Martell, 2007). Herein, Martel notes of the various interpretations of the 
“third wave,” which are much more heavily focused on ideational or discursive centered 
approaches than the abovementioned transformationalist “third wave” (Martell, 2007). These 
iterations of the “third wave” not only include the constructivist strand covered at length herein, 
but also Ian Bruff’s “third wave” typology (2005), which includes a neo-Gramscian focus on 
class struggle (Bruff 2005; Burnham 2006; Cox 1987; Jessop 1997; Levy & Newell 2002; 
Overbeek & Van Apeldoorn 2012), as well as post-structuralist and postmodern frameworks 
(Jessop, 2004; Palan, 2013), which are emphasize nuanced, descriptive accounts that see 
theorizations as mere pretension (Martell, 2007; also see Hay, 2002: 27).
 5
  Additionally, post-
colonial literature— particularly that of Walter Mignolo— have conceptualized “globalization” 
as an extension of colonial or Western epistemic and/or hermeneutic framings, which have 
historically subordinated or “subalternized” non-occidental theorizations and wider forms of 
knowledge (Mignolo, 2012, 2015a; also see Grosfoguel, 2011).
6
  
                                                          
5
 Also see feminist accounts of globalization (Bergeron, 2001; Nagar, Et al., 2002; Sassen, 1999).  
6
 In this sense, post-colonialist suggest that both the idea and material reality of globalization or the “global market,” 
which are respectively dominated by Western intellectuals and financiers, is intrinsically hegemonic (Mignolo, 
2012: 13, 21. While this thesis remains embedded or tied to what can be considered “Eurocentric” epistemological 




Nevertheless, to ensure “analytical depth” and “rigor” in the face of this complex, 
expansive, multifaceted, and even problematic body of globalization literature this thesis narrows 
its focus to issues of economic globalization. Specifically, it critically engages with the more 
dominant camps set out as the: hyperglobalist, skeptics, transformationalists, and constructivist 
positions. Additionally, herein the “wave” typology is set aside, due the confusion caused by its 
various iterations, as well as the inherent temporal spuriousness it may convey (Cameron & 
Palan, 2004; Martell, 2007).   
Reconstructing globalization 
While the abovementioned hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalist tend to approach 
globalization as if it were a material reality, social constructivist (Hay, 2011; Hay & Rosemond, 
2002; Schmidt, 2010; Smith, 2005) suggest that understanding globalization as a normative or 
ideational phenomenon is a more fruitful endeavor. For constructivists, the importance of ideas 
means that there is more to globalization than what can be tallied from the ledgers of states, 
institutions, and businesses.
 7
 In turn, constructivist political economists see globalization’s 
power based in its ability to construct what are by and large normative constraints, as Hay and 
Watson noted, they foster “a logic of no alternative” (Hay & Watson, 2003; Smith, 2005; Hay, 
2007). Moreover, by treating globalization as an external constraint— it serves as a rationale for 
the depoliticization of economic policymaking. In concurrence, other scholars sensitive to the 
effects of ideational factors, such as Cameron and Palan have emphasized how social 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
it also affirms that Latin American intellectuals on the periphery, “border” can indeed “think” (Mignolo, 2012, 
2015a).  
7
 Perhaps one of the more understated suppositions in Keynes’ work is that he in fact saw economics as a social 
construction, as opposed to a natural or readily quantifiable order (Keynes, 1936: 383, 69-70; Minsky, 1986; 
Widmaier, 2003; Keen, 2011). Moreover, Keynes’ heavily cited “animal spirits” quote not only acknowledges the 




constructions or efforts to “frame” a discourse within certain parameters, which effectively 
constrains the space for choice or alternatives (Cameron & Palan, 2004).  
However, one concern that has been raised within the constructivist literature itself is the 
need to also account for the harsh realities of material factors, as well as their potential 
constraining effects on ideas (Marsh 2009; Smith & Bates, 2008: 202). For instance, Marsh 
diverged from his past concurrence with Hay by positing that material, as well as ideational 
factors work to either constrain or facilitate agents (Marsh 2009: 686-687; Hay 2002: 208). 
Accordingly, for Smith, “at its heart, the globalization debate is about the power of capitalism, 
and whether or not that power ultimately servers to determine the decision and actions of 
national governments (Smith, 2005: 197). Smith’s observation leads to two points: 
Firstly, what ultimately shapes our material reality are “the choices and actions of human 
actors,” in policymaking positions or institutions, which by their nature tend to operate via the 
discursive and ideationally laden processes of deliberation, wherein “different types of ideas 
(cognitive and normative)” come into play (Smith 2006: 198; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). A second 
point of emphasis, which appears to parallel the work of Peck and Tickell (1994, 2002, 2012) on 
the variegated path of neoliberalism itself suggests that the way in which ideas affect decision-
making or policy outcomes must be considered within “specific national contexts,” as spatial, 
and even temporal variances come into play (Smith, 2005: 198; also see Brenner, Peck, & 
Theodore, 2009; Foucault, 1979, 1986; Jessop, 2000).  
To this end, for Smith and Bates, a greater inclusion of the dynamics of geographical 
space and time, in both theoretical and methodological frameworks would “explicitly refute the 




and futures exists…” (2008: 202). These are two critical points as it appears that while 
constructivism has been able to pick up on globalization’s normative constructions, it should not 
lose sight of how material factors can concurrently effect agents, institutions— and how they 
might form a bi-directional feedback loop. Thus, these two observations suggest that a bi-
directional flow exists between ideational and material factors, but also that spatiotemporal 
variances effect how ideas and discourses (of globalization) develop within different institutional 
settings and also how they are internalized by agents.
8
 
One such approach that systematically reconciles the abovementioned need for balance 
(between the material and ideational) is provided by Vivien Schmidt’s analytical framework 
(Schmidt 2008). Due to abovementioned desire for balance its worth noting that— the emphasis 
or importance of Schmidt’s analytical framework to this thesis is not due to the ideational 
distinction between appeals making either normative or cognitive arguments (2003). Rather, the 
focus herein is on the ideas trafficked within the analytical distinctions Schmidt makes in 
discerning between institutional discourses with material consequences vis-à-vis those deployed 
to influence or “frame” the parameters of agents’ ideas (Schmidt, 2003, 2008, 2014; also see 
Cameron & Palan, 2004: 51).  
Specifically, Schmidt’s discursive institutionalist (DI) framework separates institutional 
or other policy building discourses from those put forth by market, media, and political 
interlocutors that traffic in the ideational centered “process of persuasion” (Schmidt, 2014). For 
instance, Schmidt identifies coordinative discourses as those that take place within 
organizational structures, institutions, or epistemic communities whose outcomes materialize as 
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either policy or some sort collective action (Schmidt, 2014). Conversely, communicative 
discourses are best understood as ideational constructions that operate within the public relations 
or political sphere, with the end goal of influencing agents or other target audiences (Schmidt, 
2008). In turn, the thesis’ two empirical sections are divided along these lines, as an account of 
these spaces illustrates the variegated ways in which these social constructions impede or 
catalyze change.  
Schmidt also posits that her (DI) framework can serve as a means to bridge the gap 
within historical institutionalists (HI) works who tend to describe change “rather than explain it 
by reference to what actors themselves think and say that leads to change” (Schmidt, 2006, 2007, 
2008; also see Hall & Taylor, 1998).
9
 For Schmidt therefore, focusing on the content of the 
discourses (e.g. what agents say) helps get closer to the actual processes of change (Schmidt, 
2008). Her work in particular falls into the (DI) camp, a self-applied term used both by Schmidt 
and Hay (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Abdelal, Blyth & Parsons, 2015; Schmidt, 2010).  
Nevertheless, Schmidt suggests that synergies can result from combining HI “rules and 
regularities,” as the “HI analysis elucidates structures and DI illuminate agency…” (Schmidt, 
2008, 2010). For instance, Schmidt argues that the incorporation of historical institutionalist (HI) 
methods can help demystify how institutions constrain or encourage actors, who internalize its 
rules and norms (2010). Additionally, HI’s focus on tracing institutional processes over time can 
be specifically applied to gauge how ideas or discourses evolve (or persevere) (Schmidt 2010, 
12). However, it is important to note that this constructivist-institutionalist synthesis is not 
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exactly groundbreaking, as the analytical framework used in Broome and Seabrooke’s studies on 
the IMF negotiations actually operationalizes much of Schmidt’s argument (2007; 2008; see 
chapter 2). In turn, their methodology provides a ready-made framework to analyze institutional 
discourses. And with some alterations, it can also serve as an organizational template for the 
analysis of communicative discourses.
 10
   
Ultimately, the central task of this thesis is to understand how ideas about globalization 
matter. In other words, how these “globalizing” ideas function in practice— and also, how these 
normative constructs work to promote or rationalize neoliberal policies and outcomes by 
measuring their ability to crowd out the space for alternatives. Therefore, in order to interrogate 
how these discursive constructs or “logics of globalization” have been deployed, either within 
the deliberations of global institutions or public discourses the thesis must turn to an empirical 
examination. Ultimately, this theoretical framework not only informs the empirical analysis by 
focusing on “how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter” in terms of institutional 
change, but also how spatiotemporal variances create a need for contextualized accounts 
(Schmidt, 2010). For this thesis, the application of Schmidt’s framework does not intended to 
find a correlation between the two discourses, but rather it seeks to show the different the ways 
and spaces wherein the “logics of globalization” can be used to either catalyze or impede change. 
In turn, the thesis’ focus on Argentina satisfies the abovementioned critiques (Smith & Bates, 
2008; also see Peck & Tickell, 2002), which stressed the need to account for the inherent 
variances of neoliberal globalization’s social constructions within time and space. 
Methodology   
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As mentioned above, the overarching structure of this thesis’ adopts Schmidt’s 
framework, which differentiates between internal and external discourses (2010). However, 
within this distinction this thesis incorporates and builds upon Broome and Seabrooke’s 
qualitative methods, which provides a means to trace and detect liberal bias within International 
Monetary Fund’s internal discourses (2007; 2008). This particular methodology is unique in its 
ability to “narrow the focus” to how the agents internalize deliberative discourses, which allows 
for an analysis with a greater emphasis on how its policy advice was arrived at, and also how it 
has evolved over time (2007, 579). In turn, this thesis’ methodology is influenced by the work of 
Broome and Seabrooke’s 2007 and 2008 studies on the IMF’s biases (2008; 2007).  
However, it does advance their methods by applying modified iterations that not only 
cover the coordinative discourses of the IMF, but also the communicative discourses of the 
financial press. Overall, this exercise delineates the IMF’s policy advice for the specific purpose 
of assessing its flexibility with regards to a nation’s political economy. Accordingly, the data is 




Altogether this first section, forms a historical tracing of the institutional dynamics within 
the IMF-Argentine debt negotiations.
12
 This is done by incorporating Broome and Seabrooke’s 
historical process tracing methods, which cover the Article IV negotiations held from 1976 until 
their ultimate withdrawal in 2006.
13
 The focus on the institutional dynamics of the IMF 
contributes to understanding the spatiotemporal variances of neoliberalism’s spread, as well as 
its role as a “globalizing institution” (Woods, 2006). Overall, this particular section examines 
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how the logics of globalization constrain the deliberative space for heterodox policies.
14
 The 
upshot herein is that economic policy is much more endogenously or politically driven than the 
externalizing, (pseudo)scientific logics of neoliberal globalization or neoclassical economics 
would suggest.   
The methods within this thesis’ second empirical section bring into focus the discourses 
of global finance within Argentina. These cases, which focus on the narratives of the press and 
the financial executives they interview and cite— provide a content analysis of the 
communicative discourses inspired by the methods of Broome and Seabrooke. It begins from the 
initial influx of foreign finance capital in 1997 through aftermath of the Argentine Great 
Depression, which led to the abrupt departure of several foreign banks leading to a systemic 
restructuring.
15
 It specifically interrogates how Argentina’s financial crisis was explained and 
interpreted within the press and how globalization’s logics, as well as other neoliberal or 
neoclassical discourses— and broader narratives were constructed. The overall aim of the cases 
is to uncover the explicit aims or content of the discourses of neoliberal globalization, and also 
show how they have spread through different spaces and times.   
Altogether, this second empirical section examines the dominant ideational constructions 
by collating the bias of discourses and broader narratives on Argentina’s relationship with 
international finance. While the discourse analysis within the first section examines the closed-
door, policy oriented deliberations between IMF executives and Argentine authorities, the goal 
herein is to examine not so much the direction of the policy, but rather the direction or biases of 
the narratives that the press and financial executives outwardly projected. As a result, the 
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discourses sampled survey the domestic press’ reporting, editorials as well as paying close 
attention to the firsthand accounts made by financial executives therein. Overall, the analysis 
collates the dominant narratives and characterizations of competing theories and policies.  
This ties back to the thesis’ core empirical question of how globalization is deployed in 
practice by interrogating how and if the concept of globalization was interwoven into the 
discourses, and what exactly this narrative rationalized or advocated for, at different times. In 
turn, this contributes to the constructivist understandings of the role and effects of intersubjective 
factors. It also begins to reveal the bi-directional dynamic that exists between globalization as a 
discourse and neoliberalism as an economic paradigm.  
The case of Argentina 
As noted above, the theories and methodological framework previously outlined guide this 
thesis’ empirical analysis, which examines the IMF-Argentine negotiations, as well as the 
narratives or normative constructions found within the discourses of Argentina’s national press. 
The goal in applying the aforementioned framework empirically to the Argentine case is to 
illustrate how globalization discourse effects policy outcomes, and also how “global logics” are 
ultimately legitimized via public discourses. Therefore, as mentioned above the empirical case 
studies are divided between coordinative and communicative spheres.  
Specifically, the first set of cases examine the coordinative discourses within the IMF-
Argentine article IV consultations. Herein, emphasis is on how the logics of globalization 
crowded out the space for alternative policies. This second section analyzes the communicative 
discourses from 1997-2006. Specifically, it examines the press’ discourses during the 1990s 




known as the “corralito.”
16
 Altogether, the emphasis of this second empirical section is on 
understanding if and how the press’s narratives legitimated the liberalization and consolidation 
of Argentina’s financial sector during the 1990s, as well as how it framed understandings of the 
ensuing economic crisis— including how the “corralito” (Argentina’s current account bail-in) 
was explained, and lastly how it framed the ensuing reform period.
17
  
The choice of Argentina itself is significant, as its political economy serves as an axiom 
of neoliberal globalization’s thriving instability. In a relatively short span (since the mid-1970s), 
Argentina’s political economy has cycled through multiple economic reconfigurations and 
crises.
18
 Argentina was also once considered the IMF’s model state (Camdessus, 1998). Yet, for 
all the praise of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, Argentina would ultimately break through 
the normative constructs of globalization and enact structural policies that reasserted the role of 
the state via the re-nationalization of state assets and financial reform. However, the 2015 
election of the Argentine president Mauricio Macri— who ran on a platform of economic 
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 The corralito (enacted on December 1, 2001) was a current account bail-in that nearly eliminated the circulation 
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ineffective bank bailouts and bail-ins. From 2003-2015, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner presided over the 12 year 
break from the liberal policies of the 1990s, which ultimately pulled Argentina out of its depression and rolled back 





liberalism and fiscal restraint— proved that, even for Argentinians, the logics of globalization 
are not only relevant, but powerful enough to win a presidential election. 
To date, much of the literature on the Argentine crisis has focused on whether the 
privatizations that took place during the 1990s can be considered a key causal factor. For 
instance, a large number of works defended privatization and liberalization, mostly on the 
grounds of the microeconomic efficiency and profitability it purportedly afforded (Chong & 
Lopez-Silanes 2004, 54; Manzetti 2008, 2009; Di Tella et al. 2008; Dove 2012). However, works 
critical of Argentina’s privatization program suggest that this very focus on “efficiency” and 
“profitability” was directly responsible for the record levels of unemployment during the 1990 
and early 2000s (Azpiazu 2002; Baer & Montes-Rojas, 2008; Dagdeviren 2011; Manzetti 2009; 
Rodriguez-Boetsch 2005).  
Another area of the Argentine crisis that was extensively covered was the dynamics 
between the state and subaltern groups (Erbetta 2011; Fiorentini 2012; Munoz, 2009a, 2009b; 
Schaumberg, 2008; Theophanous, 2003; Sikkink, 2008). These works presented the nation-state 
as a buffer or mediating force, not just between the external demands of foreign capital, but those 
of ground-level, grassroots protestors. Moreover, for Cooper and Momani the “coercive power” 
of external actors (e.g., the IMF, bond holders and foreign finance) was actually scattered and 
even elusive (2005). Overall, the literature was able to piece together how the state and internal 
forces were able to evade or resist neoclassical dictates. However, much less emphasis was 
placed on the inverse— that is on mapping out how these “external forces” applied pressure or 
reacted to the internal forces. In other words, although the abovementioned literature covered 




or external forces (e.g., the IMF and foreign banks, and the financial press) within Argentina 
itself received much less attention, which is exactly what this thesis attempts to cover.  
One reason for the lack of attention on the role of “global forces” is that much of the 
aforementioned literature focused on the outcomes, as well as who or what was to blame for the 
crisis—citing the state’s lack of oversight, the machinations of large multinationals, and even the 
interference of international institutions, and on some occasions even their lack of involvement 
was given as cause (Cavallo, 2004; Cooper & Momani, 2005). In other words, much of the 
literature’s focus was on outlining the economic and political failures of politicians, corporations 
and institutions—which left out the ideational and discursive dynamics therein. For instance, in 
terms of the IMF, politicians and scholars have pointed to their loan stipulations as one of the 
primary reasons for the Argentine crisis (Azpiazu, 2002; Ennis & Pinto, 2002; McKenzie & 
Mookherjee 2003).
19
 Nonetheless, the analysis found within these works focused on the 
outcomes, despite that they were also implying that the coordinative discourse within this 
institution impinged upon the ideational space for Keynesian style, counter-cyclical policy 
making. 
Therefore, what was left out of the abovementioned works was an account of the 
deliberations with these global actors or institutions, which would establish causality for the 
choice of policies. To this end, the focus of the first set of empirical cases is on how the logics of 
globalization within institutional settings— specifically, the IMF-Argentine Article IV 
negotiations— affects or sustains ideas that ultimately materialize as policy. However, this is 
well worn ground, as Ngaire Woods’s seminal work on international institutions posited that the 
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IMF was indeed a “globalizer” (2006). Since then, academics have suggested that the key role of 
the Fund is as a (neo) liberalizing institution, but have disputed when exactly this came about.  
Therefore, the debate surrounding the Fund’s (neo) liberalizing tendencies not only harks 
back to the aforementioned theories that stress empirical accounts of the spaces wherein 
neoliberal globalization discourse is deployed, but also the temporal variables. While arguments 
from Woods and Chweiroth suggest that its penchant for liberalization and austerity did not 
become institutionalized within the Fund until the 1980s, researchers such as Panitch and Babb 
see its stretching as far back to either its inception at Bretton Woods or the 1950s, respectively 
(Woods, 2006; Chweiroth, 2007; Panitch & Gindin, 2013a; Chorev & Babb, 2009). Ultimately, 
this first set of cases, which interrogates the IMF’s role as a globalizing agent within Argentina 
contributes towards the abovementioned need to empirically account for the variegated ways in 
which neoliberal ideas and discourses spread through space and time.    
My thesis’ second major empirical account, follows Schmidt’s framework by accounting 
for how communicated discourses were deployed within the context of the Argentine financial 
consolidation of the 1990s and its ensuing crisis of 1998-2002, as well as the period of reform 
that followed (2003-2006). The focus on the discourses and narratives of finance itself stems 
from another interesting anomaly— namely, that Argentina’s “heterodox” post-crisis reform 
only took shape upon the exit of both the IMF and the majority of global financiers. Moreover, 
the notion that Argentina ironically stood to gain more economic latitude in the absence of global 
financiers garnered a small, but influential consensus amongst several high profile scholars 




As a result of this point of contention, my thesis’ second major empirical account 
critically engages this assertion by cataloging the ideational proclivities and policy biases of 
private finance via the analysis of one of the primary interlocutors, the national press. The goal 
herein is to provide an analysis of the discourses surrounding the early influx of global financial 
institutions, as well as the narratives that served to chronicle the sector’s subsequent period of re-
capitalization. This provides the basis for the second empirical account, which embarks on an 
examination of the financial sector’s communicative discourse, via the Argentine press— one of 
its central interlocutors (Schmidt, 2008).    
Altogether, the prior literature on the Argentine crisis not only ended in a circular 
stalemate as to who or what was to blame, but there was also no comprehensive account of how 
the institutional and ideationally focused discourses affected policy as well as broader 
understandings. As such, the two empirical sections of my thesis take on the task of confronting 
both the institutional question of the IMF, as well as the discursive content relating to 
Argentina’s financial consolidation, its collapse, and the subsequent reforms. In doing so it 
maintains the thesis’ focus on the political economy of finance and monetary policy. When taken 
as a whole this provides an empirical landscape wherein the use or advocacy of neoclassical or 
heterodox policies can be contrasted and readily accounted for.  
One of the key empirical questions herein pertains to the role of the “corralito” itself as a 
political construction, which has been neglected or understated within the literature on 
Argentina. While it has served as a temporal marker of the capitulation of the Argentine state’s 
policy efforts to intervene in both monetary and financial markets, its conspicuousness has drawn 
attention away from the speculative financial deleveraging and capital flight leading up to its 




(1997-2006) may show that the financial press and more specifically, the financial firms—via 
their consolidation of private finance, their reluctance to lend, and their subsequent large-scale 
repatriations— played a much greater role in the economic conditions that precipitated 
Argentina’s financial collapse. This posits that the “corralito” was not just a non-sequitur, but 
that it served to frame the discourse in terms of Argentina’s ultimate failure to integrate into 
global financial markets, as opposed to seeing global financial markets as outright failing the 
Argentine economy (See Cafiero and Llorens 2002; Keen, 2011).   
Ultimately, these empirical gaps in the understanding of the ideational dynamics allows 
this thesis to contribute empirically, by suggesting that perhaps a better line of inquiry would 
seek to consider how the logics of neoliberal globalization were deployed to closed off the 
ideational space for heterodox approaches (Hay & Smith, 2005, 2013). While understanding how 
ideas can catalyze change is crucial in unraveling the Argentine puzzle, empirical cases within 
the constructivist literature on globalization remain quite US, EU and OECD centric. (Campbell 
& Pederson, 2001; Hay, 1999, 1996; Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Schmidt, 2013, 2006, 2002). This 
leaves unresolved the abovementioned issue of interrogating globalization’s spatiotemporal 
variances brought up by Smith and Bates (Smith & Bates, 2008; also see Peck & Tickell, 2002). 
And while there are numerous studies on the Argentine Great Depression, few have sought to 
place it within the context of globalization, let alone specifically focusing on both the ideational 
and institutional dynamics of finance (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002; Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer, 2003; 
Murano 2004; Kedar, 2013). Therefore, this thesis’s case studies on Argentina’s political 
economy provide an empirical contribution towards filling the abovementioned spatiotemporal 
voids, while conversely providing a constructivist analytical perspective from which to examine 





The abovementioned case studies find that appeals to globalization’s core logics remains 
critically important to the advancement of neoliberal policy and thought. This underscores the 
importance of ideas within the globalization debate, institutional deliberations, and broader 
narratives (Blyth 2012; Hay & Marsh 1999; Smith, 2005).  The cases show that the coordinative 
and communicative discursive spaces of the IMF and Argentine press, respectively— were key 
battle grounds for both ideas, outcomes, and even material interests. Altogether, the evidence 
gathered suggests that the perpetuation of neoliberal logics via the discourses not only precluded 
the space for alternatives, but effectively rationalized the commandeering of the nation-state on 
behalf of international financial interests— be it from the conditions imposed by the IMF or the 
staunchly pro-finance narratives of Argentina’s press (see Smith, 2005:197). Nonetheless, for 
nation states, following this neoclassical path did not mean reducing its role in the economy, but 
rather redirecting monetary, tax, fiscal, and regulatory policies to privilege supply-side initiatives 
that ostensibly benefited capital (see Peck, 2004).  
Broadly, this thesis’ analysis of the coordinative discourse demonstrates that Argentina’s 
economic policy under the rubric of the IMF (1976-2006) followed a 30 year trajectory wherein 
it progressively intensified its support for neoclassical policies. Precisely, the IMF’s policy 
rigidity progressively increased throughout the 30 year period, save for a brief respite during the 
immediate aftermath of the Argentine Great Depression, from 2002-2003. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the IMF’s deliberation process encouraged and appealed for the implementation 
staunchly neoliberal monetary, tax, fiscal, and regulatory policy mix that ultimately culminated 
in economic failure. Thus, the rigidity of the Fund’s advice and its inability to either foresee, and 




capabilities, as well as its capacity to provide member states a “pool of comparative knowledge 
on experimentalist governance” (2008, 223). In sum, within the coordinative institutional 
discourses, the space for heterodoxy was not just virtually non-existent, but the adherence to 
neoclassical policy was treated as an inexorable condition for Argentina’s good standing.   
The findings within this thesis’ second empirical section focus on the communicative 
discourses of finance. Overall, the inexorability of global finance guided the wider narrative of 
the press’ discourse. For this study, this meant that the press’ narratives consistently appealed to 
the logics of globalization, which characterized the flows of international capital as an inexorable 
constraint on the Argentine economy. Ultimately, the results of the narrative not only cut off the 
space for heterodox ideas, but actively lobbied for the interests of foreign banks. 
For instance in chapters 6 and 7, the press put forth a consistent, externalizing narrative 
that used the logics of globalization to support the idea that Argentina’s economic growth, 
stability, and even its “modernization” depended on its ability to attract net-positive flows form 
global capital markets. While these two earlier chapters chronicled the initial influx and 
subsequent need for rescue of these foreign institutions, chapter 8 examines how the press 
confronted the vacuum left from the decision of foreign banks to divest and in two cases 
(Scotiabank and Credit Agricole) outright abandon the Argentine market. Herein, the press 
shifted away from a narrative that underscored the idea of the natural laws of global market 
forces to a focus on the possibility of international sanctions—namely, via a global embargo 
enforced by international institutions— for the state’s decision to cut off aid to international 
banks and provide compensation for any resulting losses.  
Therefore, the notion of natural, self-disciplining external market forces gave way to the 




ultimate arbiters of the “global economy”. Working back from this, it also becomes clear that it 
was ultimately the prerogative of the state to enact policies that either prioritized policies that 
would presumably attract foreign capital flows— primarily via deflationary policies— or focus 
on endogenously stimulating internal demand and industry. Ultimately, the discourses show that 
the concept of “external” (i.e., global) market forces is best understood as a social construct that 
is the result of ideas, deliberations, and policies— stemming from, both the national and 
international level. In turn, how these ideas develop in practice is critical to the understanding of 
how economic policy is constructed as well as how it is understood.    
Thesis outline  
The thesis’ structure follows its broader engagement with neoliberal globalization and the space 
for heterodoxy. It is divided into three parts. The first section (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on 
setting out both the theoretical and methodological rationale for the study. The second section 
makes up the first empirical analysis, which focuses on the “coordinative,” policy constructing 
discourses of the IMF from 1976-2006. The third and final section focuses on the communicative 
discourses of the financial press from 1997-2006.   
The first chapter engages with theories of globalization that are relevant to this thesis discursive 
institutionalist position, starting from the emergence of the debate and its ties to both 
neoclassical economics and neoliberalism. The second chapter outlines the thesis’ empirical 
analysis by first explaining its choice of cases, as well as the methodology employed. Herein, the 
importance of examining the discourses within the IMF and the financial press are elucidated. 
Specifically, it posits that dominant discourses—namely, those following the logics of 
globalization—can crowd the space for alternative policies and broader social norms. Chapter 




theoretical assumptions. Within the methods section, the methodological framework is 
explained. 
Section 2 turns to the thesis’ first empirical section. This first set of cases examines the 
discourses within the IMF-Argentine Article IV consultations. The cases historically trace the 
content within the IMF-Argentine debt negotiations from its initial loan agreements in 1976 
through 2006, which altogether chronicles how and if the IMF’s policies changed over time. This 
diachronic analysis not only examines the institutional discourse of this “globalizing” institution, 
but simultaneously helps set a broader historical context for the following section on the 
Argentine financial crisis.  
This tracing of the IMF deliberations also sets out the long term trends with regards to 
whether or not the Fund held a neoliberal bias within its monetary, fiscal, tax and regulatory 
policy advice and how it rationalized it. In turn, it carries forward the thesis’ central thrust, which 
stresses the dialectical dynamics between both the structure and agents— in this case it seeks to 
gauge whether the institutional discourse crowded the ideational and material space for 
heterodox or Keynesian polices. Thus, the empirical analysis herein focuses on the question of 
whether the IMF exerts undue influence on borrowing states' fiscal, monetary, regulatory, and 
tax policy. Specifically, chapter 3 begins at the inception of the IMF-Argentine lender-borrower 
relationship, and thus, historically traces the negotiations held between 1976 and 1983. Chapters 
4 and 5 carry this empirical examination forward, respectively tracing the IMF article IV 
consultations from 1983-1989 and 1999-2006.  
This thesis’ third section provides a discursive analysis of the narratives constructed by 




financiers and the press to frame issues of foreign direct investment, capital flight, as well as the 
subsequent appeals to bailout private, international banks. More broadly, it seeks to identify 
some of the dominant narratives put forth between 1997 and 2006. Specifically it asks whether 
the press treated global finance as an inexorable constraint, despite the fact that it was a 
relatively novel phenomenon within Argentina. Additionally, it interrogates how the normative 
constructions set out in these communicative discourses hindered or catalyzed reform efforts and 
whether they limited the ideational space alternatives.  
Since this section focuses on the narratives surrounding the financial collapse that 
climaxed at the end of 2001, Chapter 6 begins by first analyzing the press’ communicated 
narratives pertaining to the influx and consolidation of foreign finance—which was facilitated by 
the liberalization policies of the 1990s. This chapter retraces the discourses covering the initial 
influx of foreign capital, and later— the early fissures within the banking sector— particularly, 
those related to Citibank and Scotiabank. Overall, this chapter shows how the logics of 
globalization were used to present an externalizing narrative that showcased the entry of foreign 
finance, not as a consolidation and deregulation of an industry, but as an opportunity for 
Argentine borrowers to tap global credit markets, which promised greater access, cheaper rates, 
and added economic stability. 
Chapter 7, begins at the nadir of the Argentine Great Depression— namely, the onset of 
the banking freeze known as the “corralito”. It examines the press’ explanations of capital flight, 
bank failures, and the imposition of the abovementioned capital controls. It also analyzes the 
widely publicized suspension of Scotiabank (April 2002) and its subsequent appeals for the state 
to provide financial assistance. Herein, the narrative shifts gears, as globalization is no longer 




neoliberal or liberal policies. Herein, the globalization discourse is deployed as a means to warn 
against the reprisals that come from upsetting global capital markets if foreign banks operating in 
Argentina are allowed to fail.  
Chapter 8 covers the discursive constructions stemming from the Central Bank 
suspensions of Scotiabank (April 2002) and Crédit Agricole (May 2002), which resulted in their 
ultimate receivership and sale. It also analyzes the press’ position on the disputes between the 
Economic Ministry and the Argentine Central Bank, as well as the later resurgence of domestic 
banks, which moved in to fill the void left. Herein, the press’ narrative begins to acclimate itself 
to the new circumstances, wherein domestic banks (public and private) reassert their dominance. 
Again, this illustrates the dialectical relationship that exists between material and normative 
factors.  
As noted above, the film Network appeared to inadvertently allude to the synergetic 
relationship between neoliberalism and globalization, which suggests that we should not jettison 
the importance of how structures can influence or even create the need for ideas. Nonetheless, 
another important quote within this picture the chant from Beale: “We're as mad as hell, and 
we're not going to take this anymore.” This specific mantra not only speaks to the power and 
importance of how agents and wider publics internalize norms and events, but it also mirrors the 
popular chant that filled Buenos Aires streets, which urged politicians who failed to avoid the 
economic collapse to step down: “¡Que se vayan todos!”.
20
 This leads to a potential dialectical 
dynamic between neoliberalism and globalization and what it results in. Again, one of the key 
tasks of this thesis is to interrogate how and if discourses within neoliberal structures, as well as 
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those outwardly projected by globalization’s discourse, work to promote or rationalize certain 




1. Globalization and ideas still matter 
Over the last three decades the academic debate over globalization appears to have come and 
gone. While globalization became a major buzzword during 1990s and 2000s, the popularity of 
the debate has since waned— especially within the field of international political economy (IPE). 
More recent trends in the field of political economy have cut out the globalization middleman in 
order to directly discuss what its logics of no alternative promote (e.g., neoliberalism or 
neoclassical economics) (Giroux, 2015). However, appeals citing the vicissitudes and constraints 
presumably inherent to global capital markets continue to persist within the lexicon or logics of 
political (Walter, 2017), institutional (Höllerer & Walgenbach, 2017; Kant, 2017; Wolf & 
Young, 2014), journalistic (Kraidy, 2017), and even the geographical spaces (Fujita & Thisse, 
2013). In other words, globalization (as an externalizing logic of no alternative) endures and 
even thrives by serving as the core rationale for the proliferation and conservation of neoclassical 
economics, austerity, and the broader neoliberal project.  
The folly of the early globalization debate was that the various camps, which include 
hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalists, conceptualized globalization as a “vague… 
umbrella term to lump together a number of actual processes of change,” which puts less 
emphasis on how ideas and discourses figured within (Smith, 2005: 25). As Smith notes, this 
ambiguity allows authors, particularly transformationalists to conveniently present globalization 
itself “as uneven and contradictory,” therefore making it “extremely difficult to unpack and, in 
turn, to investigate empirically” (Smith, 2005: 25-26). However, by focusing on globalization’s 
cognitive and normative logics, rather than its “complex” or “contradictory” nature, social 
constructivists and other scholars who emphasize the importance of ideas and discourses have 




set the parameters of what was thought to be politically and economically feasible (Cameron & 
Palan, 2004; Hay & Marsh, 2000;  Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Rosamond, 2003; Schmidt, 2007; 
Smith, 2005). Altogether, their analytical emphasis was on understanding how ideas are used to 
promote or even sustain normative constructs, which can carry material consequences or effects 
(Smith, 2005: 27).  
Nonetheless, the constructivist position is quite varied as there are internal distinctions 
within the literature, which explain and emphasize different aspects of what globalization is and 
what it does.  For instance, Hay’s ideationally driven understanding emphasizes how “discursive 
constructions” alter policy— regardless of whether empirical or material factors actually support 
the claims (Hay, 2002, 2007; Hay & Watson, 2003). In contrast, “thin constructivists,” such as 
Ian Marsh— and also Alexander Wendt (2000)— argue for a balance that takes into account that 
material factors matter just as much as ideas, in the way that they can constrain or facilitate 
agents (Marsh 2009: 686-687; Hay 2002: 208). Taking this further, Smith and Bates appear to 
turn to the critical materialist conceptualizations (Peck & Tickell, 2002, 2012; Jessop 2000, 
2006) in order to compensate for social constructivism’s ideational centricity by suggesting that 
what is actually needed is a greater inclusion of spatiotemporal dynamics within both theoretical 
and methodological frameworks (2008: 202; also see Cameron & Palan, 2004). 
Remaining cognizant of constructivism’s presumed middle ground position (Adler, 1997) 
between rationalism and postmodernism, keeps this thesis’ framework from sliding into either a 
purely positivist or relativist epistemic framework (Hay, 2002: 199; Schmidt, 2001). 
Nonetheless, this thesis stays true to the efforts of social constructivists who sought to steer 
institutionalism away from the highly structuralist, path-dependent frameworks that drew on 




1998: 952; also see Adler, 1997; Hay, 2002; Blyth, 1997, 2003; Marsh, 2009; Seabrooke, 2007). 
In turn, the goal herein is to contribute to the development of ontologically social frameworks 
that not only take into account “the crucial space granted to ideas” within institutions, but also 
how more general perceptions are shaped by “existing policy paradigms, and worldviews” (Hay 
& Wincott, 1998: 956). Ultimately, the way this thesis reconciles this fine balance—whether it 
be between structure and agency or the ideational and material— is by adopting the framework 
of Vivien Schmidt, which lends equal weight to discourses within institutions wherein policies 
are effectively materialized vis-à-vis those communicated outwardly, which have more abstruse, 
intersubjective effects (Schmidt, 2008).  Moreover, there is a circular or dialectical relationship 
between material and ideational factors, which is clear within policy building institutions, whose 
ideas lead to polices with “real” effects. In contrast, the presumably more ideationally centered 
discourses communicated outwardly— herein, those specifically from the financial press— were 
in support of, and directly supported by the tangible interests of private finance capital (see 
chapter 2).  
This chapter begins by first setting out the initial and still dominant hyperglobalist 
position. Hereafter, the chapter turns towards the skeptical rebuttal, which offered a rigorous 
refutation on material grounds of the inexorability of the global order. The third position 
discussed is that of the transformationalists, who like the hyperglobalist, suggested that 
globalization is indeed occurring, albeit in a much more non-linear, multifaceted manner 
(Giddens 2015, 6; Held 1999, 14-15; Scholte 2003, 85). Lastly, this chapter turns to the 
constructivist literature, wherein this thesis’ own position is drawn from. Herein, it ventures to 
address and internalize some of the criticisms and competing theories by focusing on how both 




1.1 Identifying the prominent positions within the globalization debate 
While scholarly critiques engaging with the issue of globalization have fallen out of favor in 
recent years, its neoliberal conceptualization continues to hold a dominant position within 
economic and political discourses, as well as within academia. As the debate itself came to 
prominence, various scholars began delineating the contrasting positions into successive 
waves— most notably settling on three— beginning with the abovementioned neoliberal 
iteration, the skeptics, and the transformationalists (Hay & Marsh, 2000; Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt, Perraton 1999; Kofman & Youngs, 1998). However, the “waves” typology creates a 
false sense of logical or theoretical evolution, as it may tacitly imply that—outside of these 
somewhat insular theoretical nodes— the (initial) neoliberal conceptualization of globalization 
no longer holds a privileged position in practice (Cameron & Palan, 2004).  Asides from this, the 
way in which these “waves” were organized varied significantly from author to author. For 
instance, Martell points out that the “third wave” in particular, has seen various interpretations, 
such as Bruff’s (2005), which includes Gramscian and post-structuralist accounts (2007).  
Ultimately, in response to the problematic issues inherent to the waves typology and the 
vast swathes of literature on the issue of globalization, which also branches out away from 
economics and more towards its cultural implications, dropping the “waves” typology in order to 
more acutely specify the focus of what the thesis engages with becomes necessary “to ensure 
greater depth of analysis” (Martell, 2007). Specifically, these alternative or otherwise critical 
readings of globalization put forth by various camps, include the abovementioned neo-
Gramcians and post-structuralist, post-colonialist, feminist, and of course the constructivist 
conceptualization.
1
 Therefore, narrowing this thesis’ theoretical engagement allows it to make 
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clearly discernable theoretical claims (Martell, 2007; Also see Pieterse, 2004; Tomlinson, 1999). 
Specifically, it allows the thesis to focus on its critique of the prominent and equally problematic 
analytical conceptualizations of globalization (e.g., the hyperglobalist, skeptic, complex theses), 
which fail to sufficiently account for how social constructions (i.e., the effects of ideational 
dynamics within discourses and narratives) affect change. 
1.1.1 The neoclassical roots of globalization’s hyperglobalist thesis 
The hyperglobalist or neoliberal thesis represents the first iteration of the broader debate on 
globalization, which took root in the 1990s. Asides from being the de facto initiator of what 
became a vast and highly contested debate, this neoliberal or neoclassical conceptualization of 
globalization continues to hold a dominant position within economic, political, and academic 
discourses. However, this is not to say that its preeminence has gone uncontested, as the broader 
debate on globalization has— at least within the literature— made a strong case against this 
popular view. Yet, despite the fact that this neoliberal position on globalization has been 
rigorously contested (by the aforementioned critical globalization literatures), its logics remain 
“extremely influential” in the advocacy and rationalization of neoliberal policies (Cameron & 
Palan, 2004).  
While Keohane & Nye traced the concept of globalization back to Richard N. Cooper’s 
1968 study of interdependence between nations, neoliberalism itself is often depicted as capital’s 
codependence on the state (Cooper, 1968; Keohane & Nye, 2000). In this sense, neoliberalism 
itself represents the market centric project or paradigm— founded on neoclassical economic 
thought— that itself holds a privileged position within academia, international institutions, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(See Bergeron, 2001; Nagar, Et al., 2002; Sassen, 1999), post-structuralist (Palan, 2013; Palan & Cameron, 2004; 
Yapa, 2017; also see Springer 2012), and postcolonial iterations (Ashcroft, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 2012; 




politics (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Keohane, 2011; Peck & Tickell, 2003). Globalization is 
better understood as a way to explain, and at other times excuse, neoliberalism by essentially 
priming readers for the “21
st
 century capitalism” (Reich, 1991), whose “borderless world” 
(Ohmae, 1990) marked “the end of geography” (O’Brien, 1992). The common theme within 
these hyperglobalist “epistemic framings”—for better or worse— was the notion that the global 
economy was inexorably caught in a race to the bottom, wherein nation-states were obliged to 
adhere to neoclassical economic logics in order to attract footloose capital by liberalizing its tax, 
fiscal, labor, regulatory, and monetary policy (Cameron & Palan, 2004: 53).
2
  
Thomas Friedman’s 2006 work titled the ‘The World Is Flat’ neatly sums up the 
hyperglobalist narrative when he optimistically observed that the Berlin had been replaced by 
Windows©, which would serve as the foundation for global interconnectivity. This book 
summarizes the prior 16 years of neoliberal globalization, which on the whole mirrors the crude 
cartography of the Hellenistic Greeks (Friedman, 2006). This flat earth thesis is a common 
concept within the hyperglobalist position, which depicts a world wherein the nation-state has 
become increasingly obsolete via the proliferation of economic interdependence and technology 
(Nye and Donahue, 2000). As such, these two factors are routinely deployed in order to validate 
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policy prescriptions, which— in the name of global competition— justify the liberalization of 
financial, environmental, trade and tax law along with the retrenchment of social spending.  
The collapse of the former Soviet Union marks a common point of inflection for 
hyperglobalists, who see this period as initiating a worldwide relaxation of national barriers. 
Additionally, the fall of the Soviet Union also served to exalt their own theoretical assumptions, 
as in their view it signaled the triumph of liberal democracy over communism, social 
democracy— and of course, the nation-state (Ohmae, 1996; Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002; Razu, 
2006; Robinson, 2014). Asides from this political dimension to globalization’s advent, the rise of 
computer information systems and the internet are also used to explain the deepening of global 
links—catalyzed by the speed, efficiency, and ease of transnational communication (Castells 
1998, 2010; Cairncross, 2001; Friedman, 2006).
3
 In all, these two events help set the backdrop 
for a neoliberal global order wherein a nation’s productive capacity, as well as its capital are no 
longer territorially bound—essentially a new era of economic hypermobility. 
Hyperglobalists presented the second phase of this new order as characterized by the 
increasing importance of Asian economies, including the likes of China and India. As a whole, 
Asian economies have been crowned as the major winners during this period of global 
convergence, while China and India have been commonly cited as axioms of this globalizing 
process. From a center-left perspective, Robert Reich warned early on that corporations and 
investors had become disconnected from their states of origin as they now “scour the world for 
profitable opportunities” (Reich, 1992: 8). Friedman similarly updated the idea of a footloose 
economy— albeit in a much more naively optimistic and inclusionary manner— by discerning 
between the outsourcing of information technology and customer support work to India vis-à-vis 
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the offshoring of entire industries to China as two distinct globalizing forces in their own right 
(Friedman, 2006). Curiously, this exact scenario had actually been played out in Clyde 
Prestowitz’s 2005 offering, wherein he described his internet purchase of an IBM PC that was 
made in China and supported in India (Prestowitz, 2005). 
Like Friedman and Prestowitz, other proponents of this “hyper-globalized” world 
continued to reiterate the saliency of their neoliberal world view by updating their earlier 
suppositions with new evidence. Ohmae would restate his support for the hyperglobalist thesis 
15 years later, reasserting that the world has become ‘an increasingly borderless place’ (Ohmae, 
2005: 20-23). A much more recent reassertion from Reich, rehashed his 20-year-old thesis by 
illustrating the global nature of production, as he broke down Apple’s I-phone production 
process— wherein globally sourced components converged in China to be assembled (Reich, 
2013). Coincidently, Reich’s example was quite similar to the abovementioned vignette hashed 
out in Clyde Prestowitz’s 2005 book, which shows the longstanding continuity within the 
hyperglobalist’s message.    
Even post-2008—the upshot for mainline hyperglobalists continues to maintain that in 
order for developed, Western states to compete in the new global order they will need to further 
liberalize their economies. For Hufbauer, America has “a golden opportunity to ‘ride the wave’” 
by embracing “global cooperation in politics and economics.” Here, he specifically argues that 
reactions to the 2008 financial crisis along with the increasing popularity of the climate change 
debate could result in a reemergence of financial and trade protectionism, which could severely 
impede the progress of globalization (Hufbauer, 2010: 247; also see Guest, 2011). It seems 
unclear exactly how “riding the wave” of neoliberalism will keep people above water, both 




relinquishing of control, which could leave states, their money supply, and labor pools marooned 
during the ebbs:  
After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.  
                                                                                                  (Buffet, 2001) 
Asides from the hyperglobalist position’s attempt to rationalize labor insecurity, other authors 
herein emphasized the fickleness of financial flows, which facilitated these capital shifts. For 
instance, Greider’s work suggested that the banking system had been structured in a way that 
allowed it to independently channel the equity derived from both its savers and borrowers to its 
preferred industries and even nations (Greider, 1997).  Likewise, even critics of neoliberal 
capitalism, such as William Robinson implicitly externalize the locust of control by suggesting 
that the rise of a “global capital mobility has allowed capital to reorganize production worldwide 
in accordance with a whole range of considerations that allow for maximizing profit-making 
opportunities” (Robinson, 2004). For El-Erian, the post-2008 era—is one in which the West will 
have to continue to adjust (primarily via fiscal retrenchment) to the increasing influence that 
emerging financial markets wield over these globalized flows of capital, production, and 
demand— predominantly via sovereign wealth funds (El-Erian, 2008). While El-Erian did 
suggest infrastructure spending via the private sector as part of a way out for the West, his 
overriding thesis, like the abovementioned— emphasized the rise of a multipolar financial 
landscape— that encouraged further globalization of capital.  
While the above hyperglobalist position attempts to present the world as becoming 
increasingly borderless— in both political and economic terms— its position has been 
vigorously challenged. Nonetheless, their general thesis not only suggested that nation-states 




come to accept and conform (via liberal reforms) to its increasingly hypermobile globalized 
flows. The common bond throughout the hyperglobalist thesis is that the diffuse and agile nature 
of global capital markets constrains a nation’s political and economic choices. Therefore, in this 
rigid view of neoliberal globalization, a nation state’s role in the economy is to actively appease 
and attract capital, rather than to actively regulate it or protect its labor force. Thus 
globalization— in this form— works to preclude old forms of demand-focused, Keynesian 
regulation and interventionism in both labor and capital markets. 
Yet, claims made herein were contested on various grounds by the globalization 
literatures that followed. In economic terms for instance, skeptics (discussed at length hereafter) 
refuted the veracity of these claims by presenting evidence, which not only suggested that trade 
levels were in fact comparable to early periods, but also that what was actually taking place was 
more akin to regionalization (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Rugman, 2001; Wade, 1996). The 
complex or transformationalist position, serves as a retort to the skeptics, suggesting that the 
world has indeed become increasingly global, however, qualifying that it is happening in a much 
more complex and multifaceted manner (Cerny, 2006; Dicken, 2015; Giddens, 1990; Held, 
1999).  
Perhaps a more cynical reading would suggest that these neoliberal prescriptions 
amounted to nothing more than a euphemistic appeal for the marginal benefits of workforce 
discipline. For constructivists, responses to the hyperglobalist literature (particularly the skeptical 
and transformationalist view) fail to confront the true power of the hyperglobalist position— 
namely, its ability to frame or construct “reality”. Moreover in this constructivist view, 
globalization is more accurately understood as a discursive and/or ideational construct, which  




(Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Smith, 2005). Therefore from the constructivist perspective, what 
hyperglobalists actually offer is a social construct that discursively imposes a neoliberal policy 
paradigm (Hay & Smith, 2005). 
Nonetheless, one of the issues constructivist research faces is in finding a balance that 
does not simply favor discourse at the expense of not accounting for, or being aware of, material 
or structural factors, which are then allowed to hide in plain sight (Marsh, 2009). This highlights 
the importance of discerning between and understanding the nexus that exists between ideational 
and material dynamics. Nevertheless, understanding the ideas that sustain the globalization 
zeitgeist, which in and of itself leads to tangible outcomes remains crucial, and central to 
constructivist works. Ultimately, this apparent duality (between the material and ideational) 
harks to this thesis’ argument, which suggests that globalization must be understood, both 
ideationally (as a construct), and materially since the policies and results that it rationalizes stem 
from neoclassical theory and the broader neoliberal project. Altogether, this not only obviates the 
fact that the globalization debate remains unresolved, but it also suggests that in order to 
understand globalization itself, neoliberalism must also be contextually explored. 
1.1.2 Global skepticism, regionalism, and the importance of the state  
The sobering, but narrow response to the idea that the world was becoming more globalized 
came from a cohort of scholarship— better known as the skeptics (Hirst, Thompson, Bromely, 
2015; Rugman, 2001; Wade, 1996). Initial Skeptics like Wade quite simply urged “skepticism” 
as a response to the hyperglobalist world view (Wade, 1996: 61). Others like Rugman 
forthrightly asserted that “no credible evidence could be found to support the viewpoint that a 
system of global capitalism exists” (Rugman, 2001: 218). As Smith puts it, their work focused on 




primarily on material grounds, their work serves as the quintessential example of how ideas can 
be completely overlooked within a body of scholarship.  
The skeptics attacked the idea (keyword) of a globalized world by simply challenging the 
veracity of this very claim. First, skeptics argued that what had been understood as 
“globalization” was not a new phenomenon at all, but rather a return to the pre-war levels of 
trade, which marked the turn of the century (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Roderick, 1997; Rugman, 
2001). Furthermore, their interpretation of the data lead them to conclude that rather than being 
truly global, international economic activity possessed a regional character. In all, the main 
contribution of this rebuttal was purported to be in its efforts to quantify or test the veracity of 
the claims made by the abovementioned works, which saw globalization as posing an inexorable 
and existential paradigm shift that would curtail the growth of the nation-state, but in fact the 
data showed quite the opposite.   
An important point made by skeptics was that “globalization” was not a new 
phenomenon, but rather that increases in economic activity running up to the 1990s were best 
described as a return to levels reached prior to the inter-war period (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; 
Roderick, 1997; Rugman, 2001). Specifically, Hirst and Thompson posit that “international trade 
and capital flows, both between the rapidly industrializing economies themselves and these 
various colonial territories, were more important relative to GDP levels before the First World 
War” (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 32; also see Rodrik, 1997: 7). Michapolus and Tsaliki cite the 
data from Madison’s 1995 study of the ratio of World Exports to Gross World Product, in order 
to challenge the hyperglobalist claims of an increasingly interconnected economy. Herein, they 




increased by 4 percentage points in the 80 year span between the 1920s and 1990s (Michapolus 
& Tsaliki, 2002; Madison, 1995). 
Skeptics also refuted the idea that capital itself had become hypermobile, which was used 
by hyperglobalists to rationalize the need for nation-states to accommodate MNCs via liberalized 
economic policies (Buch, 2004; Michapolus and Tsaliki, 2002; Wade, 1996). In this regard, 
skeptics were able to point to the fact that during the 1980s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
to developed economies were actually growing—despite of their comparatively higher labor, 
environmental and tax costs vis-à-vis those of the developing world. Michapolus and Tsaliki note 
that FDI to and from industrialized states actually grew at respective annual rates of 12.7% and 
14% between 1981-1989, yet from 1989-1996 there was zero growth for outflows and negative 
FDI growth rates for inflows (2002: 13) In terms of the distribution of FDI, Wade notes that 
“two-thirds of inward FDI flows worldwide in the 1980s have been into the United States and the 
EU. The biggest recipient by far is the United States, which alone got 46 percent of world 
inflows in 1985-1989; the EU got just 19 percent, and Japan accepted virtually none” (Wade, 
1996: 70).  
Skeptics also limited the scope of what could be understood as FDI or “global finance” 
by highlighting some of the limitations foreign lenders face in assessing credit worthiness of 
retail borrowers (i.e., their ability to perform due diligence). 
4
 In terms of access to global capital 
flows, Buch notes that although location is less important to wholesale banking— at the retail 
level it is “essentially a local business”. This is because retail lending requires a degree of 
information and recourse— at the local level— that remains difficult to access globally (Buch 
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2004). This suggests that international banks in new or less familiar markets can become more 
hesitant to lend at the retail level, which can have major economic implications depending on 
their share of the financial market. Take for instance the amount of information available for 
financiers with regards to securitized assets such as corporate stocks, derivatives as well as 
private and public bonds vis-à-vis that for an individual home or auto loan borrower in 
Singapore.   
However, skeptics are not simply detractors, as their world view also spills into the much 
more theoretically rigorous concept of regionalism (Hirst, Thompson, Bromley, 2015; Keating & 
Loughlin, 2013; Pettman, 2016; Rugman 2001; Sunkel & Inotai, 2016). As touched on above, 
investment decisions themselves were found to have “a quite sizeable regional component or a 
‘home bias,’ and that net capital flows are relatively small” (Buch 2004, 58, 220). Nevertheless, 
for many of these scholars regionalism and globalization are not mutually exclusive (Hettne, 
2016). Rather than seeing the world as simply experiencing a convergence or flattening of 
financial flows and production, towards some sort global equilibrium, the general thesis within 
regionalism suggest that the world is actually organizing into “macro-regional” blocs (Keating & 
Loughlin, 2013: 134).   
Similarly, the view that globalization has constrained or shrunk the role of the state has 
also been regarded as a myth by skeptics and the ballooning debt ratios. As Roderick noted, state 
expenditures have not diminished, but in fact steadily grown. He noted government expenditures 
in the industrialized world had more than doubled since the pre-World War II era, going from 
21% to 47% of GDP in the mid-1990s (Rodrik 1997, 49). More recently, the growth of 
government has continued to increase as IMF data shows that from 2001 to 2014 the average 




50.67% to 73.17%, respectively (IMF 2016). Thus, the role of the nation-state has actually 
increased 3 fold since the pre-war era. The current data appears to reconfirm the skeptical thesis 
assertions that the role of the state is in fact— for better or worse— playing a larger role in the 
economy. 
In all, the hyperglobalist and the skeptical thesis relates to each other in a quasi-
dialectical, dualistic manner, wherein the emphasis is primarily on measuring the material or 
“tangible” aspects of globalization. Perhaps the lasting contribution of skeptics was not so much 
its refutation of globalization, but rather their evidence, which reemphasizes the importance of 
regionalism and also that nation-state continues to play an integral role in IPE. Moreover, the 
exponential increase in sovereign debt suggests that nation-state are player a greater supporting 
role within the economy. Despite this skeptical refutation on material terms, there is a 
conspicuous silence in terms of any analysis of the ideational implications of the hyperglobalist 
discourse— something the constructivist perspective is sensitive to. In other words, what remains 
to be explained is how or in what ways this ostensibly problematic hyperglobalist position—
based on what skeptics considered as misconceptions or exaggerations— was able to perpetuate 
itself. 
1.1.3 Transformational or complex thesis: globalization as a complex, non-linear process  
…globalization as a historical process cannot be characterized by an evolutionary logic or 
an emergent telos. Historical patterns of globalization have been punctuated by great 
shifts and reversals. (Held, 1999: 414) 
As noted in this chapter’s introduction, there are various bodies of literature that have attempted 




Gramcians, Feminists, post-structuralists, post-colonialists.
5
 However, the aim of this review of 
the literature is not to present a comprehensive chronicling and critique of the many positions 
that have staked a claim within the broader debate, as works set out with this specific intent are 
readily available (See Cohn, 2017; Martel, 2016; Palan, 2013; Cameron & Palan, 2004; 
Ravenhill, 2014; Ten Brink, 2014). And as Martel notes, the vast swaths of literature and diverse 
topics that fall under the rubric of “globalization” makes it important to specify the thesis’ 
engagement in order “to ensure greater depth of analysis,” which also helps in setting out 
discernable theoretical claims (Martell, 2007). In turn, this thesis focuses on highlighting what it 
finds as the more problematic and equally prominent positions, which either present 
globalization as a tangible constraint precluding the space for alternatives (hyperglobalist and 
transformationalist thesis) or simply conceptualizes a refutation of it that largely devoid of 
ideational or normative factors (skeptical).  
The last problematic position covered is the transformationalist or complex view of 
globalization. Like hyperglobalists, the complex view affirms that the modern economic order is 
indeed best described as “global”. However, they concur with the skeptics in that the 
hyperglobalist accounts were based on anecdotal evidence and oversimplified generalizations 
(Dicken, 2015; Held, 1999; Scholte, 2005). For Held the transformationalist position sought to 
“develop a more comprehensive explanation of globalization which highlights the complex 
intersection between a multiplicity of driving forces, embracing economic, technological, 
cultural and political change” (Held, 1999: 7-12, 436; also see Cerny, 2006: 384; Dicken, 2015; 
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 Other 3rd wave or alternative theorizations on the topic of globalization include, but are not limited to: neo-
Gramcian (Burnham 2006; Cox 1997; Jessop 1997; Levy & Newell 2002; Overbeek & Van Apeldoorn 2012), 
Feminist (See Bergeron, 2001; Nagar, Et al., 2002; Sassen, 2015), post-structuralist (Palan, 2013; Palan & Cameron, 
2004; Yapa, 2017; also see Springer 2012), and postcolonial iterations (Ashcroft, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 




Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 1993; Axford, 1995; Albrow, 1996; Rosenau, 1990, 
1997).
6
 Yet, while their view ostensibly straddles the abovementioned hyperglobalist and 
skeptical positions, it inherently supports the idea of the present inexorability or “stickiness” of 
the neoliberal tendencies of globalization (see Held, 1999). 
For this group of scholars, globalization is best thought of as an unevenly developing 
“spatiotemporal process of change” that brings together and transforms “human activity across 
regions and continents” (Dicken, 2015, 6; Held 1999, 14-15; Mann, 1997: 494-495; Scholte 
2003, 85).
7
 Transformationalist appear to suggest that what is occurring is an opening up of new 
social spaces that transcend the material and territorial limitations of the old order. According to 
Scholte, this sort of “space-time compression” has provided greater channels for global 
transactions which include, but are not limited to the ubiquity of the corporate media and the US 
Dollar, women’s movements and even greater levels of environmental degradation (Scholte 
2003, 86-87). These bear the hallmarks of what Held considers as “…‘thick’ global flows and 
interaction networks.” Nonetheless, for Held, the complexity of global political economy renders 
this state of “thickness” contingent on a myriad of factors and possibilities that could— at any 
point— significantly reconfigure or even invert globalization’s current state (Held, 1999: 431, 
447). In a sense then, transformationalists admit that globalization is neither an inevitable nor 
inexorable condition. This caveat in the transformationalist understanding is perhaps one of the 
starker points of contrast between its own conceptualization of globalization and the 
hyperglobalist position.  
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 Also important for Held are the expansionary tendencies of military and migratory factors. 
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 Mann’s argues that proponents of globalization— who “comprise a very varied group of littérateur, philosophes, 
historians, sociologists, political and business economists, geographers and environmentalists”—typically cite four 
observations suggesting that globalization has transcended beyond the nation-state.  These are: neoliberal capitalism, 
environmental limits (e.g., carbon emissions and overpopulation), transnational social movements, and post-nuclear 




Transformationalists also set out to operational define the term global (Dicken, 1994; 
Held, 1999).  Interestingly, their analysis closely resembled that of the skeptics as their reading 
not only concluded that only a small number of corporations could be considered “global,” but 
they also held closely to the “hard facts” of the economic data. Dicken’s early work took to the 
task of defining the term “global” by adopting Bartlett and Ghosal’s typology, which classifies 
transnational corporations as either, multinational, international, or global — based on their 
operational rigidities and dependency on a particular state (1994).
8
 Held similarly suggested that 
the process of globalization could “be located on a continuum with the local, national and 
regional,” but also retorted that frameworks must account for various dimensions, including (but 
not exclusive to) the expansiveness of its trade, communication, as well as the intensification and 
velocity of their respective flows (Held, 1999: 15). However, lost in the transformationalist view 
is how to navigate through the complexity— particularly, in terms of how to conceptualize a 
framework that not only recognizes that ideas are being communicated, but also how and what is 
being communicated and the implications henceforth. 
Ultimately, for transformationalists the world is neither borderless, nor flat, but rather 
globalization— is a process that occurs in an uneven manner. For Cox this unevenness is 
systemically embedded within neoliberal globalization (Cox 2008: 408). Moreover, in this 
complex view the globalization has propelled the neoliberal “competition state,” which is by no 
means fixed, but rather an ongoing struggle between groups that benefit from the latter, and 
those “who bear the brunt of the downside of globalization…” (Cerny, 2010: 18). Dicken also 
notes that “at the global scale, the development gap is stunningly wide” and inequalities extend 
into rich, as well as poor states when accounting for “smaller geographical scales and in terms of 
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non-geographical criteria (e.g. gender, race and social class)” (Dicken 2015). Ultimately, Cerny 
sees globalization as a “political phenomenon” or condition wherein the nation-state no longer 
serves as either the central locus for internal “collective action” or final arbiter of “external 
commitments” (Cerny, 2006: 377). Yet again, these assertions do very little (if not further 
entrench) to interrogate how ideas of globalization serve as a means to depoliticize these largely 
unpopular “neoliberal” constructs.  
  Another way that globalization has progressed in an uneven and unequal manner is via 
“growing dominance of the financial services sector,” which Dicken blames for the widening 
gaps in income inequality in the US and UK since the 1970s (Dicken 2015, 316).
9
 
Transformationalists suggest that the rampant speculation in derivatives and foreign exchange 
(FOREX), which are intermediated and dominated by markets in developed states have added to 
the complexity, unevenness, and even ethereal nature of global capital flows (Dicken 2015; 
Gidden, 2002; Scholte, 2005). Dickens illustrates this point by highlighting the exponential 
growth of international FOREX markets relative to stocks as the gap exploded from 2:1 in 1973 
to 100:1 in 2007 (Dicken, 2015: 512, 537). In other words, transformationalists are illustrating 
how these financial innovations have become “objects of investment in themselves” as opposed 
to just facilitating the liquidity of the underlying (Scholte, 2005: 165,166; Dicken, 2015: 516-
518). Nonetheless authors like Dicken refute the idea of “borderless finance” noting that, despite 
lapses, individual governments still “heavily supervise and regulate” capital (Dicken, 2015: 518). 
However, their analysis does very little to interrogate impact of the discourses and narratives, 
which promote the idea of hypermobile capital markets. 
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 Dicken uses figures from respective studies by Stiglitz and Dorling in order to support his argument. Stiglitz notes 
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Indeed, unlike skeptics complex theorists argue that the role of the nation-state has in fact 
been challenged and reconfigured. However, both share some common ground in terms of 
refuting the hyperglobalist argument that the nation-state has lost its place in the global arena. 
For instance the term “glocalization” became a way to describe the idea that global commerce 
was now able to directly access or interact with local pools of labor, capital and resources. 
Dicken was one of the first to note that transnational corporations (TNC) were neither responsive 
nor conducive to local institutions, as providing “an attractive ‘business environment’ in which 
TNCs can operate” was their only leverage (Dicken 1994, 42). 
Skeptics and transformationalists also shared common ground insofar as noting that state 
power had not been eradicated. However, in the transformationalist view the nation was the most 
important organizational level because of its ability to mediate these real “global forces” (Amin 
& Thrift, 1994; Axford, 1995; Mittelman, 1996). In this sense the term “glocalization” and even 
the inexorable view of globalization was seen as an attempt to bypass the nation-state within the 
organizational hierarchy by downplaying its efficacy to negotiate, enact, and enforce laws and 
pacts that regulate global forces. Going further, Panitch and Cerny assert that national 
institutions have not lost control over global capitalism, but have in fact authored its proliferation 
(Panitch, 1996: 85; Cerny, 2006: 384; Panitch, 2013a, 89-91). Dicken would continue to draw 
from the skeptical thesis by noting that TNCs are in fact organizing regionally, not just because 
of geographical proximity, but because of the efforts of international political structures such as 
NAFTA, the EU and ASEAN (Dicken, 2015: 169). 
Ultimately for transformationalists national structures required significant reforms to 
meet these external challenges. As Panitch posits, “a false dichotomy between the national and 




transforming the state, even as a means of developing an appropriate international strategy” 
(Panitch, 1996: 85). Giddens goes further by suggesting that democracy must “be fostered above 
the level of the nation-state” through appeals for further democratic, transparent and responsive 
governance at the regional level (2002: 80-82). In hindsight, Rosenau’s assertion that new 
horizontal channels of communication had brought about a global consensus, which had already 
begun to put pressure on, and potentially reign in the practices of “international institutions such 
as the World Bank, WEF, World Trade Organizations and the IMF” was not only naïve, but 
displayed the limitations of the externalized, transformationalist understandings of institutional 
dynamics (Rosenau, 2003: 233).
10
 
It is important to stress several points here. Firstly, transformationalists stress that 
globalization as a concept must be refined or defined in such a way that it is not just a ubiquitous 
catchall term. Nonetheless, their body of work suggests that there are tangible, global or external 
forces that seek to transform nation-states, whether it be from transnational corporations or 
finance capital itself. Another important point of concurrence within this thesis is that the notion 
of “local embeddedness” (glocalization) is a symptom or result of national policy, rather than 
some sort of evolutionary maxim (Axelrod, 1995; Dicken, 2015; Panitch, 2013). In other words, 
they acknowledge that this absence of the nation-state is a political manifestation— that can be 
changed. However, the role of social constructions in this systemic “transformation”— or rather 
the “transformation” of the discourse or political lexicon itself is left largely unexplored.  
In this sense transformationalists remain attached to more structuralist conceptualizations 
by suggesting that global dynamics pose real “democratic deficits,” or as in the case of 
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Rosenau— who suggested that these external dynamics could explain or signal a coming 
paradigm shift (2003).  Additionally, Giddens attributed the rise of authoritarian capitalism in 
Russia and the corporate monopolization of Western media to democratic gaps—both of which 
speak to Scholte’s abovementioned manifestations (Giddens, 2002: 78-79). More recent works 
suggest that globalization has been the central “driving force” behind China’s political, cultural 
and economic transformation, which has brought about its leading role as well as a growth 
inequality (Halsall & Cook, 2012; Hölscher, Marelli, & Signorelli, 2010). Ultimately, these 
interpretations harken back to Scholte, who made sense of these global forces by suggesting that 
they had birthed a form of “contemporary polycentric governance,” wherein democratic gaps are 
expressed as: citizen ignorance, institutional process failures, and structural power inequalities 
(Scholte, 2005: 351-355).  
While the abovementioned transformationalist points focused on gauging and articulating 
the complexity of neoliberal globalization, it appears to have glossed over how ideational factors 
figure within. In turn, their conceptualization of globalization puts forth a highly structuralist 
reading that does little more than add nuance to the hyperglobalist thesis. In a similar manner to 
the hyperglobalist literature, transformationalist use appeals to external dynamics to rationalize 
why heterodox, demand-side policies no longer fit. Moreover, while this complex view of 
globalization was keen to report on the trends and trajectory of globalization, their lack of an 
endogenous analytical framework kept the internal dynamics of globalization within a proverbial 
“black box”. This is likely due to the lack of analytical focus on the actual decision-making 
process. As a result their work perpetuates the externalizing narrative of globalization, albeit in a 




1.1.4 The limitations of the hyperglobalist, skeptical and transformationalist positions 
While the work of hyperglobalists and skeptics clearly defines themselves as diametrical 
opposites, transformationalists attempted to present a more complex view of neoliberal 
globalization by focusing on its non-linear development. In addition, transformationalists do not 
believe in the inevitability or inexorability of globalization, per say. Yet, transformationalists like 
Held note the importance of “recognizing that political power is being repositioned, 
recontextualized and, to a degree, transformed by the growing importance of other less 
territorially based power system.” The upshot herein is that “traditional mechanisms of political 
accountability and regulation” will continue to be skirted by these more “complex power 
systems” until institutions begin to adjust to the changing dynamics of power (Held, 1999: 447, 
452).  
Ultimately, all three views discussed present a narrow, and rigidly materialist 
understanding of globalization because their perspectives fail to incorporate or interrogate the 
role of ideas in any rigorous way. As a result skeptics challenged hyperglobalist solely in regards 
to measuring the extent of globalization (Smith, 2005). Additionally, while transformationalists 
have openly critiqued the structural logic of hyperglobalist accounts, work’s such as Held’s 
(1999) ultimately suggest that globalization has—albeit in a complex and variegated fashion— 
altered the global economy, which precludes space for alternatives. For Held, these changes 
require institutional or perhaps even systemic reform, thus indicating the “stickiness” of the 
complex view of globalization (Held, 1999: 447- 452). Lastly, while transformationalists and 
skeptics acknowledge some of the overtly political implications of the hyperglobalist thesis, their 
materialist conceptualizations nonetheless fail to rigorously interrogate these intersubjective 




for the ideational power of globalization— which is precisely the central focus of this literature. 
This is something that the following section seeks to address. 
1.2 Global constructions  
The common theme within the aforementioned hyperglobalist, skeptic, and transformationalist 
positions was that globalization was treated as a tangible, material phenomenon. Specifically, 
and as outlined above, these positions were focused on gauging the extent to which external or 
material phenomena (e.g., changes in political relations, communication, trade, and the capital 
flows) caused globalization. Additionally, the transformationalist focus on interrogating the 
extent and trajectory of the “globalization” of corporations, international finance, and means of 
communication vis-à-vis the role of nation-states, regional blocs— within different spaces and 
time (Dicken, 2015; Held 1999; Mann, 1997; Scholte 2003) — appears to straddle the space 
between hyperglobalists and skeptics by presenting a slightly more complex and even 
contradictory position (Smith, 2005). Ultimately then— irrespective of the level of complexity 
involved— the argument was that these factors either posed material constraints on the nation-
state, or not.  
Altogether, by focusing on the extent, rather than the logics behind globalization the 
abovementioned positions framed the basis for the debate in a manner that bypassed the question 
of whether it could exist as an ideational or political phenomenon, which is where social 
constructivism interjects. For constructivists, globalization is not understood as a material 
phenomenon or tangible constraint, but rather at its core it is a political construction aimed at 
institutionalizing and de-politicizing their preferred economic policies (Watson & Hay 2003; 





1.2.1 Social constructivism: the notion that ideas matter 
Proponents of a constructivist epistemology posit that their theory provides a more inclusive lens 
that focuses on how individuals interpret and form ideas that in turn lead to collective norms, 
which construct a social reality (Adler, 1997:326-29). For constructivists, “reality” (insert 
globalization) is mediated by what amounts to a dialectical relationship between individual and 
collective understandings. Therefore ideas and the study of how they are formed takes 
precedence, or is at least on equal footing with other factors. Adler explains this by highlighting 
the relative nature of epistemic communities, which he describes as, “vehicle[s] of collective 
theoretical premises, interpretations and meanings.” Herein, his emphasis is on how these 
epistemic beliefs can be adopted by political groups in order to frame issues (Adler, 1997: 343- 
344; also see Cameron & Palan, 2004).   
Globalisation has, in short, come to be articulated and understood as setting clear limits 
on what is possible in economic, social and political terms (such as the need to reduce 
“excessive” wages and welfare expenditure). (Hay & Smith, 2013) 
By constructivist accounts, their own view of agency presumes a higher level of complexity, as 
decisions are motivated by contingent and endogenous interpretations of social norms (Hay, 
2002: 50). For instance, Seabrooke claims that constructivist frameworks “expand the capacity” 
to understand how uncertainty is rationalized, which in turn leads to a better understanding of 
how the mechanisms of change are mediated within institutions, groups or individual agents 
(Seabrooke, 2007: 382-383). One way constructivist have illustrated their more socialized 
conceptualizations of change is by contrasting it against materialist, neoclassical models, whose 








Perhaps the key difference between the two camps is that constructivists seek to 
understand what motivates agents rather than making an attempt to hypothesize on their likely 
course of action, which requires rationalists to all but preconceive their subject’s underlying 
interests or end game from the model's start. In this sense, constructivist see agents within 
“rational choice” models as not having much of a choice, as the rational actor is essentially path 
dependent to the extent that within a given context it will always choose the same course of 
action (Hay, 2002). Bylth and Abdelal concur suggesting that rational choice models “by 
definition, lack agency and the way such factors are said to animate agents is either too simplistic 
or, with automatic and unproblematic readings of ‘structural variables’ values.” (Blyth & 
Abdelal, 2005; Blyth, 2003: 696). Thus, constructivist thought diverges on both, epistemological 
and ontological grounds via its focus on the intersubjective dynamics of agency, which fits 
within its relativist world view.
12
 For Marsh, this divergence can be traced back to the 
antagonistic camps separated from the outset by their ontological suppositions, which lead to 
very different approaches with regards to how uncertainty and the contingency of human agency 
are mediated (Marsh & Savigny, 2004; Furlong & Marsh, 2010). 
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 Going forward, this thesis adopts Bronk’s inclusive definition of “neoclassical”  in order to operational define it as 
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Altogether, the constructivist critique of rational choice is by and large a debate held at 
the microeconomic or agential level (e.g., its focus is on the decision making and behavior of 
individual agents). This is made most clear by Hay, who attempts to highlight the underlying 
weakness of the rationalist reading of agency based on two critical assumptions (Hay, 2002). 
First, he notes that actors are assumed to possess perfect information about their environment 
and how to best interact with it. Secondly, it assumes that identically positioned actors have 
objectively identical interests without any variance or subjectivity in the rationale. Therefore, in 
the spirit of parsimony the logic takes a very shallow if not completely inappropriate analytical 
position to account for variances in human action (Hay, 2002: 196). In a sense then, Hay’s 
critique against rational choice does not only stress that the modeling of agents is too simplistic, 
but it also suggests its potential to operate in a tautological manner.  
Asides from their critique of rational choice, constructivists made a significant 
contribution to the globalization debate by theorizing it as primarily existing as concept with 
endogenous qualities rather than as an external or tangible object in and of itself. Hay makes the 
constructivist view clear asserting that “discursive constructions” have the ability to alter policy 
regardless of whether empirical or material factors actually support the claims (2002: 202). As 
such, constructivist authors see globalization as a catalyzing concept or tendency as opposed to 
an objective fact (Hay & Watson, 2003; Smith, 2005; Hay, 2007). Within this line of thought, 
globalization is treated as a metanarrative of crisis wherein a neoliberal policy paradigm provides 
the “discursive solution” (Barnett, 2010). In other words, neoliberal globalization (as a 
discourse) serves as means to set “clear limits on what is possible in economic, social and 




liberalization or austerity is fomented endogenously (i.e., via discourse, norm construction and 
identity politics) rather than by actual external or material causes. 
Hay draws attention to political, discursive and normative strategies employed to chip 
away at the legitimacy of social-democratic constructs by attacking its very viability through 
what he calls, “the politics of the globalization” (2007: 317). To Hay, these politics serve to 
depoliticize the retrenchment of the state and in turn, allow the economy to act outside of the 
democratic process
 
(Hay, 2008: 591). This coincides with Blyth who posited that norms are 
introduced by politicians through a discourse of globalization, with the ultimate aim of creating a 
culture conducive to liberalized economic policies (Blyth, 2003: 701). It also harkens to Hay’s 
prior work with Watson wherein they suggested that globalization’s “language of necessity” 
effectively put together a “discourse of no alternative” that rationalized economic liberalization 
and austerity (Hay & Watson, 2003).  
Building on the works of Hay and Watson, Smith maps out the competing understandings 
of globalization within the context of the Irish case in order to flesh out its tendencies (Smith 
2005). Concurring with Hay’s general assessment, Smith describes globalization as a diffuse, 
discursive construct that rationalizes its desired outcomes, by abstracting processes and 
constraints that in many instances do not even exist (2005, 25). In this view, globalization 
operates as a mythology, zeitgeist, or “Fās,” as described by Cameron and Palan, which must be 
understood as occurring in a variegated manner (2004). However, one of the hallmarks of 
globalization in the neoliberal sense is that its discourse can also be identified via its “common 
economic policy paradigm,” which characteristically promotes low inflation targets, free trade, 




Smith considers the term “globalization” as a normative construction, which is part of a broader 
power struggle for control between capital and the nation-state (Smith, 2005: 197).   
1.3 Critiquing constructivism: accounting for material factors and spatiotemporal 
dynamics  
Smith’s qualification alludes to or opens the door for critiques, which suggest that material or 
structural factors— outside of the ideational construct of globalization— must also be accounted 
for. In this sense, ideas do matter, but also carry consequences that have “material” or tangible 
effects. Herein, a dialectical, bi-directionality emerges that parallels the work critical realist 
(Bailey, 2008; Jessop, 1991, 1997, 2000) and historical materialist (Cox, 1987; Burnham, 2014, 
2006, 2000) understandings of globalization, capital and its broader projects of dispossession and 
depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, the level of analysis cannot solely be done at 
the microeconomic or agential level, as “macroeconomic” factors, which can manifest as or 
within contextualized spatiotemporal dynamics must also be incorporated or accounted for.  
One of the most direct and compelling attempts to rein in the “idea centric” theorizations 
of social constructivism comes from David Marsh’s 2009 paper, which argues that this focus on 
ideas has favored discourse at the expense of accounting for material factors. Herein, Marsh 
charges that Hay’s later works deviated from their past concurrence on the view that material 
factors are just as important as ideational ones, specifically in the way that they can potentially 
constrain or facilitate agents (Marsh 2009: 686-687; Hay 2002: 208). In other words, Marsh 
emphasizes that the trending focus on ideas must not come at the expense of accounting for how 
material factors fit within explanations of change and stability (2009: 679). Interestingly, he does 




fact acknowledged the influence that economic factors—for instance— carry within issues of 
globalization (Marsh, 2009: 690; also see Smith 2005).   
Notwithstanding, the upshot of this specific critique is its call for a rebalancing of 
constructivism so that the dialectical relationship between material and ideational factors carries 
as much weight as theories regarding structure and agency (2009: 608). In effect, what Marsh 
advocates for is a multi-directional accounting of the dynamics between material and discursive 
factors, which explains how shared ideas or norms within institutional decision making might 
materialize into a set of policies or initiatives with tangible effects (Marsh, 2009: 689-690). In 
his example, Marsh posits that the global financial crisis shows how material constraints— in 
this case arising from the exponential growth of high finance in the 1980s— came to dominate 
regulatory policy by deciding what it deemed as “acceptable” (690).
13
 Yet, this point 
acknowledges that what is ultimately constrained is the discourse on policy and how to proceed! 
Nonetheless, this dialectal relationship suggests that interests, agents, institutions or 
organizations can rally behind or support constructs that they perceive favor their own ends, 
despite the fact that the notion of rationality does not factor in because of the intrinsic complexity 
of agents.  
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1.3.1 Interrogating the spaces of neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is a constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness 
[sic] of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes 
as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such rationality. 
(Brown 2003: 4)  
Yet contrary to Marsh, ideational and discursive analyses that are also sensitive to spatiotemporal 
differences are by definition, inexorably linked to the structural dynamics and material factors of 
the specific time and space they engage with. Moreover, works contemporaneous to Marsh 
(Smith & Bates, 2008) effectively preempted his critique by apparently drawing on post-
structural (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002, 2012) and critical realist writings 
(Jessop 2000, 2006) that focus on neoliberal globalization’s spatiotemporal dynamics.
14
 For 
Smith and Bates, a greater inclusion and awareness of the dynamics of geographical space and 
time, in both theoretical and methodological frameworks would “explicitly refute the ‘logic of no 
alternative’” by way of “acknowledging that a multiplicity of alternative possibilities and futures 
exists…” (2008: 202). The link between Smith and Bates’ work and other, post-structuralist and 
critical realist accounts is the work of Peck and Tickell, who posit that “neoliberalism cannot be 
reduced to an ‘internal’ characteristic of certain institutions or polities; it also exists as an extra-
local regime of rules and routines, pressures and penalties” (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 392, also see 
Jessop 2000). As such, “progressive ‘post-neoliberal’ strategies” must develop organizational 
capacities that address the dynamics of both the local and extra-local scales. They argue that the 
latter have largely remained the domain of neoliberal interests, which as a consequence has 
allowed them to undermine local autonomy (Peck & Tickell, 2012: 247-248). Ultimately, the 
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logic herein suggests that empirically identifying and interrogating extra-local or global spaces is 
the next step.  
While the existent constructivist literatures on globalization and those honing in on 
neoliberalism remain somewhat compartmentalized, connecting the two is of importance because 
it essentially bridges the gap between the material and ideational.
15
 Authors focusing on the 
neoliberalism have a more pronounced focus on examining its characteristics, as well as its 
manifestations as institutional or structural constraints (Brown 2003; Peck & Tickle, 2004; 
Bockman, 2012; Haarstad, 2009). Reflecting on his prior work with Tickell, Peck refines his 
prior position— which described neoliberal policy as part of a project that sought to “roll-back” 
the size and scope of the state— by positing that it is better understood as a re-alignment of the 
role and objective of state institutions and directives (Peck & Tickell 1994, 319; Peck 2004; 
394). Consequently, since the 2008 financial crisis there has been a massive growth in sovereign 
debt within developed states confirming that there is no global retrenchment of the state, per se. 
Within this logic, neoliberalism manifests itself as a contingent or “variegated” process that takes 
on “hybrid formations,” making its development unique to the spaces it evolves in (Peck, 2004: 
403; Peck & Tickell, 2002: 392; 2010: 184; 2012: 247).  
This notion of a variegated evolution proposes that neoliberal “processes are temporally 
discontinuous and spatially heterogeneous; and [that] they produce (always mutating) macro-
institutional frameworks that simultaneously intensify and exploit this constitutive 
spatiotemporal unevenness” (2010: 208). What this means is that empirical accounts in different 
spaces and times would present very different or at the very least, nuanced mappings. This ties 
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neoliberalism back to the idea of it actually existing as a political project, “a form of ‘meta-
regulation,’ a rule system that paradoxically defines itself as a form of anti-regulation” (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002: 400). In other words, neoliberal projects take an “all roads lead to Rome” 
approach with the aim of imposing market-centric policies, which in fact heavily rely on the 
nation-state, institutions, and agents within to enforce its conventions.  
The upshot from the abovementioned is that policy space then becomes an important 
battleground, which can nonetheless be interrogated by an analysis of their respective discourses. 
Following the work of critical-realists, Oseland and Haarstad attempt to account for the dialectal 
nature of ideational and material factors by focusing on the “spaces of neoliberalism” (2012). 
They see “policy space” as the opportunities and constraints within which agents must negotiate. 
In this view, neoliberalism is described as being “loosely composed of different reforms that 
unfold temporally and spatially, and partly in relation to popular mobilization” (Oseland & 
Haarstad, 2012).
16
 Haarstad and Oseland build upon this by suggesting that this ideational 
dialectic— or “sphere of public discourse”— remains at the level of the nation-state, which in 
turn, regulates “economic and employment affairs” that transnationals are ultimately subject to 
(2012: 97). For instance, their work posits that media is structured and scaled in a manner, which 
is optimized to target national audiences, which includes and is exemplified by their analysis of 
online news cites (2012: 97). Again, the upshot herein is that neoliberalism evolves 
endogenously and uniquely (within distinct spaces), rather than simply the result of exogenous 
factors. However, their work falls short of putting together a systematic framework that 
apprehends the two aforementioned dynamics at play within. 
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 Their work attempts to highlight the dialectical struggle between the “variegated” evolution of neoliberalism and 
ebbs and flows stemming from “cycles of social resistance,” which together speaks to the broader crisis literature 
that focuses on the inter-temporal fluxes that crises provide (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; Hay, 1996, 2009; 




It is important to note than in a similar, and even complimentary manner post-colonialist 
works have emphasized the West’s or “colonialist” control of knowledge (Ashcroft, 2013; 
Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 2012; Mignolo & Escobar, 2013; Sanyal, 2014). Herein, concepts 
such as “justice” and “economic efficiency” are ultimately defined and subsequently appraised— 
in a quite hegemonic fashion— by the presiding colonial powers and its extensions, such as 
international institutions and actors, like the IMF and international financiers. Moreover, the 
thrust to “globalize” (i.e., liberalize and financialize) foreign economies uncannily resembles 
prior efforts to Christianize the “New World,” which respectively serve as means to consolidate 
power (Mignolo, 2015b). While taking a longer historical perspective, this notion of a sort of 
economic proselytizing of globalization also captures the combination or nexus between material 
and intersubjective dynamics.   
1.4 Reasserting the importance of discursive institutionalism: a systematic framework for 
interrogating ideas, structures, and outcomes  
From the debates covered above it becomes clear that ideas remain important. However, there 
are many critiques and shortcomings to employing a purely ideational framework. It also appears 
that the literature has gone full circle in its quest for balance. As examining “policy space” has 
been the domain of institutionalist works, which have developed systematized approaches, 
methodologies and broader frameworks that can capture exactly how policy spaces evolve, even 
via discourse.
17
 Yet, at the very cross section of institutions and ideas is the work of Vivien 
Schmidt, who incorporates constructivism’s focus on the ideational with her institutionalist 
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 New institutionalist can be understood as a separate body of literature that hones in on the role institutions play 
within the global economy are also of importance. For this group the institution serves as a pivotal conduit for 
globalization and political economy as a whole (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Garret, 1998; Scharpf 1997, Thelen, 2001; 
Weiss, 2003). In terms of the wider debate on globalization or neoliberalism, these “new institutionalists” posit that 
how institutions react to external stimuli (e.g., global market pressures) is often a much more fruitful endeavor than 
simply measuring its extent— asides from addressing some of the abovementioned critiques of constructivism, it 




background. In this sense, Schmidt’s conceptualizations provide a balanced framework that 
addresses the issues raised from critiques of constructivism. In turn, by applying Schmidt’s 
analytical framework, within different spatiotemporal contexts, it can not only show how 
discourses traffic in widely understood or internalized social constructions, but also how— 
within policy-making settings— they can have very real or “material” effects.  
Schmidt also provides a framework with which to open the black box of institutional 
decision making, via discourse. In other words, it provides a framework that accounts for 
constructivist focus on ideas within the inner workings of institutional decision-making. In turn, 
just as it can elucidate how social constructions affect wider publics, within institutional spaces it 
can help unpack how discursive constructions sway or color the decision-making process. 
Consequently, it also provides a systematic answer to the critiques of critical realists, while also 
incorporating much of the insights from post-structuralist and complex theorists who emphasize 
the variance inherent to spatiotemporal differences. Ultimately, this balancing act allows the 
ideational and material realms to coexist within a common dialectic, while also proposing that 
agents and structures evolve together.  
It is in this same sense that Schmidt’s framework also serves as a bridge between the 
more structuralism frameworks of new institutionalists (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Garret, 1998; 
Scharpf, 1997, Thelen, 2001; Weiss, 2003) and the more relativist ontology of social 
constructivists, or what later emerged as discursive institutionalism (DI), a term used both by 
Schmidt and Hay (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; see also Abdelal, Blyth & Parsons, 2015; Schmidt, 
2010). By bridging this gap this thesis can provide a rigorous assessment of how ideas affect 
policy change. Precisely, Schmidt’s work promotes the study of discourse within institutions by 




those that “engage in collective discussion” in the hopes of reaching agreements, which in turn, 
have real or material consequences (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 11; Sabel, 1992, 1994).
18
  
The specific contestation put forth by Schmidt is that the conceptualizations of new 
institutionalists like Soskice and Scarpf’s “remain highly deterministic, as institutions determine 
politics, which determine political outcomes, and it still can’t explain the origins of the 
institutions or the political coalitions that created them, let alone why they might change 
institutions or policies over time” (Scarph, 1997; Soskice, 2006; Schmidt, 2010: 6). Moreover, 
Hall and Soskice also, outwardly deferred to Elster’s positivist methodological approach, 
centered on game theory, an alternative to which is Schmidt’s discursive analytical framework 
(Elster 1998; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2010: 7). It is for these reasons that Schmidt’s 
body of work provides balance by bringing in some of the relativist elements found with 
constructivist focus on agency, which is centered on how ideas and norms animate or influence 
the decisions that lead to institutional rules or reforms— what are considered as “structures”.  
Schmidt’s more systematized conceptualization helps garner a better understanding of the 
central role of discourse within (black boxed) policy spaces. First, she notes that institutions do 
not lock agents into a structural path; rather institutions exist as the constructs of the very agents 
within. In other words, these agents have the potential to either sustain or alter its course through 
their deliberations. Secondly, Schmidt posits that interests are “neither objective (because 
interests are ideas and, as such subjective) nor material” (Schmidt 2008, 322).  These assertions 
challenge the logic of rational choice models whose one dimensional agents simply seek to 
maximize very clear and tangible payouts. And as noted above, Schmidt suggests that due to its 
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inability to endogenously account for change, new institutionalist’s theories and methods fail to 
“capture the complexity” of how states navigate through “entrenched interests, institutional 
constraints and cultural impediments” (Schmidt 2003, 128; 2010, 21).  
Schmidt provides a theoretical conceptualization aimed at understanding change via 
discourse. In terms of her framework’s scope, Schmidt holds a fairly inclusive view of what 
constitutes discourse by suggesting that it can be taken “as whatever policy actors say to one 
another and to the public more generally in their efforts to construct and legitimate their policy 
programs…” (Schmidt 2002, 169). In her view the term “discourse” is general enough to 
encompass language, narrative, and communicative action (Schmidt 2004, 193).  Yet, it is the 
central factor in understanding not only how ideas spread, but how institutions operate.   
Notwithstanding, her analytical approach splits discourse into two key areas, coordinative 
and communicative. In order to situate her focus on coordinative discourse, Schmidt harkens 
back to past scholarship on the “policy construction via discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993; 
Sabatier 1993; Lehmbruch 2001)” (Schmidt 2014, 190). For Schmidt, coordinative discourses 
take place within institutions, organizations or even epistemic communities and typically results 
in either policy or some form of collective action. Communicative discourses on the other hand, 
are best understood as operating within the public relations or political sphere. Specifically, 
Schmidt posits that “it consists of the individuals and groups involved in the presentation, 
deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public.” Agents involved can 
include but are not limited to politicians, spokespeople, as activists, intellectuals and various 
forms of media (Schmidt 2008, 310). 
Schmidt also suggests that there are indeed synergies between institutionalism— which 




Specifically, Schmidt argues that historical institutionalism (HI) is crucially important, as it helps 
explain how institutions constrain or “guide” actors, who internalize its rules and norms. 
Additionally, HI’s focus on tracing institutional processes over time can be applied to gauge how 
ideas or discourses evolve (or persevere) (Schmidt 2010, 12). Altogether, this combination’s 
importance is found in ability to unpack institutional decision making. 
Consequently, the qualitative HI methods employed by Broome and Seabrooke, which 
trace the IMF negotiations with non-borrower states were highly influential to my own empirical 
analysis (See chapter 2; 2007; 2008). Nonetheless, while they provide a sound methodological 
framework that covers the “coordinative processes” within institutions, their work overlooks the 
legitimizing discourses communicated publicly. Thus adapting their methods to also analyze 
communicative discourses helps fill the void. This coincides with Schmidt’s view, which 
considers DI as “the missing element in the explanation of policy change” (Schmidt 2002, 
169).
19
 In an effort to gain a better understanding of coordinative and ideational struggles that 
take place within institutions and broader publics, my work combines Schmidt’s theories and 
analytical framework with the HI methods found in Seabrooke and Broome’s historical tracing 
of the IMF’ article IV consultations.
20
  
In turn, the thesis’ structure mirrors Schmidt’s dichotomy as its two empirical sections 
are divided along the lines of coordinative and communicative discourse. This provides an 
account of the aforementioned spaces, which illustrates the variegated ways that these social 
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 For Schmidt, the “discursive approach helps to explain the actual preferences and strategies of actors in both RI 
[rational institutionalism] and HI [historical institutionalism] and it helps to explain normative orientations 
emphasized by SI [sociological institutionalism]” (Schmidt 2010, 21). Schmidt argues that the three prior iterations 
of new institutionalism can benefit from the discursive approach, which accounts for change endogenously as 
opposed to all of the abovementioned who externalize it (Schmidt 2010, 2). 
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 Loosely Drawing off Schmidt’s analytical framework, I divide my thesis’ empirical work into both coordinative 
discourses of the IMF and the communicative discourses of financial executives and financial pundits within the 




constructions impede or catalyze change. Ultimately, the central task of this thesis is not to find 
correlations between the communicative and coordinative, but rather interrogate how these 
different spaces internalize neoliberal ideas, which not only shows how certain policy outcomes 
come about, but also how they are rationalized— and ultimately, crowd out the space for 
alternatives. 
For this thesis in particular, the analytical distinction made by Schmidt helps discern 
between discourses aimed at bringing out material or structural consequences and those intended 
to influence the perception and opinion of agents. Altogether, the overarching aim of this thesis 
is to reengage, reconnect, and update the globalization debate by emphasizing the dialectical 
dynamics. It seeks to show the different the ways and spaces wherein change can either be 
catalyzed or impeded. Ultimately, this allows the thesis to show how powerful discourses and 
ideas are, but also how the space they come to dominate can become highly structuralized. 
Therefore, the central task of this thesis is to interrogate how and if discourses within global 
structures, as well as those outwardly projected by globalization’s discourse, work to promote or 
rationalize neoliberal ideas and policy outcomes by measuring its ability to crowd out the space 
for alternatives. Lastly, it shows how powerful ideas and discourses are, but also how the space 
wherein these ideas reside can exhibit structural qualities.  
Conclusion 
While globalization’s wide-ranging literature has moved far beyond the crude hyperglobalist 
account, this simplistic conceptualization still represents the mainstream position within 
policymaking debates, politics, and even the press’ narratives. And while the profile of the 
academic debate on globalization has waned, the externalizing logics of the hyperglobalist thesis 




neoclassical economics, austerity, and the wider neoliberal project. Yet, recent trends reveal that 
in spite of this predominance, a growing desire for alternatives has begun to grip the very states 
that initiated and ostensible gain from globalization— namely, the US, UK, and EU.  
Going forward, revisiting the globalization literature becomes a necessary first-step in not 
only understanding its core logics, but also situating the thesis within what has been written. In 
turn, the issues brought up between hyperglobalists and the skeptics can be seen as fundamental 
step in testing the veracity of globalization as a tangible constraint. Subsequently, while 
transformationalists put forward a more complex view of globalization that accounted for 
spatiotemporal differences— like the other two— their approach remained highly materialistic, 
as it only measured the flow or gross exchange of ideas, rather than engaging and unpacking the 
normative effects therein. Lastly, social constructivists presented a more sophisticated and novel 
conceptualization, which posits that globalization mainly exists as an ideational concept.  
However, critics charge that its emphasis on the ideational potentially lends itself or results in 
reductionist frameworks and understandings. A common consensus amongst its critics— namely, 
critical-realists, and post-structuralists— is that there is a need to account for the varied spaces 
wherein globalization and, or neoliberalism evolves in. Specifically, in terms of addressing the 
material outcomes, the common ground within the debate converges on the need to better 
account for the dynamics of policy space in particular. In turn, the work of Vivien Schmidt has 
produced a framework, which can, not only interrogate how policies are coordinated within these 
“black boxed” policy spaces, but also how normative constructions are communicated to wider 
publics.  Therefore at its core, this thesis seeks shows how social and discursive constructions— 




alternative ideas, and in turn tangible policies. In other words, how do privileged ideas 
(neoliberal globalization) limit alternatives in practice?  
Drawing on Schmidt’s framework, the empirical analysis (detailed in chapter 2) is divided 
into two distinct cases, which respectively examine the coordinative and communicative space 
for policy alternatives within the Argentine case. This case study, which analyzes the IMF-
Argentine debt negotiations, as well as the narratives of high finance will show how discourses 
work to crowd out alternatives in practice, within in two very distinct spaces. This framework 
also shows how (globalization) discourse ultimately materializes as policy, either directly (via 
institutional policy setting deliberations) or indirectly (in appeals for public consent) of 
legislative, judicial, and even private party action. It also highlights some of the implications and 
ultimate uncertainty that states must confront, irrespective of their choice to either continue down 
the preferred orthodox path set forth by global actors, institutions, and structures or implement 
endogenously arrived at, heterodox alternatives. Altogether, gauging and chronicling the latitude 




2. Case study and methods: interrogating the space for alternatives 
within policy and general discourses  
Having set out the theoretical framework in the previous chapter, the thesis now turns to 
explaining the choice of Argentina as a case study, as well as the methods employed in carrying 
out this empirical analysis. This second chapter begins by first explaining the importance of 
Argentina as a test case for understanding how ideas about globalization work within the 
respective spaces covered (i.e., within institutional deliberations and public discourse). It then 
provides a rationale for why the discourses of the IMF and the financial press are of importance 
to understanding how ideas about globalization operate in practice.  
Specifically, this chapter introduces the thesis’ two empirical sections on Argentina, 
which are delineated via Schmidt’s analytical distinction between coordinative discourses of the 
IMF and the communicative discourses put forth by the Argentine financial press.
1
 First, it 
explains the central role of the IMF as a “globalizing institution” and also, how the discursive 
space for alternatives to neoliberal globalization’s logics within is critical to how policy 
outcomes are arrived at.  The second empirical section, which focuses on the discourses of global 
finance fit within Argentina is also introduced thereafter. Lastly, this chapter ends with a detailed 
explanation of the methods employed within the two case studies. Herein, the rationale and 
methods used within this thesis’ set of empirical cases are laid out. Precisely, this content 
analysis of the IMF-Argentine relations is an examination of its coordinative discourses. The 
subsequent case study on the discourses of international finance found within the press cover the 
communicative discourses of Argentina’s financial consolidation, collapse, and ultimate 
restructuring. 
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2.1 Why Argentina: exploring the room for heterodoxy within ideational and policy spaces  
The choice of Argentina is important for many reasons— both empirical and theoretical. 
Overall however, Argentina is especially important in relation to the theoretical framework, 
which attempts to understand exactly how ideas operate in practice. Consequently, the choice of 
subject matter is also relevant to Schmidt’s dichotomy— that is between coordinative and 
communicative discourses (2014). Specifically, Argentina’s policy constructing discourses with 
the IMF, as well as the normative constructs of global finance, which are found within the press 
make it a fundamental test case for ideas about neoliberal globalization. Moreover, this test case 
for not only serves to interrogate how these ideas operate in practice, but more specifically how 
ideas and discourses surrounding the neoliberal logics of globalization crowd out the space for 
alternatives. 
Once the model state of the IMF and a net positive recipient of FDI, Argentina now 
serves as an axiom of the vicissitudes of modern neoclassical economics, as well as a source of 
reference and quintessential test case for the aforementioned debates and theories on 
globalization (Camdessus, 1998; ECLAC, 1998). Since the mid-1970s, Argentina has gone 
through several bouts of inflation, deflation, mass unemployment, and political turmoil. 
Furthermore, the responses to these instances of instability were met with a wide variety of 
initiatives— including, liberal reforms, bailouts, and bail-ins, which even brought about a return 
to policies that were more nationally focused.
2
 This latter policy throwback to Peronist or 
Keynesian-nationalism not only spurred the devaluation and delinking of the peso from the US 
dollar, but it also severed the Argentina’s ties with the IMF. As a direct consequence of the 
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economic failures and its policy decisions, Argentina was then forced to reorganize its financial 
sector.  
Ultimately, the relevance of globalization remains linked to diverse spatiotemporal 
dynamics, which include the structures, institutions, actors, and the ideas they internalize and 
project. Even today, as most of the G7 nations rally behind populist appeals that promise a shift 
towards policies of de-globalization, Argentina now under the administration of Mauricio 
Macri— who ran on a platform, which promised to reintegrate Argentina into the global 
economy— has begun to ebb back towards liberal reforms. What this all signifies is that 
globalization as discourse and as a subject of inquiry continues to grow in complexity. Moreover, 
these recent developments provide new and uncharted terrain for IPE that can either challenge or 
support past assumptions. Moreover Argentina’s past and present appears to serve as a 
microcosm for the present and future events within the G7 nations. In turn, this chapter sets out 
the case for the continued importance of globalization— and specifically, what can be learned 
from the study of Argentina’s policies and ideational spaces of the IMF and finance, 
respectively. 
While the failures of the structural reforms of the 1990s, as well as the ensuing Great 
Depression (1998-2002) have been the focus of contemporary works on Argentina (Azpiazu, 
2002; Baer, Montes-Rojas 2008; Dagdeviren, 2011; Manzetti, 2009; Munoz 2009; Rodriguez-
Boetsch, 2005), trends towards opening up its economy to international or global forces stretches 
back further. For instance, Kedar’s work traces the liberalizing tendencies within the IMF-




involved heads of private finance (Kedar, 2013: 58-60).
3
 Nonetheless, Argentina’s official turn 
towards a sustained, IMF lead, structural reform effort— which was overshadowed by the state 
sponsored terrorism that ran concurrently— was carried out by the by the military dictatorship of 
Videla and Bignone (Tedesco, 1999). Consequently, Laura Tedesco attributes the economic 
adjustment that took place during the 1970s to the international shift from Bretton Woods system 
to the more liberal, financialized, monetarist model, which “increased the power of international 
investors, creditor countries and two financial institutions— the IMF and the World Bank” 
(Tedesco, 1999; also see Clift, 2012). 
Following up on Kedar and Tedesco’s observations, another important facet to account 
for within the Argentine political economy is the role and dynamics of the financial sector. 
Moreover, the literature on Argentine banking finds that foreign finance capital has even deeper 
roots within its economy than the Fund itself. For instance, Adrian Murano chronicled one of the 
earliest bouts of capital flight to London, which occurred in 1891. Herein, Argentine banks such 
as Hippotecario, Banco Nacional, and Banco de la Provincia all suffered heavily losses, which 
ultimately spiraled into a currency run causing the devaluation of the Peso (2004: 23-25).  
Additionally, Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer trace the entry of American finance into Argentina to 
1914, which marked the opening of the first Citibank branch within Argentina (2003: 13).
4
 
Altogether, these abovementioned works harken to the importance of understanding the role of 
both international institutions (such as the IMF) and private finance within the evolution or 
“opening up” of Argentina’s political economy, as well as the dynamics of FDI and capital 
flight.  
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However, identifying and mapping the role of global finance’s normative constructions 
within the Argentine case is an area that has been less developed and thus, less understood. As a 
result, this empirical account aims to glean greater insights into how globalization logics are 
internalized and projected by institutions and financial agents. In other words, how globalization 
discourse operates in practice is at the core of the thesis. Ultimately, interrogating how ideas 
effect policy outcomes and broader understandings held by “globalizing” institutions and agents, 
as well as the broader public understandings is the central task of this thesis.
5
 
2.2 Why the IMF: the importance of the gauging coordinative discourses within policy 
spaces 
The IMF and the literature surrounding it is not only central to the Argentine puzzle, but also to 
this thesis’ theoretical position, which sets out to account for how the logics of neoliberal 
globalization limit ideas and in turn, policy choices. Consequently, this thesis’ first empirical 
section zeroes in on the potential biases within the coordinative discursive space (i.e., the IMF-
Argentine Article IV negotiations) (Schmidt, 2008). Specifically, it provides a content analysis 
on the extent of the IMF-Argentine debt negotiations, picking up from the outstanding loans 
floated from 1976 to its eventual default in 2006. Altogether, this enquiry provides a 
comprehensive, historical evaluation of the biases and tenor of all published Article IV 
consultations between the Fund and Argentina. In turn, the data gleaned from this empirical 
study serves as a chronological mapping of the disposition of the IMF’s advice. In other words, 
via an analysis of the institutional discourse it tracks how ideas are used in practice.  
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international finance and the Argentine press during its initial period the consolidation in the mid-1990s, as well as 
the subsequent period of crisis, which was marked by the rigid imposition of bailouts and capital controls, and the 




The IMF’s relationship to globalization itself has been the focal point of prominent IMF 
scholars (see Stiglitz, 2003; Woods, 2006). Indeed, while the idea of the Fund serving as a 
“globalizer” (Woods, 2006) and debates surrounding its ostensible shift towards neoliberalism 
(Abbott, Andersen, and Tarp, 2010; Chwieroth 2007; Chorev & Babb, 2009) have become well-
worn ground, less and less attention has been given, especially in a systematic manner, to the 
actual discourses and ideas trafficked within these deliberations. For this reason, this thesis 
conceptualizes the IMF as a potential “globalizer” in a similar capacity as Hay and Smith saw the 
role of the British New Labour party, which they suggest as defending the “liberal order” (2005). 
Consequently, this defense (or expansion in the case of Argentina) of this “liberal order” was to 
be accomplished via the promotion and/or imposition of “a common economic policy paradigm,” 
which emphasized low inflation targets, free trade, fiscal austerity measures, and “free capital 
mobility” (Hay & Smith, 2005: 134-135).  
While the works of Kedar (2013) as well as that of Cooper and Momani (2005) offer rich 
chronicles of the IMF-Argentine negotiations, the actual biases of the Fund, or rather how their 
discourses and ideas ultimately effected policy outcomes was not covered in any type of 
systematic manner.  However, works such as those from Broome & Seabrooke (2007, 2008) have 
put together a methodological framework that can be specifically used to test for discursive 
biases within the Fund. Yet, Broome as well as Seabrook have put forth findings suggesting that 
the Fund has indeed shown signs of “flexibility,” which implies that the Fund is perhaps not a 
champion of globalization as the abovementioned scholars suggest (Broome, 2015; Broome & 
Seabrooke, 2007, 2008) 
Nevertheless, one of the main criticisms of the IMF is the charge that it has consistently 




reduction, austerity, deregulation, and privatization (Chorev & Babb, 2009; Momani 2004; 
Pagliari, 2008; Panitch & Gindin, 2013a; Stieglitz, 2002). Following heterodox, or Keynesian 
demand-side logics, critics have argued that the IMF’s overreliance on what amounts to a 
deflationary economic policy mix can exacerbate downturns (Stieglitz, 2002; Thacker, 1999; 
Wade & Veneroso, 1998).
6
 Other critics of the global financial order posit that this obstinate 
focus on currency appreciation can actually lead to instability as it facilitates the entry of short-
term capital from developed states, which can exacerbate the inflationary pressures they sought 
to curtail (Panitch & Gindin, 2013a; Edwards, 1990). However, these Keynesian logics are 
largely left out of the “global” or “globalized” conceptualization of markets, which in their 
absence makes adhering to neoliberal policies a rational imperative. In other words, in this 
scenario the Fund’s neoliberal policies are founded on the presumption that— rather than being 
an ideational construct— globalization is a material reality or constraint, which is irrespective of 
their silence on the term itself.  
Moreover, the shortcomings of Argentina’s liberal policies during the 1990’s also sheds 
light on the origins of these purportedly immutable “global” capital flows.
7
 For instance, critics 
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 Keynes defines deflation as the reduction of the “ratio between the volume of a country’s currency and its 
requirements of purchasing power in the form of money, so as to increase the exchange value of the currency…”  
(Keynes Essays, 102) Simply put, a deflationary policy is one that seeks the appreciation of a currency’s value or 
purchasing power thereof. However, one of the negative effects is that when money itself becomes more 
“expensive”, its velocity (i.e., its rate of circulation within the economy) decelerates, which slows down economic 
activity. Minsky views neoclassical economics neutral or ‘sterile’ view of money as problematic and crude since it 
excludes the effects of “capital intensive production, capital assets…and capitalist finance.” (1984: 114,124) In its 
place, Minsky offers an endogenously created cycle, which posits that the flow of money is dependent on the 
intersubjective actions and reaction of agents who heuristically validate and accelerate trends to either invest or 
divest from financial sectors, markets, or states (1986: 237). 
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of neoliberal policies to the mid-1990s. Precisely, several scholars peg the institutionalization of neoliberal policies 
within the IMF to a 1995 board decision, which was said to be spearheaded not by the US, but “neoliberal 
proponents in the MAE [now the Monetary and Financial Systems Department] and managing director Michel 
Camdessus” (Camdessus, 1998; Chwieroth, 2007: 19; also see Abdelal, 2006: 192). However other scholars, such as 
Abbott as well as Chorev and Babb cite the 80’s as an inflection point wherein the Fund’s advice took on a more 
structural character that went beyond the focus of macroeconomic thresholds as it now sought to, effectively 




of the 2001 Argentine collapse posit that the state’s embrace of liberal policies during the 1990s 
is what ultimately opened the economy to the type of short-term speculative investments that 
thrive off market instability (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002; Murano, 2004; Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer, 
2003).
8
 In turn, this “legislated” or state-enabled fickleness is itself a construct, which the ideas 
or logics of globalization’s discourse explain as a natural, rather than political phenomenon. In a 
sense then, it is the state’s prerogative to decide on whether to actively manage instability via a 
focus on endogenous growth or adhere to the hyperglobalist logic, wherein their role would be to 
enable, entice and placate these global capital flows via neoliberal or neoclassical policies. 
Ultimately, this is where understanding the IMF’s role as a “globalizing” institution and the 
degree to which they promoted neoliberal policies within different spaces and times that 
becomes important.  
2.2.2 A flexible and “experimental” IMF in the face of an existential crisis?   
A recent intuitionalist counter to the more established view of the IMF as a rigid 
“globalizer” posit that the Fund has in fact demonstrated outward signs of flexibility. Precisely, 
this view suggests that— as early as 2002— due to its deteriorating reputation and portfolio, the 
Fund began to move away from boilerplate solutions in favor of more flexible or  
“experimentalist” approaches (Broome, 2010; Dieter, 2006; Graham and Masson 2002). 
Similarly, Chwieroth has also suggested that an equilibrium of sorts has been reached between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Chorev & Babb, 2009: 460). Moreover, Chorev and Babb qualify this by also nothing that “by the end of the 50s, 
the Fund had a well-established policy of ‘conditionality,’” which required a country to “commit to macroeconomic 
reforms designed to crack down on inflation, particularly reducing government spending and the money supply” 
(2009, 465). Coinciding with Choerev and Babb, and also specific to the long term dynamics of the IMF-Argentine 
negotiations, Kedar posits that the core liberalizing tendencies were in fact “internalized” by local authorities during 
its first loan agreements, which ran from 1958-1962 (61). Grugel and Riggirozzi corroborate these liberalizing 
tendencies, as well as the influence of Washington on Argentine policymaking by noting that the state’s import 
substitution policies had historically lead to tensions with the US, as early as 1945, which subsequently intensified in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2008: 504). Ultimately, it becomes a question of the degree to which the 
Fund relied or pushed neoliberal polices.  
8




international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) vis-à-vis the IMF and neoliberal 
economists despite the fact that, in his view, the IMF remains liberalizing force. In his 
estimation, these INGOs have moderated the effects from both the “coercive influences 
accompanying IMF loan programs…” as well as “normative influences” that are imported by 
neoliberal economists (Chwieroth & Pinheiro). However, this appears to be more generalization, 
as the proof would be found in the actual analysis of the deliberations themselves, which could 
also vary both spatially and temporally (i.e., between different states and time periods).  
Altogether, these assertions imply that the IMF does in fact have the capacity to provide 
policy space. In turn, this wave of institutionalist authors, effectively supporting a “flexible IMF” 
thesis have attempted to roll-back the debate by providing a basis for other more tempered 
interpretations. In other words, they provided a sort of “3
rd
 way,” or middle ground from more 
critical positions, claiming that the IMF was either a champion of neoliberal globalization or arm 
of the Washington Consensus (Chorev & Babb, 2009, Babb, 2012; Grugel, Riggirozzi, 
&Thirkell‐White, 2008; Momani, 2004; Stieglitz, 2002). 
According to Broome and Seabrooke, the IMF’s advice itself, as well as its efficiencies in 
monitoring and rating, both the implementation of policies and the macroeconomic trajectory of 
states are more reason for both borrowers and non-borrowers to seek out its expertise (2008, 
223).
9
 In terms of advice, Broome and Seabrooke suggest that the Fund’s experience provides its 
                                                          
9 Asides from the potential benefits of the Fund’s past experience, the authors also points to its ancillary 
efficiencies in monitoring and rating (Broome & Seabrooke 2008, 223). Clearly both, borrowers and non-borrowers 
who receive negative feedback risk the possibility of a credit downgrade or at the very least rousing investor’s fears. 
However, as the case of Argentina showed, capital flight actually preceded the IMF’s official negative forecasts, as 
well as their emergency negotiations (See Chapter 2; Also See Cafiero and Llorens 2002; Murano 2004; 
Zlotogwiazda and Balaguer 2003). Nonetheless, how the Fund wound up being the last to come to terms with the 
economic conditions could be due to either lapses in oversight or perhaps the potential conflicts of interest within 





member states with a global “pool of comparative knowledge on ‘experimentalist governance,’” 
which “small states can tap to increase their understanding of the probable outcomes of 
alternative reform options” (2008, 223). However, the suggestion that member states can pick 
and choose policy alternatives à la carte underestimates the influence of the deliberation process 
(i.e., the coordinative discourses) that their work analyzes. Moreover, as Broome and Seabrooke 
themselves note, the stakes for borrowers are raised, as they remain susceptible to coercive 
action (Broome & Seabrooke, 2008). Ultimately then, it is the disposition and what is borne out 
of the Article IV deliberation process itself, which is indicative of the degree of 
“experimentalism” or “flexibility” afforded to a state.  
In a logical sense, if the deliberative discourses show that the IMF’s dual role— as an 
economic advisor and forecaster—consistently insinuates a neoclassical policy mix on member 
states; does it not reinforce the arguments, which peg it as not just a “globalizing institution,” but 
a conduit of neoliberalism? Asides from this point, the case of Argentina could be said to run 
counter to Broome’s broad view of the Fund’s efficacy, wherein he states that “…we can observe 
direct negative effects for states when they fall out with the IMF or deviate from an ‘IMF 
friendly’ policy stance” (2008, 222). In other words, although Broome sees states who yield to 
the Fund’s authority as better off because of these abovementioned points, perhaps the case of 
Argentina not only illustrates the drawbacks of remaining open to the vicissitudes of global 
capital, but may also present an alternative path?   
In a paradoxical twist, Momani (2004) has put forward evidence, which shows that unmet 
calls for liberalization, fiscal retrenchment, and other orthodox measures can still lead to a 
positive standby agreement (SBA). However, the caveat is that these instances the “flexibility” 




political factors (e.g. the Washington Consensus) or as a result of states, like Argentina, who are 
able impose their will within hostile negotiations (Momani 2004; Cooper & Momani 2005). 
Again, this implies that the “globalizing” or the “opening up” of a state is much more the result 
of political deliberations, rather than simply the natural or “scientific” laws that effectively 
penalize states that don not conform.  
Nevertheless, a second wave of critics has engaged with these abovementioned claims of 
flexibility. For instance, Abbott Et. al found that not much had changed with regards to the 
Fund’s flexibility, despite its purported shift away from conditional lending (Abbott, Andersen, 
and Tarp, 2010). Perhaps a more cynical reading of the “flexible” thesis would conclude that the 
idea of a reformed IMF itself could be best understood as public relations overhaul in the face of 
its waning credibility as an effective lender of last resort. In this guise, Güven agrees with the 
initial premise of the “flexible thesis”— which is that there was in fact a steep decline in the 
IMF’s portfolio from 2004-2007.
10 
However, he also notes that lending quickly returned to peak 
levels with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), which according to Güven, 
allowed the Fund to keep its neoclassical playbook intact (2012). In concurrence, a more recent 
paper by Broome, which consequently tests for biases within borrower states, and also broadens 
its testing parameters, suggests that the post-crisis surge in demand for loans has allowed the 
Fund to revert to a policy mix centered on fiscal consolidation (Broome, 2015).  
Ultimately, the lack of consensus regarding its alleged neoliberal policy bias within the 
abovementioned literatures implicitly questions the IMF’s role as a “globalizer” (Woods, 
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 The 2007 IMF annual report noted that its portfolio had tumbled to 7 billion USD from a high of 70 billion USD 






 However, rather than focusing on a binary argument on whether or not the Fund held a 
rigidly neoliberal bias, a discursive analysis could instead focus on the degree to which the Fund 
served as a “liberalizing” or “globalizing” agent. In other words, this thesis’ empirical analysis 
focus on gauging the range of ideas within the Fund, giving a much more nuanced and therefore 
rigorous account of the Fund’s role in Argentina’s policy outcomes.  Perhaps another problem 
within above debates was the lack of consensus on an operational definition on what exactly 
constitutes policy “rigidity” or “flexibility”. As a result, within the methods section herein, this 
thesis defines “flexibility” by how strict the IMF adhered to the neoliberal logics of globalization 
(see chapter 2, section 4). In other words, within this thesis whether the consultations exhibited 
signs of flexibility, heterodoxy, or orthodoxy is strictly derived from the results of the empirical 
analysis, which analyzes the coordinative discourse of the IMF-Argentine debt negotiations. 
Thus, by gauging how ideas within discourse influence policy outcomes within the IMF-
Argentine deliberations, its and role as well as its intensity as a “globalizer”— throughout the 




                                                          
11 The more recent debates on the IMF’s newfound policy latitude are most relevant to the empirical findings of my 
5
th
 chapter. This is where this thesis’ historical tracing of the IMF-Argentine negotiations begins to overlap the 
purported “experimentalist phase”. That is, that at some time during the 2000s (circa 2003) the IMF turned to a more 
“experimentalist” approach, which was later said to be dropped after the onset of the 2008 GFC— due in part to the 
resurgence of demand for loans. In the event that no evidence of flexibility is found within the post-2000 Article IV 
consultations, then at the very least my empirical findings should serve temporally truncate the notion that the IMF 
entertained or provided the space to maneuver outside of the orthodoxy. Considering Argentina’s last Article IV 
consultation took place in July of 2006, a negative result would essentially narrow the Fund’s ‘experimentalist’ 






2.3 Interrogating ideational spaces: an analysis of the communicative discourses of 
international finance within Argentina’s financial press 
While this thesis’ first empirical section offers an analysis of policy biases within the 
institutional space of the IMF, this second section is concerned with how ideational constructs 
are disseminated to wider publics. In other words, the focus of this section shifts from an analysis 
of the coordinative discourses within institutions to the communicative, discursive constructions 
conveyed to investors and wider publics (Schmidt, 2014). Essentially, it covers another facet of 
globalization— namely, how the internationalization of finance was presented within Argentina, 
from start to finish (1997-2006).   
The contribution of this second empirical section is twofold. First, it provides a detailed 
content analysis of the ideational constructions (including both normative and cognitive) put 
forth by the press and international financiers (Schmidt, 2008). The goal herein is to collate the 
biases within the press’ discourses, which can— as Schmidt notes— inform and thus affect 
public understandings (Schmidt, 2008). Secondly, it offers an additional vantage point into the 
Argentine economic crisis, as seen through the eyes of the press and financial executives, who 
are cited either through direct interviews or their own editorial columns. This second facet of the 
analysis allows for a greater understanding of the ideational predispositions of these actors. 
Specifically, it gauges whether financial executives see markets as driven via normative or 
cognitive factors. In other words, this study can expose how or what executives and the press 
ultimately understood as driving markets, and to what degree (i.e., did they favor either 
ideational or material).  It can also explain how these agents weighted exogenous vis-à-vis 
endogenous factors— that is, if ideas of globalization where prioritized vis-à-vis those focused 




Like the first section covering the institutional dynamics within the IMF, the 3 chapters 
that follow are underpinned by Schmidt’s analytical framework, which divides discourse into the 
coordinative and communicative spheres. In turn, this second empirical section focuses on the 
latter— that is, the communicative discourses. On its own merits, the following analysis on the 
public discourses occupies the spatial channels of political communication— speaking to this 
thesis broader aim, which is which is to analyze how ideas function in practice. And more 
specifically, to garner an understanding of how the logics of globalization are deployed to crowd 
out alternative ideas. Ultimately, the narratives constructed by these agents serve as important 
puzzle pieces in understanding not only how popular ideas about the economy and finance are 
shaped, but also how they contrast and compare to those emanating from institutional discourses, 
wherein policies are first coordinated (Schmidt 2014).  
2.3.1 The corporate press and financial markets: fundamentals or fundamentalism? 
At the cross-section of globalization and finance is the question of ideas. Within the Argentine 
case, this already evident from what has been written on the subject of its financial crisis 
(Cafiero & Llorens, 2002; Murano, 2004; Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer, 2003). There are some 
telling empirical accounts specific to the Argentine case that provide a rationale, as well as 
evidence of the financial sector’s tacit acknowledgement of the power of these sort of 
intersubjective dynamics. One of the major Argentine works that inspired this undertaking was 
Zlotogwiazda and Balaguer’s 2003 book, which chronicles Citigroup’s aggressive entry into 
mass media throughout the late 90s. Within this period, Citibank drastically reorganized its stake 
in Argentine assets by divesting from nearly all its nonfinancial holdings in order to carve out a 
dominate position within the state’s domestic media.
12
 In all, their foray into Argentina’s major 
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 Citibank’s entry into broadcast television began with its acquisition of Torneos y Competencia (TYC) a 24 hour 




channels of communication, included acquisitions of periodicals, broadcast and cable television, 
and even the telecommunications infrastructure itself (Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer, 2003). 
Although its appetite for acquiring media assets did not stop at print, its initial round of bidding 
sought the acquisition of two of Argentina's leading periodicals, which are covered within this 
study— namely, La Nación and Ámbito Financiero. At the very least, this rush into Argentine 
media explicitly illustrates the financial sectors’ interest in the business of ideas and discourse.  
Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer estimated that by 1998 Citi’s total media holdings within 
Argentina were valued at approximately 1.2 billion USD (Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer 2003, 281-
282, 286). This was said to not only heighten competition within the industry, but lead to a 
defensive stance against Citi’s hasty expansion (283). Nevertheless, the upshot here was that in 
the early rungs of Argentina’s impending slump, this large foreign bank made some peculiar 
power plays, as they began unwinding their diverse positions within the Argentine state in order 
to concentrate their operations in finance and domestic press. Again, up to this point what was 
certain was that Citibank aggressively thrusted itself into the business of ideas; however, the 
ideas themselves were less of a focus in the abovementioned account.  
Taking this forward, other works on the 2001 Argentine crisis emphasized the silences 
within the discourse. For instance Cafiero and Llorens’ work, which is the only other work found 
to focus on the discourses and narratives of the Argentine collapse, alleges that the press and 
high finance effectively covered up the capital exit, which they argue brought on the collapse 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Canal 9, 9 De Parana, 9 de Resistencia and 10 Mar del Plata (Zlotogwiazda & Balaguer 2003, 285). After its 
broadcast television acquisitions, Citi CEI set its sights on cable television purchasing Cablevision for 380 million 
US Dollars as well as acquiring a 50% stake of Fintelco the holder of VCC for 382.5 million, another 50% stake in 
United International holdings for 96 million, and lastly Mandeville Argentina for 265 million (282). However, this 
foreign media coup did not go unnoticed as Zlotogwiazda and Balaguer contend that Citibank’s bid on the public 
channel ATC rattled the incumbent media conglomerate, the Clarín group, which mobilized the Argentine media 




(Cafiero & Llorens, 2002:177, Murano, 2004). This “quiet exit,” by private finance, as the 
coined it, was said to total 44 billion US dollars, 37 billion of which flowed directly out private 
sector banks between February and November of 2001 (188). Additionally, Murano’s work notes 
that the central bank actually occulted repatriation figures in its vaults throughout much of 2001 
in order to avoid public outcry (2004: 306). The total dollar amount roughly translated to 16% of 
Argentina’s 2001 GDP, the result of which was a crippling shock by even the most modest of 
estimates (World Bank, 2016).  
Caifero and Llorens work divides the press’ coverage of the initial stages of Argentine 
economic collapse into two distinct periods, the Pre and Post “Corralito” stages (2002: 148). In 
their view, the “pre-corrallito” stage allowed for a “quiet exit” of foreign capital. They suggest 
that— irrespective of intention— the press’ coverage served as a cover for the wholesale banking 
sector’s extraction of equity and liquid assets, as well as its unwinding of public sector debt and 
other “at risk” assets. Moreover, they argued that if the public would have gotten wind of such a 
deleveraging strategy it would have set off a bank run at the retail level that would have 
precipitated the impending sovereign debt crisis— ultimately putting the Peso’s convertibility at 
risk (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002: 192). In all, the “pre-Corralito” press coverage attempted to 
sustain the notion that the financial system remained on solid ground because of (rather than in 
spite of) the presence of foreign financial firms (147).  
Alternatively, Cafiero and Llorens argue that the “post-corralito” discourses focused 
almost exclusively on the consequences of the financial turmoil, a sort of myopic lamenting that 
served to displace blame away from the financial sectors predatory practices. Their findings 
suggest that the mainline press completely ignored the financial sector’s role in the bank run, 




repatriation of capital and the widespread unemployment that resulted from the privatization 
boon’s mergers and acquisitions of public industry (147). Additionally, the press’ solutions were 
mostly a regurgitation of the IMF's austerity centered conditionality programs discussed in 
chapter 5 (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002: 147). 
Politicians also failed to report on the systemic weakness of the banking sector, which as 
mentioned above, posted record levels of dollar expatriation in the lead up to corralito. Murano 
makes the case that both economic minister Doming Cavallo and president Fernando De la Rúa 
effectively obscured the cause of banking crisis by laying blame on the Argentine public, while 
virtually ignoring the prior transactions of high finance (2004). For Murano, this more 
generalized blame not only rationalized the adjustments foisted upon the general public via the 
retail banking freeze, but also served to diffuse responsibility for the ensuing collapse (Murano, 
2004: 306).  
Under these circumstances, Cafiero and Llorens further posit that the “corralito” was 
essentially a non sequitur, as it failed to address the root cause of the decline, which was the 
absence of private lending. Moreover, they note that retail bank deposits were actually 
experiencing modest gains. They specifically point out that between December of 2000 and 
February of 2001 private lending was saw a 1 billion a month reduction, while deposits 
maintained, not just steady, but positive growth. (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002: 218-223). Therefore, 
by ignoring heterodox theories the press framed the debate in such a way that it was able to avoid 
confronting the endogenous factors of demand-side economics.  
Although domestic deposits continued, private Banks like Scotia, Citi and Credit 




high net worth clients. Murano’s work delves into the details of the financial exit taking place 
behind the scenes (2004). He notes that in 2001 money moving abroad was concentrated within 
27,828 accounts that made a total of 43,320 wire transfers.  Additionally, private banks 
accounted for 81.23% these transactions, 50% of which came from Citibank and the Bank of 
Galicia (Murano, 2004: 307). Clearly, the aversion to lend along with the speculative exit of 
capital played a significant role in creating the conditions for the collapse. Moreover, Table 1 
shows that the money supply (m2) saw its greatest year to year decline from 1998 to 1999 with 
another leg down significant leg down in 2000, which corroborates the “quiet exit” hypothesis 
(IMF, 2016). In other words, the decision to freeze accounts at the end of 2001 came 
considerably late, if not serving as a symbolic gesture or political maneuver rather than a reaction 









Ultimately, the idea or narrative that capital flight had been the result of external or 
“global” conditions was a narrative that failed to look inwards (Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 
Table 1. Banking system (1997-2001) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Credit to private sector 18.6 10.8 -2.1 -3.8 -6.0 
Money and quasi-money 
(M2) 
20.3 24.7 -2.4 -2.5 -9.0 
Velocity (GDP relative to 
M2) 
8.5 8.0 7.6 7.8 8.5 
 (As a percentage of GDP)*                                          
 





2007). As the slowdown in the velocity of money, particularly in terms of lending was also 
compounded by the surge in unemployment that took off during Menem’s neoliberal 
administration. The ultimate collapse of the banking sector stemmed not from a lack of savings, 
nor foreign reserves or let alone the failure to abide by an austere fiscal policy, but rather from an 
endogenously centered process of deleveraging. This deleveraging was actually precipitated by 
the slowing of demand due in large part to mass unemployment caused by the privatization of 
state assets and a decade of a strict adherence to austere fiscal policies. Naturally in the face of 
daunting conditions banks sought to hedge themselves by curtailing domestic lending and 
hoarding capital, which lead to a liquidity crisis. In fact, the smoking gun according to Cafiero 
and Llorens appears to be the private financial sector’s net liquidity figures, which grew 6 fold 
throughout the course of 2001 going from 878 million to 5.99 billion. (Cafiero & Llorens, 2002: 
223-224).  
One common theme of these works was that it suggest that the press’ narratives—
irrespective of their knowledge— served to obfuscate the realities of the financial exit. 
Additionally, it noted that the Argentine authorities set policy that coincided better with 
mainstream or “hyperglobalist” accounts, as well as the Fund’s advice rather than the underlying 
crisis of liquidity. Therefore, one question that formed the review of the abovementioned works 
was that if the banks themselves were indeed invested in the idea that these channels of 
communication presented some sort synergistic benefit to their financial operations, would this 
not lessen the professed or ostensible orthodox view of a “free market” that reaches equilibrium 
through an objective rather intersubjective manner?  In other words, does the empirical evidence 
within the communicative discourses show that bankers and/or financial pundits do not follow 




Altogether these works on the Argentine financial crisis, not only outline the importance 
of material interests (e.g., the power of finance capital), but perhaps more importantly they show 
that it is the ideas and discourse that ultimately legislate or lead to policy outcomes that— for 
better or worse—enable globalization. In turn, rather than simply highlighting the implicit 
importance of ideas and discourse, as the abovementioned works do, this thesis examines the 
press’ narratives to not only explicitly show the importance of ideas, but how and in what ways 
were these ideas were used to rationalize neoliberal policies and crowd out the space for 
alternatives. In other words, it systematically interrogates the ideas of global finance capital.  
2.4 Methods for scoring the IMF Article IV consultations (chapters 3-5) 
The methods employed within this first empirical section— which gauges the IMF’s policy 
bias— was inspired by the framework set out in Andre Broome and Leonard Seabrooke’s 2007 
and 2008 papers (2008; 2007). Their methods “trace how IMF staff and Executive Board advice 
compares with actual changes to taxation and monetary regimes” (Broome & Seabrooke, 2007; 
2008). However, this thesis does advance their methods by updating and modifying them to 
comprehensively test the IMF’s biases particularly with regards to the presence of neoliberal 
globalization’s “common economic policy paradigm,” which not only includes issues of 
monetary and tax policy, but also regulatory and fiscal policy (Hay & Smith, 2005). Overall, this 
empirical section delineates the IMF’s policy advice for the specific purpose of assessing its 
flexibility with regards to a nation’s political economy. Herein, a total of 60 IMF Staff Reports 
and Executive Board Meetings (EBMs) with dates ranging from 1976-2006 are examined.  
Before moving onto the details of the methods employed in analyzing the IMF’s bias, it is 
important to first introduce and discern between Broome and Seabrooke’s original framework 




exclusively examined the relationship between the IMF and non-borrower states. Nonetheless, it 
attempted to provide empirical evidence of the IMF’s experimentalism, despite their 
qualifications noting that “we can reasonably expect the IMF’s advice to have a ‘strong’ impact 
in borrowing developing states,” which can be “subjected to a range of coercive sanctions” 
(2008: 222). A more recent paper by Broome did attempt to fill this spatial gap by accounting for 
borrower states. In this particular analysis, Broome concluded that with the onset of the 2008 
GFC, “one-size-fits-all structural reforms” of the 1980s and 1990s, were replaced by a much 
“narrower focus on the promotion of fiscal consolidation” (2015: 161).  While the post-2008 
IMF goes beyond the scope of the Argentine case, this thesis can track any changes in the policy 
mix up to the 2006 default— a period that actually remained unaccounted for within Broome’s 
latest work.
13
 Essentially, this temporal gap leaves open the question of whether there was ever 
an experimentalist phase at all? 
Ultimately, this co-mingling of two distinct sample groups, along with the absence of an 
account for the Fund’s “experimentalist” period of the 2000s, perhaps unintendedly blurs the 
spatiotemporal boundaries. Another concern, was their interpretation of the data, since in taking 
the results of their content analysis at face value it would appear that IMF policy advice was in 
fact quite rigid for non-borrower states. Precisely, in the 29 year span covered by Broome and 
Seabrooke their work cited only 5 instances wherein policy advice was considered to exhibit 
heterodox qualities— all of which came under its tax policy advice (Broome & Seabrooke, 2008: 
211-215).
14
 In a sense then, their work expressed signs of cognitive dissonance by basing their 
conclusions not so much on the collated data, but rather vaguer conceptualizations, which cited 
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 The 5 instances included: Denmark 1989 (both the staff report and Executive Board), Sweden 1993, New Zealand 




the IMF’s use of associational templates, its openness to “dialogue” rather than “monologue,” as 
well as its interest in understanding New Zealand’s “experimentalist governance” model (2008: 
222-223). To avoid potential incongruities, this thesis derives its conclusions directly from the 
results of the content analysis, which are presented along with a contextualized account of the 
Article IV consultations. 
Herein, I shall present a brief overview of Broome and Seabrooke methods, which is then 
followed up with a more comprehensive account of my revised iteration. Firstly, it is important 
to recap how the IMF reports in question circulate through its institutional structure. As Broome 
and Seabrooke note, these Article IV consultations begin with Staff Reports, which “detail 
current economic developments and trends, assess a state’s comparative institutional 
competitiveness and, importantly, recommend what should be reformed” (2008: 210; Also See 
Harper, 1998). The Executive Board then further elaborates on these findings and makes a “final 
decision on the issues under discussion” (211). A positive result then leads to the acceptance of 
the standby agreement, which releases funds to the borrower state.   
Broome and Seabrooke’s analysis evaluates the IMF’s monetary and tax policy advice in 
order to assess the degree of policy rigidity (2008).  For example, their tax policy mix examined 
IMF policy leanings on VAT, trade tariffs and income taxes. An “IMF friendly” tax policy mix 
would receive a maximum of 6 points— if for instance, “the Executive Board proposed that a 
state should introduce a consumption tax, that it should reduce tariffs and that it should ‘flatten’ 
the income tax structure and lower tax rates” (211). Likewise, the same criterion applies in order 
to evaluate the Staff Reports. If either chose to apply policies that suggest the inverse (i.e., 




a zero would result from the absence of a policy preference.
15
 Their “IMF friendly” monetary 
policy mix works in a similar manner as it positively scored any advice that favored a floating 
exchange rate, a decrease in public debt and liberalized interest rates (Broome & Seabrooke, 
2008, 212).   
2.4.1 The scoring criterion for the IMF Article IV consultations 
Upon my initial review of the IMF consultations with Argentina between 1976 and 2006, I found 
that the economic discussions and scope of the meetings varied greatly. This lead to some minor 
problems with Broome and Seabrooke’s original framework, as tax and monetary policies were 
not always the most salient issues within the Article IV consultations. Moreover, their 
framework did not account for fiscal or regulatory biases, which Hay and Smith had identified as 
part of what can effectively be considered the “common economic policy paradigm” of 
neoliberal globalization (2005; see figure 1). However, appeals to globalization or “global” 
constraints were almost non-existent. Consequently, what was present were policy discussions 
ranging from direct calls for retrenchment of various government programs, the privatization of 
national industry, as well as the deregulation of financial and labor markets. 
As a result, not only did the policy discourse range beyond issues of monetary and tax, 
but these deliberations were marked by their cognitive or technical language, as opposed to the 
use of the normative appeals to globalization or external constraints, which nonetheless 
rationalize these very policies. In other words, the IMF appeared to operate in its “globalizing” 
or “liberalizing” capacity through a much authoritative discourse. For example, in place of 
“global” constraints was the issue of inflation, as well as the need to focus on currency 
appreciation— which would ultimately lead to more foreign investment—nonetheless this was to 
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be achieved via fiscal retrenchment, and policies of liberalization, including those calling for 
privatization of state assets. Therefore, in order to account for the Article IV discussions on 
matters of fiscal and regulatory policy, as well as any calls made for privatization these 











hus, unlike Broome and Seabrooke’s analysis, which only examines tax and monetary advice, 
this study delineates policy into four distinct areas: monetary, tax, fiscal, and regulatory. Figure 1 
provides a graphical overview of how the content analysis delineates the Fund’s advice. 
Secondly, there are some variations from their original coding of the advice, which I explain by 
section. Lastly, in order to elucidate the matrix further, each period examined is accompanied by 
Figure 1.  Neoliberal IMF policy advice 
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a comprehensive analysis of the Article IV discussions. These modifications should allow for a 
more inclusive and transparent account of the IMF’s potential biases. 
Accounting for fiscal and regulatory policy, as well as calls for privatization allows this 
thesis to engage with the abovementioned debates on a much deeper level— including those on 
globalization— because it provides a way to track how conditionality agreements potentially 
seek to open up states to global capital markets. Therefore the goal herein is to empirically detect 
and collate the tenor, biases, and policy prescriptions of the IMF, with the aim of garnering 
sufficient evidence, which would support the use of value-laden terms describing the IMF as 
either “flexible” or “rigid,” or even somewhere in between. In other words, was their space for 
heterodox policy within this institutional setting?  
IMF advice considered as inflexible or neoclassical monetary policy include demands 
for: central bank autonomy, inflation Control, and either a floating exchange or some form of 
“dollar peg”. Suggestions of policies that promote greater central bank independence also 
considered those, which maintained a tight money policy, typically via high interest rates. 
However, inflation control also came via policies set outside of the central bank, primarily via 
fiscal cuts and the removal of government deficits (Hay & Smith, 2005). Again, harkening back 
to Hay and Smith, policies that prioritize exchange rate stability where exchange rates are 
flexible— while alternatively pushing for “Dollarization” wherein the exchange rate proves 
unsustainable were also considered to fall within the neoclassical rubric (2005). In contrast, 
“flexible” monetary policies would permit the consideration of a central bank controlled via the 
legislature, inflationary policies meant to stimulate demand, and an actively managed exchange 




overview of the operationally defined criteria for what the analysis classifies as heterodox or 
flexible.  
An inflexible tax policy would essentially press for a more regressive tax policy where 
VAT ultimately made up a larger bulk of the collections, while income tax was reduced. Calls 
for the removal of any or all trade tariffs would also fall into the neoclassical mix.  Flexible tax 
advice is essentially the inverse: herein, the study marks a progressive tax policy as flexible (i.e., 
advice wherein the VAT is lessened and/or the income tax is graduated relative to income. 
Additionally, a flexible trade policy would permit some import substitution policies as well as 
export subsidies.  
Figure 2.  Heterodox IMF policy advice 
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This study’s criteria for a neoclassical or rigid fiscal policy seeks explicit demands for 
retrenchment, which include cuts to pensions, healthcare, welfare, and education. Increases in 
fiscal budgets would naturally score as flexible. In general terms, a rigid regulatory policy mix 
calls for liberalization across-the-board. Specifically to this study, the focuses is much more 
centered on accounting for the deregulation of both labor and finance (including the augmenting 
of creditor rights and financial sector easing). In addition, this particular study also considers 
privatization of public firms as another of liberalization of the economy. Conversely, calls for 
greater regulation and the support of public enterprise would be marked as either flexible or 
heterodox.  
The delineated scoring criterion explained above is then entered into entered into a 
scoring matrix, which allows the policy biases to be represented graphically. Individual policy 
suggestions within a category or column are represented by increments of 2, with each column 
receiving a maximum absolute value of 6. For instance, the first column depicts a (maximum) 
score of +6, which signifies that the document in question presented neoclassical advice on at 
least 3 separate points, within the delineated policy spheres. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
is a score of -6, which is the maximum for an interventionist or heterodox policy mix. This 




Lastly, a score of 0 indicates that either no relevant policy advice was mentioned or that a 
mix of policies canceled each other out— leading to a result that indicates a balanced “bias”. 
One side note, on policies that cancel out is that they can also temper the bias scores for scores, 
leading to results less than the absolute value of six.
16
 Ultimately, a balanced or flexible policy 
mix would show either no bias, meaning 0 scores or offsetting columns. Figure 3 illustrates how 
the scoring matrix delineated above is graphically represented. 
2.5 Methods for section three: the communicative discourse of finance (Chapters 6, 7, 8)  
While the abovementioned explained the methodology employed within the first section’s 
institutional analysis (chapters 3-5); the contents henceforth set out the rationale for this thesis’ 
second set of cases, which gauge the biases of the financial press during Argentina’s period of 
financial consolidation, the ensuing bailouts and bail-ins, as well as the ultimate reform of the 
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 It is important to note however, that within the 30 years of Article IV consultations on Argentina the data showed 
that policies rarely canceled out. In most cases, within this study a score of zero normally meant that there was no 
policy advice detected. 
Figure 3. How the scoring matrix graphically represents policy bias  
 
















banking sector. Thereafter, the methods of this thesis’ second empirical section (chapters 6-8), 
which focuses on narratives conveyed to the wider publics are described. As a whole this 
empirical split coincides with the thesis’ theoretical underpinnings, which draw on Schmidt’s 
dichotomous conceptualization of discourse— which emphasizes an accounting of both the 
coordinative (section 2) and the communicative (section 3). In turn, this section focuses on the 
latter, communicative discourses (i.e., how narratives are constructed and presented to the 
public).   
Going beyond the insular institutional dynamics of policy formation, the focus herein is 
on unpacking the normative constructions of the global financial press. In other words, the 
attention shifts from how institutional discourse shapes policy to how policies and broader 
normative constructions are presented, deliberated on, and ultimately legitimized or rationalized 
(Schmidt 2008). Schmidt’s analytical framework serves as the bridge that links historical 
institutionalism to the ideational and normative insights of constructivist camps. Of particular 
importance herein are the works of Colin Hay and Nicola Smith that grapple with the strategic 
and sometimes arbitrary ways in which social constructions effect policy (Hay, 1996, 1998; Hay 
& Smith, 2005). 
Altogether this thesis’ theoretical foundation (discussed in chapter 1) supports the 
empirical aim of this section, which attempts to unpack global finance’s “animal spirits,” by 
chronicling how their agents develop, share, and disseminate norms. In turn, this empirical 
exercise build on the thesis’ primary focus, which is in finding the discursive space for heterodox 
policy— within institutions and the wider public narratives. Lastly, an ancillary goal of this 
section is to begin to draw causal links between the policy biases of international lenders of last 




via bonds and other forms of direct finance. Altogether, this section serves to fill the gaps 
between the institutionalist literatures covering the inner workings of the IFI’s like the IMF and 
the ostensibly more diffuse, market pressures inherent to high finance. 
The empirical account itself takes the reader from the press’ initial coverage of the bank 
privatizations through the failed recapitalizations and attempted bail-in that culminated in the 
hasty retreat of foreign finance. What results is a content analysis that historically traces the 
normative constructions of financial discourse. The articles not only provided the opinion of 
financial pundits and embedded journalists, but also proved to be a rich source of 1
st
 hand 
accounts via interviews, as well as financial executives that actually maintained their own 
columns.  
2.5.1 Coding, collating, and scoring press biases  
In terms of the data set, chapters 6, 7, and 8 analyze 261 articles from three of the largest 
circulating Argentine periodicals: La Nación, Ámbito Financiero, and El Clarín. Herein, the 
survey assesses the press’ biases in its coverage of 3 private, international financial institutions: 
Scotiabank, Citigroup and Credit Agricole. The sample set itself reflects a comprehensive survey 
of the archives of each of the periodicals in question. Additionally, there was no complex 
criterion on the sample set other than included all articles pertaining to the three banks in 
question. Temporally, the analysis retraces the initial incursion of these foreign financial firms 
beginning in 1997, the liquidity crunch, and the ensuing period of capital flight (2001-2002), and 
the post-crisis reform period (2002-2006). The methodology—which I discus below—carries 
over some of the elements employed in the previous section on the IMF, which was inspired by 




As in the first section, the methods applied draw from Andre Broome and Leonard 
Seabrooke’s 2008 paper, which— as mentioned above— tests for bias in the IMF. This 
framework allowed for an empirically grounded, cumulative, graphical representation of the 
reporting that delineated the content from year to year. Although the criteria is tailored to focus 
on communicative discourses, the scoring matrix works in much the same manner as the 
previous section.  Accordingly, positive scores represent the presence of appeals to orthodox 
policy mixes. Conversely, negative scores indicate that the writing appealed to heterodox policy. 
Lastly, a score of zero indicates that either the reporting was balanced or there was no applicable 
criteria found.  
 
Setting aside how the results are scored and graphically represented, within this section 
there are some differences in how the content analysis is organized and coded. For instance, 
Figure 4. The scoring criteria for press bias1 
(Source: Author’s own) 
 
 
•Did it present globalization or finance as 'inexorable' or did it politicize 
the matter?  
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1. Politics of Finance 
 
•Did it focus on exogenous or endogenous factors, either economic or 
political? 
 
• (+1) Exogenous focus: (FDI and/or liberal trade) 
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2. The Role of Finance  
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figures 4 and 5 delineate how the empirical analysis operationalizes the ideas of global finance 
and how the biases are scored, which run along 6 different dimensions. The first column 
considers whether the report in question presumed that the effects of global finance were either 
constraints brought on by global finance were either politically inexorable or if it instead allowed 
for the politicization of the paradigm itself (Hay & Smith 2005).
 
A second point of concern 
directly linked to the first asks whether the writing focused on either exogenous or endogenous 
factors or even both. In other words, was the locus of control taken as external or internal? What 
distinguishes this second point from the first is that it is interested in what was said to move the 
economy forward. In other words, was the market better offer relying on external investment or 
were endogenous economic dynamics seen as the primary drivers of growth.  
Figure 5. The scoring criteria for press bias (continued) 
(Source: Author’s own) 
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•Did their narrative see financial markets as driven by material 
or ideational factors?  
 
•(+1) Focused on material constraints or "fundamentals" 




5. Market Dynamics 
 
 
•Did their writing support IMF Conditions? 
 
• (+1) Was the success of private finance contingent on IMF 
demands or aid?  
• (-1) Did it suggest distancing from or blame IMF policy?  
 




The third point examines whether the report’s favored economic strategy called for either 
market deference or intervention on behalf of the state. This helps tease out just how much faith 
the writers and the bank representatives cited had on orthodox equilibrium theories of self-
correcting markets. The fourth point considers whether the policy advice was closer to orthodox 
or heterodox approaches? At first glance it may seem counterintuitive or circular when combined 
with the aforesaid, but a large number of writings appealing to either market deference or state 
intervention still called for an adherence to or principles aligned with an orthodox policy mix. In 
other words, regardless of whether they adhered to notions of self-correcting markets or the 
expediency of state intervention, these actually converged on an orthodox mix of remedies (e.g. 
fiscal retrenchment, zero deficit laws, labor deregulation and bank rediscounts that acted as a 
form of quantitative easing).  
The fifth dimension focuses on market dynamics—namely whether the articles 
emphasized or appealed to material factors or ideational dynamics? This accounts for the 
ontological basis and rationale used within the prescription of journalists and the financial 
executives. It reveals how financial executives devise their market strategies— and whether they 
are based on material calculations, normative constructions, or somewhere in between. The 
broader implications of this are quite important to the constructivist conceptualizations of 
agential decision-making, as it provides empirical evidence on how markets are ultimately 
understood by private financiers. Lastly, the final dimension tallies whether the writing either 
supported IMF conditions or urged for greater latitude.   
2.5.2 A cumulative overview of the collated data   
 Altogether, this second empirical section is comprised of 261 articles from 3 of the highest 




from La Nación, 82 from Clarín, and 61 from Ámbito Financiero. The articles themselves 
directly pertain to three of the most influential international financial institutions and their 
subsidiaries that operated in Argentina— namely, Scotiabank, Crédit Agricole, and Citibank. As 
a primer to the more in-depth analysis contained within the respective chapters, table 2 provides 
a broad overview of the content analysis.  
 
The first column shows that when explicitly discussed, articles almost exclusively 
considered both finance and globalization as politically inexorable phenomena (Hay & Smith 
2005). In other words, the press saw virtually no political recourse that could either avail or 
manage the negative externalities of globalization or the vicissitudes of finance. The second 
column was less definitive, yet nonetheless shows that the periodicals in question were more 
than twice as likely to consider finance as the primary driver of the economy. The third column, 
which measured the paper’s preferred economic strategy actually appears split, as many of the 
articles (73 in total) explicitly appealed for economic interventionism. However, as column 4 
demonstrates, state intervention was nearly always called upon to aid supply-side (save for 2 
instances), as demand-side initiatives were only present in two articles.   
On its own merits the 4
th
 column showed that supply side economics prevailed by and 
large. Altogether, 92 reports made appeals for supply-side initiatives that supported quantitative 














Orthodox 158 119 79 92 142 38 
N/A 93 87 109 167 70 220 
Heterodox 10 55 73 2 49 3 




easing or financial sector bailouts, which were to be accompanied by austerity. In contrast, just 2 
articles out of the 261 examined actually proposed demand-side initiatives. The fifth column 
surveys what the writers and financiers believed to be at the core of markets— be it normative 
“spirits” or “hard fundamentals”. While the writers were over 2.5 times more likely to be explain 
the market as being driven by material factors, a sizable 19% of the articles sampled saw markets 
as being driven by intersubjective dynamics. 
Due to the scant amount of empirical work focusing on the role of the Argentine financial 
sector in the economic downturn I believe that this section’s contribution to the literature and the 
thesis as a whole is indispensable as it collates not only the press’ biases but the resulting 
normative constructions. Moreover, since the academic literature has been slow to expound on 
the Argentine puzzle, an examination of the narratives surrounding the entry and exit of foreign 
finance remains important not only in the context of Argentine IPE, but also in how ostensibly 
promoted theories of political economy line up in both their material and discursive applications. 
Specifically for my thesis, this section presents an endogenous understanding of the financial 
crisis as it was understood or explained to the Argentine public. As a consequence this also helps 
reground or link the studies of the IMF back to its financial underwriters, who typically remain 
outside of the bounds academic analysis. In a sense this holistic mapping of the institutional 
biases of the IMF combined with an examination of the discursive constructions of the financial 
press begins to tease out the dialectical dynamics.  
With this said, my initial findings suggest that the Argentine press presented global 
finance as an inevitable phenomena that would prove to be an absolute positive for the economy, 
although it would require greater liberalization to attract foreign investment. In a bit of a 




of them called on state intervention primarily to preserve private sector earnings. Another 
interesting twist was that they tacitly acknowledged that financial markets were socially driven, 
as they conceded that austerity is not materially effective, but rather served to bolster faith or 
confidence. Although the reports paid lip service to orthodox pieties, the bulk of their policy 
recommendations and even their understandings of how markets work are best understood via 
heterodox theories, as opposed to automatically correcting equilibrium models that view markets 
as guided by rational, utility-maximizing agents.    
Before moving forward it may be worth noting some of the potential limitations of the 
methodology employed. Perhaps the single biggest point to make is that as a single country case 
study it may restrict broader generalizations on a state-to-state basis. However, in light of the 
aforementioned issues with Broome and Seabrooke’s larger N studies the aim herein was to put 
together a more nuanced qualitative analysis that respected spatiotemporal differences while also 
providing a higher level of descriptive detail, which would in turn support and confirm, both the 
findings and any conclusions drawn therefrom (Broome & Seabrooke, 2007, 2008). Thus, the 
thesis’ single country case study opts for a “thick analysis” (Brady & Collier, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it does allow for strong descriptive inferences by specifically positing that a 
positive finding of strict neoliberal policy biases within Argentina, not only negates (or seriously 
puts into question the veracity of a “flexible thesis”), but it also suggests that quite similar 
findings may be possible on a state-to-state basis (Burnham, Gilland, Grant, & Layton-Henry, 





3. The IMF’s early approach: analyzing article IV consultations 
from 1976-1989 
This first empirical chapter puts into action the aforementioned methodology, which 
begins to plot the space for alternative or heterodox policies within the coordinative discourses 
of the IMF (Schmidt, 2014). Moreover, the first two chapters in this section also contribute to 
debates that have tried to pinpoint when exactly the IMF became an overt “globalizer” or 
promoter of neoliberalism in general.
1
 Altogether, the goal is to interrogate if, and how this 
institutional discourse constrained the space for alternatives to the economic policies that buttress 
the neoliberal or hyperglobalist policy paradigm (see chapter 2). The analysis itself will show 
how ideas function in practice. Therefore the analysis elucidates the ways in which ideas matter, 
and in what ways they are used to effect policy within this institutional setting.  
Since the IMF did not establish Article IV consultations with Argentina until 1976 this 
case has some inherent temporal limitations. In terms of this broader debate on the IMF as a 
neoliberal “globalizer,” the data set on Argentina is limited to detecting biases from the mid-
1970s onwards (Woods, 2006). Nonetheless, it can at the very least test for the degree of liberal 
bias and general policy rigidities prior to the 1980s, which can then be compared and contrasted 
to the later periods. Ultimately, what this exercise does offer is an empirically derived 
spatiotemporal map of the IMF-Argentine consultations, which seeks to find exactly how much 
space was provided to heterodox policies and theories over the years in question. In other words, 
if it measures if and how the IMF’s policy discourse promoted or imposed a policy mix that 
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 The methodology chapter set out that Woods and Chweiroth pegged the 1980s as the major inflection point for the 
institutionalization of the Fund’s liberalization and austerity agenda. Nonetheless, more critical political economists 
such as Panitch and Gindin, as well as Chorev and Babb see its liberalization penchant stretching much further back 
to either its inception during the Bretton Woods accords or the 1950s— respectively (Woods 2006; Chweiroth 2007; 




ultimately coincided with, or effectively came to represent what Hay and Smith see as 
globalization’s “common economic policy paradigm” (Hay & Smith, 2005).  
3.1 Grading economic efficiency during the dirty war (1976-1982) 
The rise to power of Jorge Rafael Videla’s military junta brought about an ironic sense of 
optimism from the IMF Staff. As their Report proclaimed, “The initial steps taken by the new 
government are clearly in the right directions” (IMF, 1976). Immediately meeting this thesis’ 
methodological criteria for a monetary policy bias that falls within the neoliberal or 
“globalizing” goalposts, the Fund praised the junta’s early attempts to appreciate the Peso.
2
 
Henceforth, the Staff buffered the new regime from criticism by blaming the prior 
administration’s monetary schemes as the underlying cause of the economic malaise.  
While explicit appeals to globalization were undetected an externalizing discourse did 
begin to form around the peso’s exchange rate (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Widmaier, Blyth, 
Seabrooke, 2007). As early as three months into the dictatorship, the IMF began using the peso’s 
weakness as a rationale for the swift implementation of fiscal adjustments in the guise of 
reducing external debts. The Staff also brushed off the political and economic hardship that these 
austerity measures would entail noting that, “there is little reason to believe that stretching such 
required adjustments over a protracted period would lessen the social cost” (IMF, 1976). In other 
words, the IMF’s ideal way forward was through planned austerity shocks ala Naomi Klein’s 
bestseller (2001). With that said, it is important to note that the term the “shock” was not a clever 
exhortation penned long after the fact, but part of the IMF’s lexicon, present in the IMF’s 
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 It should be noted that the Argentine peso had gone through several devaluations under the preceding 






 Moreover, the term’s use obviates the IMF’s understanding that its 
policies were destructive, albeit in their view— only in the short run (See Klein, 2001; IMF, 
1982a).  
The 1977 Staff Report further lauded the dictatorship’s early measures noting the, 
“marked improvements in the balance of payments, permitting a virtually complete liberalization 
of restrictions on foreign trade and payments, and to a major correction of distortion in relative 
prices” (IMF, 1977). The Staff also commended the relative successes in reducing the deficit 
along with the resurgence of private savings, which was credited to the application of austerity 
measures and a rise in interest rates. The Staff further noted that, “the central government deficit 
has been halved in real terms, by means of a reduction in real wages of public employees, 
restraint in other expenditures, and efforts to improve revenue collections” (IMF, 1977). Even 
with all of the recent successes the Staff still pressed for greater retrenchment in the guise of 
stamping out any remaining inflationary pressures: 
The first priority of the 1977 program is therefore, a deceleration of the rate of inflation 
and the attainment of this objective is dependent to a large degree on the wage, fiscal, and 
monetary policies to be followed. (IMF, 1977)  
 
The 1979 Staff Report and Chair’s summary continued to use the Peso’s appreciation as part of a 
logic that effectively externalized or depoliticized Argentina’s economic imperatives. Herein, the 
Fund praised both the headway made in reducing the fiscal deficit as well as the growing 
international reserves, which in their view, renewed investor confidence in the Peso and in 
foreign investments. However, the Chair acknowledged some of the board member’s concerns 
with the “dramatic turnabout in the balance of payments,” which in their view “…made 
                                                          
3
 The “Shock” strategy or doctrine was not just a rhetorical concoction. The term was present in IMF’s 1982 
Executive Board Meeting minutes, as it was used to describe the economic strategy set into place that year, which 




monetary policies more difficult” (IMF, 1979b). In other words, the Fund acknowledged that the 
appreciating peso was slowing economic activity, particularly with exports. Yet equivocally, the 
Board’s advice was to push for further deficit and inflation reduction initiatives, which 
nonetheless, required additional fiscal cuts (IMF, 1979b). 
The lack of policies entertaining demand-side theories was evidenced in the 1979 Staff 
Report, which admitted that while the anti-inflationary policy mix had attained its goal of a 
stronger peso the broader economy had actually slipped into a period of stagnation (IMF, 1979a). 
As a result, in the face of their prior assumption, the Fund was forced to admit that the 
appreciation of the Peso was in fact limiting trade. The Staff Report went on to warn, “that in the 
medium run a further large appreciation of the peso cannot be sustained without eroding 
competitiveness of Argentina's exports; hence, the urgent need of placing greater reliance on 
demand policy to control inflation” (IMF, 1979a). Ultimately, the slowdown in economic 
activity due to the appreciation of the currency went against the neoliberal assumptions of the 
IMF’s discourses, wherein a strong peso would bolster economic activity.
4
 Yet, despite their 
newfound awareness of the implications of further economic contractions, the IMF continued to 
promote deflationary policies via fiscal retrenchment— which put into question its flexibility, as 
well as its efficacy.
5 Hereafter, the executive board would reiterate the Staff’s position a year 
later, calling for even greater fiscal retrenchment: 
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 Herein, it becomes quite evident that maintaining the peso’s gains— which consequently increased the profit 
margins on outstanding debt— was the Fund’s first priority. If this was not the case then continuing their pro-
cyclical policy mix—outside of a complex, two-teared monetary scheme— was at best a spurious endeavor, as 
economic convention and by their own estimations further appreciation of the peso, would, hurt exports by 
increasing their relative costs.   
5
 Issues regarding the IMF’s policy intransigence would again arise nearly 20 years later, during the Menem 
administration. In an uncannily similar predicament, the Fund’s resolve to block the Argentine authorities from 
using monetary or fiscal policy to relieve deflationary pressures resulted in a prolonged economic stagnation, which 




It was felt, however, that the continued success of the exchange rate strategy designed to 
reduce inflation further would depend largely on a strengthening of the fiscal situation 
and on a close monitoring of credit of domestic origin. (IMF, 1980b) 
The 1980 Staff Report, once again set aside Argentina’s economic contraction in order to 
emphasize the need for additional efforts to drive down inflation. The report praised the 
authorities’ recent successes in tapering down the rate of inflation, which slowed from an eight 
month high of 166 percent to 90 percent in the month of May (IMF, 1980a).  Although the Staff 
recognized the economy’s deceleration, they again urged for even deeper fiscal cuts to taper 
demand as in their view, “claims on available resources continue[d] to be substantial…” (IMF, 
1980a). They also advised the Central Bank to limit public sector lending, which would 
presumably allow it to concentrate on currency stabilization through the maintenance of foreign 
reserves. The 1980 Executive Board and the 1981 Staff Report would also regurgitate the 
abovementioned logics, which appeared to dominate the Article IV consultations that took place 
from 1976-1982 (IMF, 1980b; IMF, 1981).  
The Fund’s strict adherence to a monetary policy that was in accordance with the 
economic policies that would decades later be identifiable with the term “globalization” 
continued through 1981. However, this Staff Report now revealed that the appreciating peso had 
actually slowed down the economy as a whole. In their own words, the Staff admitted that the 
“real appreciation of the peso contributed to a decline in economic activity” (IMF, 1981). Never 
the less in the midst of this realization, the Staff took perhaps its most paradoxical stance by 
arguing that the Central Bank’s credit policy was too loose. Herein, they made the case for a 
curtailment of the expansion of credit in order to slow the growth of money further, which in 




In between the deflationary hubbub, the Staff took the liberty of chastising the authorities 
for deciding to alter the previously unified and free-floating exchange rate. Specifically, the Staff 
urged the Argentine authorities to revert to the liberalized exchanges noting, “that the 
maintenance of a dual exchange rate system creates certain instabilities and in the longer run is 
bound to prove detrimental to resource allocation” (IMF, 1981). By the 1982 Article IV 
consultation, the authorities acceded to both, the aforementioned demands for a tighter credit 
policy as well as the reunification of the free-float (IMF, 1982a).   
 
As evidenced above, the monetary policy advice offered by the Staff and Executive board 
throughout the period of the military junta (1976-1982) centered on curbing inflation— even 
during times when the economy was clearly in a depressed and/or deflated state. In other words, 
whether the Peso experienced inflationary or deflationary pressures was irrelevant to the IMF’s 
Figure 1. IMF Monetary Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
 






























preferred means of recovery, which was to restrict the supply of money. In turn, and as the scores 
in figure 1 suggest, their advice was tethered tightly to the study’s operationally defined 
“globalizing” policy paradigm— focusing on currency appreciation, inflation control, and fiscal 
retrenchment (Hay & Smith, 2005). Although the IMF’s favored means were followed faithfully 
by the Argentine authorities, their expectant ends of an economic resurgence remained elusive. 
In turn, the sum of the IMF’s monetary advice during this period was devoid of flexibility (see 
figure 1).   
3.1.1 The IMF’s Tax and Trade Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
The IMF’s desire to dismantle or “open up” Argentina’s long-established, Peronist economic 
model centered on import substitution can be taken as another facet of its role as a 
“globalizer”(Woods, 2006; also see Adelman, 1994; Baer, 1972; Silva, 2007). As mentioned 
above, the 1977 Staff Report praised the liberalizing efforts of Argentina’s military junta noting 
the “virtually complete liberalization of restrictions on foreign trade…” (IMF, 1977). In regards 
to trade policy, the Staff praised the reduction in tariffs, particularly the cuts to export taxes, 
which served as a major revenue generator for the state (IMF, 1976). The Staff also applauded 
the rise in value added tax (VAT) from 13% to 16%. In all, they estimated savings from both 
retrenchment and tax collection efforts would reduce the deficit from 13% to 7% of GDP, 
roughly a 53% reduction in one year. 
The 1980 Staff Report urged authorities to “press ahead with the liberalization of the 
import tariff regime in the guise of inflation reduction” (IMF, 1980a). In concurrence, the 
Executive Board remained confident in the authority’s “resolve to open further the Argentine 
economy in the course of a five-year tariff reduction process” (IMF, 1980b). However, according 




“the trade liberalization program launched in late 1978 has been halted and even reversed to 
some extent when minimum import prices were established for certain goods and import quotas 
applied to others” (IMF, 1981). In both ’81 and ’82, the IMF yet again urged authorities “not to 
retrench from the original trade liberalization program lest the ground painfully gained in 
promoting industrial efficiency and weeding out noncompetitive activities be lost” (IMF, 1981; 
IMF, 1982a). Altogether, figure 2 captures the totality of the Article IV advice from 1976 to 
1982, which foreclosed on any deviation from their preferential policy mix of trade and tax 
liberation, which sought to “open up” the Argentine economy to international trade.   
3.1.2 The IMF’s Fiscal Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
The IMF’s fiscal policy stance during this period fell in lockstep with Hay and Smith’s  
global or liberalizing (fiscal) policy paradigm, which was said to focus on removing “all sources 
of enduring budget deficits” (Hay & Smith, 2005). Specifically, the Fund supported a more 
structural reform effort that actually bled into Argentina’s tax policy via the reduction of revenue 
Figure 2. IMF’s Tax and Trade Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
 





























transfers from Buenos Aires to the provinces (IMF, 1976).
6
 The rationale of both the Staff and 
likeminded authorities was to have provinces self-finance their fiscal endeavors, which in theory 
would compel them to operate in a more austere manner.
7
 In 1977, the authorities planned to take 
the fiscal deficit down from 7% to 4% per cent of GDP—making it 2 consecutive years that the 
fiscal debt to GDP was cut by more than half. In spite of these significant cuts, the Staff argued 
that even further structural retrenchment efforts remained necessary for lasting deficit reductions 
(IMF, 1977).   
During this period the IMF also began to causally link fiscal expenditures to the peso’s 
inflation, which not only made austerity an economic imperative, but it also precluded further 
discussion on other possible factors or alternatives solutions. For instance, the 1979 Staff 
Report’s emphasis was on achieving its deflationary targets via fiscal retrenchment, noting that 
“public spending has continued at a very high level, and the overall public sector deficit, 
although much reduced, remains too large to break the inflationary expectations” (IMF, 1979a). 
Adding to this, the 1979 Executive Board reiterated the need for “Argentina to adhere strictly to 
the fiscal program and to the pre-announced guidelines of the authorities” (IMF, 1979b). The 
Staff also set its deficit reduction hopes on the efficiency of state run firms, which were expected 
to contribute “sizable funds to the Treasury” (IMF, 1979a). Thus, the purpose of state firms 
shifted from a demand-based model towards generating capital in order to buttress the Argentine 
monetary system. 
 
                                                          
6
 The elimination of income redistribution from Buenos Aires to the less developed provinces would become a 
recurrent point of contention over the next thirty years of Article IV consultations.  
7
 A secondary effect of not having the support of the central government underwriting their debt would be that 
provinces would have to borrow money at higher interest rates and with shorter maturities— thus making 





The 1980 Staff Report once again touted fiscal retrenchment as the most important, 
catchall remedy for Argentina’s monetary shortcomings. In concurrence, the respective 
Executive Board Meeting continued to push fiscal retrenchment in the guise of shoring up the 
monetary system. The Chair specifically urged authorities to “avoid a resurgence of excess 
demand and overheating of the economy, especially through an appropriate strengthening of 
fiscal policy.” (IMF, 1980b). In other words, the board’s logic was that fiscal cuts would slow 
down the public’s ability to consume (i.e. demand) and thus, deflate economic pressures. IMF 
consultations from 1980 to 1982 would continue to press for fiscal cuts in the guise of taking 
inflationary pressures off of the Peso (IMF, 1980b; IMF, 1981; IMF, 1982a).  
Altogether, the tally of the Article IV consultations represented in figure 3 confirms that 
the Fund promoted an unwaveringly austere fiscal policy mix throughout the entire period of the 
military Junta (1976-1982), leaving no room for ideas outside of the neoliberal orthodoxy. 
Moreover, the 1981 Staff report confirmed that the IMF understood that these deflationary 
Figure 3. IMF’s Fiscal Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
 






























policies were not only susceptible to technical complications as noted above, but were also quite 
unpopular (IMF, 1981). This last point revealed the IMF’s frustrations not just with the 
Argentine authorities, but also the public— for failing to embrace its recommended austerity 
measures:  
It’s clear that Argentina cannot resume sustained growth until the general public is 
convinced that there exists a firm commitment to implement an appropriate set of 
adjustment policies and, in particular, to bring about a lasting reduction in the rate of 
price increases. (IMF, 1981) 
3.1.3 The IMF’s Regulatory and Private Sector Policy Mix (1976-1982)  
 
The IMF’s advice in terms of regulatory policy, from 1976 to 1982, promoted the free 
flow of capital as well as the liberalization of public section wages. Again, its discourse fell 
within the thesis’ operational definition of what can be considered as promoting a “globalizing” 
policy paradigm. In turn, figure 4 again illustrates the staunchly orthodox tenor of its 
deliberations on regulatory policy and the support for public enterprise.  
Figure 4. IMF’s Regulatory and Private Sector Policy Mix (1976-1982) 
 






























Beginning with the 1976 Staff Report, the IMF emphasized the need to liberalize capital 
controls in order to rekindle investor confidence. In a rare occurrence, the Board introduced 
counter-cyclical policies aimed at buffering the destabilizing effects of foreign capital 
movements. Nevertheless, these protectionist measures were exclusive to both the financial 
sector and the maintenance of foreign reserves (IMF, 1979b). The 1980 Staff Report took this a 
step further as it searched for ways to incentivize greater financial investment (IMF, 1980a). 
The liberalization of wages was another major facet of the Fund’s advice during this 
period, which was again tied back to inflationary concerns in manner that effectively 
subordinated fiscal policy first and foremost to Argentina’s monetary performance. For instance, 
the 1977 Staff Report urged authorities to refrain from tracking real wage levels to inflation, but 
rather allowing them to adjust over a longer-term, “market equilibrium”. During this period the 
Fund would continue to justify the reduction in real wages, as a necessary consequence to 
Argentina’s inability to curb inflationary pressures (IMF, 1977; IMF, 1979a).  
The 1981 Staff Report made yet another case for wage liberalization adding that in the 
absence of more efficient tax collections, public sector wages required restraining in order to 
reduce deficit spending.  Yet, these recommendations came in the very report wherein 
independent surveys were cited estimating an 18 percent drop in average real wages for the year 
(IMF, 1981). In spite of the data, the 1982 Executive Board bolstered the Staff’s efforts to cut 
real wages, now arguing in support of an extension for public sector wage freezes (IMF, 1982a). 
Thus, again the main concern for the IMF was not the condition of the domestic economy, but 





3.2 The Alfonsín Administration (1983-1989)   
The IMF’s monetary policy discourse during the Alfonsín administration continued to prioritize, 
and even attempted to depoliticize the use of policies that suppressed inflation—namely, via an 
increase in interest rates, austerity measures, and the consolidation of monetary controls in the 
hands of the Central Bank (see figure 5). In 1983, the Executive Board suggested that an increase 
in interest rates was “long overdue” (IMF, 1983). Specifically, they argued “that further 
increases in interest rates would be required in order to provide the resources needed to finance 
the public sector deficit and accommodate part of the credit demand of the private sector without 
distorting the allocation of resources” (IMF, 1983). Directors also commended the authority’s 
pace towards the centralization of monetary controls—lauding the unification of exchange and 
interest rate policies (IMF, 1983). 
 
Figure 5. IMF’s Monetary Policy Mix (1983-1989) 
 























In 1984, the Executive Board urged Argentina to reform its monetary policy in a way that 
would ultimately privilege finance capital above all else (IMF, 1984). Again, the focus herein 
was on getting Argentina to raise interest rates while simultaneously buffering the Argentine 
Central Bank (ACB) — this time in the explicit guise of bolstering the profitability of the 
financial sector (IMF, 1984). In 1985, they made it clear that although were impressed with the 
development of anti-inflationary monetary policies, they were desired more in the way of fiscal 
cuts (IMF, 1986).  
The Executive Board would rationalize the great expense involved in appreciating the 
peso as the price to pay for future foreign direct investment— again the emphasis herein was on 
the externalizing the economy’s locus of control (IMF, 1986; IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b). 
Moreover, the Executive Board indicated that a much longer horizon was required for a change 
in interest rate policy as “prospects for their reduction hinged on a lasting improvement in the 
public finances and on a further reduction in inflation” (IMF, 1986). In other words, the IMF was 
now using an externalizing narrative, akin to the mainstream hyperglobalist accounts of the 
1990s, which exclusively associated economic growth with the attraction of FDI via policies of 
liberalization and fiscal retrenchment (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 
2007).  
Ultimately, the strict adherence to a deflationary monetary policy and in particular, the 
appreciation of the peso was the way in which the Fund defended its liberalization agenda, as 
well as its reliance on austerity measures (see figure 5). As a result, the Article IV consultations 
between 1983 and 1989 maintained most of the monetary stipulations set out during the previous 
military junta—namely, those focused on strengthening the peso and reducing inflation, 




which they would tack on further conditions, which now advanced the need for higher interest 
rates and the consolidation of monetary power in the hands of the Central Bank.  Once again, the 
policies between 1983 through 1989 were staunchly neoliberal, pro-cyclical, and also to include 
an externalizing narrative that was used to justify the measures taken to appreciate the Argentine 
peso (Hay & Rosamond, 2002).  
3.2.1 The IMF’s tax and trade policy mix (1983-1989) 
Throughout the Alfonsín administration the IMF’s trade policy lived up to Wood’s “globalizer” 
label (Woods, 2006). Specifically, the Executive Board’s tax and trade policy discussions 
centered on removing import and export tariffs, as well as general subsidies, which would have 
the effect of opening up the Argentina’s industrial sectors to international trade dynamics. The 
Boards main objective was the liberalization of trade, which also included the removal of 
subsidies that attempted to mitigate potential revenue losses (See IMF, 1983; IMF, 1984; IMF, 
1986; IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b). In 1984, they continued to press this agenda as they called “on 
the authorities to adopt the policies that would make possible a simplification and liberalization 





The IMF consultations for 1985 and 1987 continued to push for the liberalization of 
Argentine trade barriers and the eradication of protectionist policies, while also tying its 
deflationary goals (IMF, 1986; IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b). Beginning with the 1985 Executive 
Board meeting the IMF reiterated the need to remove trade tariff protections and subsidies on 
exports (IMF, 1986). In 1987, the Executive Board began to associate its liberal trade advice 
back to its monetary policy goals (See IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b). Herein, the Board urged the 
Argentine authorities “to ease trade and exchange controls and to follow an appropriately 
flexible exchange rate policy aimed at improving the competitiveness of the export sector” (IMF, 
1987a).  
The Executive Board capped off its policy mix by attempting to structuralize the 
elimination of protectionist policies. Essentially, directors changed their strategy as they advised 
that import laws should be replaced with tariffs (IMF, 1987b). This would serve as a means to 
Figure 6. IMF’s Tax and Trade Policy Mix (1983-1989) 
 























depoliticize trade policies by reclassifying them as a tool of economists, who purported to be 
governed by objective, mathematically derived forecasts. Altogether, the IMF’s tax policy mix 
was much more concentrated on the deconstruction of trade protectionism. In turn, figure 6 
shows that the deliberations followed the orthodox thrust of prior appeals, which concentrated on 
the liberalization of trade.  
3.2.2 The IMF’s fiscal policy mix (1983-1989) 
Figure 7 illustrates the Executive Board’s cumulative fiscal policy bias, which was colored by 
the theme of retrenchment— again within the broader frame of inflation and deficit reduction 
(IMF, 1983; IMF, 1984; IMF, 86; IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b). The 1983 EBM pressed the need 
for a “targeted reduction in the public sector deficit” in order to curb inflation (IMF, 1983).  In 
this spirit, the Board encouraged the Argentine authorities to cut utility subsidies in order “to 
bring the prices of public sector services more into line with costs” (IMF, 1983). 
 
Figure 7. IMF’s Fiscal Policy Mix (1983-1989) 
 






















In 1984, the Executive Board explicitly stated that demand suppression was their 
preferred path towards inflation reduction. Specifically, “directors agreed that the key element of 
an effective anti-inflationary strategy would have to be a policy of sustained demand restraint” 
(IMF, 1984). Following suit, the 1985 EBM’s focus focused on fiscal retrenchment, as the board 
“urged the authorities to take measures to reduce the size of the public sector...” (IMF, 1986). 
Directors emphasized that the Argentine authorities’ proposed public sector deficit target of 3% 
of GDP for 1986 “was the maximum that could be envisaged and that the authorities should 
stand ready to implement, if needed, additional measures in order to achieve that objective and to 
establish the basis for a further reduction in the fiscal deficit in 1987” (IMF, 1986).
8
 Ultimately, 
the IMF’s policy preference sought to deflate Argentina into a neoclassical equilibrium, rather 
than grow its way out of stagnation and risk further inflationary effects on its currency and 
outstanding debts. 
… many of the fiscal measures would be nonrecurring and thus short-lived; that more had 
to be done in the effort to reform state enterprises… (IMF, 1987b) 
 
In the first quarter of 1987 Executive Board sought to alter the role and structure of the 
Argentine public sector assets. Herein, they emphasized the need to shift fiscal policy away from 
revenue generation to expenditure reduction (IMF, 1987a). Although they would continue to 
press for even deeper structural reforms, the Board also praised the implementation of austerity 
                                                          
8
 The board was now pressing for public sector deficits to be taken from 5% to 3% GDP. However, when 
considering the magnitude of deficit reductions between 1982-1984 it is evident that a significant unwinding of the 
public sector finances had already taken place. In all deficits had already been reduced by 9 percentage points, in 
absolute terms. Even the Staff Report for 1982, which was actually published in 1986 acknowledged the drastic cuts 
in public sector debt, which went from  “14 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 8 per cent of GDP in 1983 and to an annual 




measures put in place via the Austral Plan, (IMF, 1987a; IMF, 1987b).
9
 However, the following 
year, “a number of Directors expressed concern that excessive reliance was [still being] placed 
on revenue generation rather than on expenditure restraint...” (IMF, 1987b). Once again the focus 
was taken away from a balanced growth strategy, toward an economic policy that exclusively 
focused on constricting the supply of money.  
3.2.3 IMF’s regulatory and private sector policy mix (1983-1989) 
Figure 8 reflects the advocacy of the IMF’s orthodox policy bias (1983-1989), which focused on 
the removal of capital controls, wage and price indexation, as well as initial pushes for the 
privatization of national assets. The 1983 Executive Board kicked off by making its case for the 
deregulation of capital. Herein, the Board set a deadline for the deregulation of financial exit 
flows through “the elimination of existing restrictions on payments and transfers for current 
international transactions by the end of the year at the latest” (IMF, 1983). Their rationale was 
that trade and monetary liberalization would allow for a resumption of foreign lending, stem 
                                                          
9
 The Austral Plan was a deflationary economic plan implemented in June of 1985 by then economic minister, Juan 
Vital Sourrouille. Its aim was to curb inflation via monetary and fiscal retrenchment. Specifically it froze increases 
in public sector wages and also temporarily cut the issuance of new pesos.   
Figure 8. IMF’s Regulatory and Private Sector Policy Mix (1983-1989) 
 






















capital flight and attract foreign direct investment (IMF, 1983).  
In the guise of protecting its monetary policy targets, the IMF also stressed the removal 
of inflation indexed wages and prices, as well as making some of the early calls for the 
privatization of national industry. For instance, in 1984 the Board persisted on the removal of 
wage and price indexation—now clearly specifying the need for reform in both, the public and 
private sectors (IMF, 1984). Asides from the sharp focus on wage and price controls, the board 
urged authorities to uphold past debts by bringing up to date its external payment arrears (IMF, 
1984). 
…the authorities would be best advised to stop intervening in the process of private 
sector wage determination, and to provide an appropriate signal to that sector by pursuing 
a prudent wage policy in the public sector. (IMF, 1984). 
 
In 1985, the Board turned its attention to the privatization of national industry. They 
praised the initiatives to privatize the national steel and petrochemical firms, whilst urging the 
government to reform the state-run oil firm in a similar fashion (IMF, 1986). These early calls 
for privatization can be taken as the initial impetus or stamp of approval for the liquidation of 
state-owned assets which would took place in the 1990s. As in preceding years, the IMF also 
remained fixated on the removal of wage controls. Herein, the Chair noted the Board’s 
disapproval in his statement, “However, a number of Directors were worried by the substantial 
special pay increases granted recently to a large proportion of national administration employees; 
these increases were regarded as excessive and, aside from the implications for the public 





One area wherein heterodox policy did find its way in—at least temporarily—was in 
terms of price controls. Initially, although they were attempting to keep inflation down, the board 
urged for the removal of price freezes on certain goods (IMF, 1984; IMF, 1986). However in 
1987, the Board made an about face on its support for liberalized price controls, suddenly 
recognizing its incongruence with its broader strategic goal of lowering inflation. The Chair 
displayed the Board’s vexation stating that, “the situation with respect to wage and price policy 
in Argentina is a tricky one” (IMF, 1987a). The chair took note that, “A number of Directors 
remarked on the need for caution in the removal of price controls” (IMF, 1987a). “However, it 
was observed that with the reacceleration of inflation, price distortions were becoming apparent 
between different sectors, and the importance of a timetable for the abolition of controls was 
noted” (IMF, 1987a). Therefore, because of the likelihood that consumer prices would rise, the 
1987 EBM wavered a bit on its stance on price controls; however, it remained resolute in regards 
to the liberalization of wages.    
However, in a follow up meeting that year, the Board reasserted its orthodox views by 
again calling into question the use of both “wage and price controls to deal with inflation” (IMF, 
1987b). The Chair even highlighted the Board’s newfound resolve to push for the liberalization 
of both wage and price controls. The chair duly noted, “Indeed, a number of Directors 
encouraged the authorities to relax such controls as soon as possible” (IMF, 1987b). Asides from 
eliminating any question with regards to its position on price controls, the Executive Board also 
took time to bring the focus back on the reform of public enterprises. Here the chair stated that, 
“…more had to be done in the effort to reform state enterprises and that action on public sector 




As shown above, the removal of capital controls and wage indexation persisted atop of 
the IMF’s agenda, going back more than 11 years to the early period of the Military Junta.  
However, the arguments against wage controls became much more elaborate during this period 
and even went further by including the removal of price controls— albeit in just one instance. 
One interesting development during this period (1983-1989) was the IMF’s newfound interest in 
spurring privatization of state owned assets, which went as far as making explicit calls for the 
sale of the national steel, petrochemical and petroleum operations.  
3.3 Conclusion  
Altogether, the IMF-Argentine coordinative discourses (1976-1989) closed off the discursive 
space for policy alternatives, as the discourses were dominated by the Funds preferred neoliberal 
logics (Schmidt, 2008). Interestingly enough though, the outright use of the term “global” or 
references to “globalization” were not readily detected within the Fund’s internal dialogue with 
Argentine authorities. In its place however, was a discourse which attempted to depoliticize the 
use of liberal or neoliberal policies along all four dimensions of economic policymaking 
analyzed (e.g., monetary, tax and trade, fiscal, and regulatory) via appeals to protect the 
Argentine peso from further devaluation. In other words, deflationary monetary policy trumped 
all else.  
In terms of monetary policy, both the Staff and Board remained affixed to policies that 
prioritized liberal exchanges, currency appreciation, while their most consistent preoccupation 
was on keeping inflationary pressures at bay. Their tax policy also maintained its focus on pro-
cyclical policies. Here the IMF consistently pushed for the removal of all trade tariffs and sector 




retrenchment, which came in the guise of curbing inflationary pressures. The Fund’s regulatory 
policy was staunchly neoliberal. It was most consistent in its efforts to liberalize wages and 
capital movements. In this regard, just four reports during out of 14 covered within the period of 
1976-1987 did not explicitly call for the liberalization of wage and/or capital controls (1979a; 
1979b; 1980a; 1980b).  
  In all, the totality of the IMF’s policy mix proved to be staunchly neoliberal, which 
closed off any room for counter-cyclical or alternative ideas. Thus, by precluding the mere 
contemplation of heterodox policies, the Fund thwarted any possibility enacting such policies. 














4. The Article IV Policy Mix under Menem (1989-1999)  
Chapter four is the second of three chapters that comprise this thesis’ first empirical 
section, which focuses on gauging the coordinative discourses of the IMF-Argentine article IV 
consultations (Schmidt, 2008). Like the previous chapter, the goal herein is on understanding 
how ideas function and guide policy outcomes within an institutional space, such as the IMF. In 
other words, it seeks to show how ideas materialize. Like the previous chapter, the analysis is 
focused on gauging the space for the operationalized policies of both, neoliberal globalization 
vis-à-vis those in support of heterodox approaches (see chapter 2).  
The administration of Carlos Saúl Menem is widely regarded as Argentina’s version of 
Thatcher or Reagan, essentially a champion of the neoclassical paradigm. For Argentina it was 
during this period that the Fund would turn towards a mix of conventional classical liberalization 
policies, which were flanked by neoclassical approaches. Precisely, this display of tempered 
“flexibility” is best illustrated by the Fund’s gradual change in opinion—where it went from a 
staunch supporter of Argentina’s free floating exchange rate to an advocate of the managed 
monetary regime. It is also important to emphasize that the IMF’s embrace of Argentina’s 
centralized monetary system actually coincides with Hay’s own conceptualization of what fits 
within the “liberal order’s… global economic governance” toolkit, wherein exchange rates are 
preferred to be either liberalized or dollarized (Hay & Smith, 2005: 135). 
While the IMF’s discourse arguably remained its most important factor throughout, 
which is reflected via the deliberation’s support of a neoliberal policies across all four categories 
examined, more tactile policies such as the convertibility scheme lend to a bi-directionality or 




nuanced consideration of how ideas interact with material factors shows how the convertibility 
scheme was embraced by the IMF, as a more tactile imperative, which allowed it to discursively 
externalize, catalyze, and buttress its neoliberal prescriptions during the 1990s. Consider that 
after its initial embrace, the Fund would steadfastly insist on maintaining the Peso-Dollar 
exchange via polices of economic liberalization and adjustment all the way up until the 
economy’s unraveling in the late nineties.   
The negotiations themselves were tethered to a sort of discursive tract that was colored by 
externalizing neoliberal logics (Hay & Rosamond, 2002). For instance, during the late nineties, 
the IMF externalized the causes of the downturn by blaming the Brazilian devaluation and the 
subsequent appreciation of the dollar. For the IMF, the increasing spread between the peso and 
the US dollar— which the Fund blamed on a combination of external factors and Argentina’s 
fiscal policy— would need to be offset by even deeper rollouts of austerity, the relaxation of 
labor laws, and a continuation of the privatization of state assets. Ultimately, the totality of the 
IMF’s advice found within this period appears to coincide with Hay & Smith’s “policy 
paradigm,” that is commonly pushed up through “institutions of global economic governance” in 
order to promote a neoliberal or “global(izing)” monetary, tax, fiscal, and regulatory policy mix 
(Hay & Smith, 2005: 134-135).
1
 
4.1 The IMF’s monetary policy mix during the Menem administration (1989-1999) 
As figure 1 illustrates, the scoring of the IMF’s coordinative discourse on monetary policy from 
1989 to 1999 once again meets the thesis’ methodological criteria for neoliberal bias. Some of 
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 However, in a broader sense it also shows how these discourses ultimately rely on their own social constructions, 
and at times faulty logic— to rationalize or externalize their preferred policy mix. Ultimately in practice, 
maintaining the peso’s dollar convertibility provided a much more tactile imperative, to justify its focus on deflation 





the themes and/or rationalizations in its appeals for a “globalizing” policy mix included more 
cognitively based arguments on the need for inflation reduction and unrestricted access to 
foreign exchange markets, as well as normative ones that raised the importance of economic 
flexibility and investor confidence (IMF, 1989a; IMF, 1990a; IMF, 1993a ). It is important to 
note that the deflationary policies herein, do appear to come as a direct reaction to the persistent 
bouts of inflation within Argentina in the run-up to the 1990s. However, it was the IMF’s 
position that the fiscal imbalances incurred during the Alfonsín administration were the cause of 
Argentina’s inflation. However, by focusing solely on the prior administration’s [alleged] 
largesse, the IMF ignored the burden of Argentina’s compounding external debt, and  arrears 
from loans originated during the 1970s military junta (see Cantamutto & Ozarow, 2016; Gelpern, 
2005; Jayachandran, & Kremer, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to subdue these mounting inflationary pressures, the IMF 
Figure 1. The IMF’s monetary policy advice (1989-1999) 
 













































staff pressed for the implementation of a sound monetary policy mix that would float the Peso 
freely, while simultaneously curtailing fiscal spending (IMF, 1989a). Thus, just 1 ½ years prior 
to the establishment of the US dollar convertibility regime the IMF Staff had actually advised 
against the preservation of any set rate of exchange, which the authorities follow through on in 
December of 1989 (IMF, 1989a). However, within a year of attempting to float the peso freely, 
the Staff would effectively guide a managed devaluation. Yet, this was by no means a green light 
for a loose money policies, as they appealed for the implementation of public sector price 
increases and tightened monetary controls—all in the guise of curbing demand (IMF, 1989a).   
Herein, the Staff rationalized the managed devaluation, which was accompanied by 
austerity measures as an economic imperative that would not only directly depress internal 
demand, but more importantly “helped reverse the deterioration of the fiscal and balance of 
payments positions by correcting basic price relationships” which in theory would lead to a 
“reduction of inflation and [the] restoration of confidence” (IMF, 1989a). Confidence herein, is 
an interesting factor within the Staff’s assumptions or desired outcomes, as it is in itself a 
concept that is laden with externalizing as well as normative qualities (Hay & Rosamond, 2002).  
Asides from this push for a flexible exchange rate regime, the staff also sought greater 
independence of the Argentine Central Bank (ACB). However, outside of noting its benefit to 
inflationary pressures, these requests were much more authoritative, as they were not 
accompanied by more elaborate justifications. For instance, in an effort to restore the ACB’s 
profitability en route to its full independence, the Staff called for a halt to public sector financing 
by the year’s end. The rationale of both the Staff and the Executive Board was that this virtual 
guarantee of financing placed an undue “burden on the Central Bank” while also precluding the 




recommended the transfer of these “quasi-fiscal” debts to the treasury, which the Central Bank 
could then re-monetize (IMF, 1989a).  
In November 1990, the IMF Staff celebrated the past 11 months of the free-floating 
exchange rate touting that, “since the introduction of a unified, freely floating exchange rate 
system in December 1989, the authorities have maintained unrestricted access to the exchange 
market” (IMF, 1990a). Ironically, less than 6 months later the Argentine authorities would be 
obliged to revert to a fixed exchange due the effects of rampant inflation. This fixed exchange 
would usher in the era of convertibility, a quasi-dollar peg that was managed through a currency 
board, which mediated the exchange of Pesos into US dollars at face value. However, the staff 
remained resolute throughout the run-up to the eventual shift in monetary policy, as they futilely 
pressed the authorities to intensify its adjustment efforts in the hopes of saving free-float (IMF, 
1990a). The Board reiterated the Staff’s sentiments, making it clear that the success of 
Argentina’s monetary policy (free-float) depended on its retrenchment efforts (IMF, 1990c).
2
  
4.1.1 Monetary policy under the convertibility plan   
Not much had changed a year into the convertibility regime as the IMF continued to 
advocate for a deflationary policy mix that suppressed internal demand, albeit now in the guise 
of maintaining the peso to dollar parity in the open market (IMF, 1992b; IMF, 1992a). Once 
again the effect of this was to create a logic of necessity ala Colin Hay that rendered alternatives 
moot and thus, non-negotiable within the Article IV consultations (Watson & Hay; 2003; Hay & 
Smith, 2005). In 1992, the Staff reaffirmed that “monetary policy will continue to be conducted 
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 Going further, the staff not only pushed for the deepening of fiscal cuts, but also urged authorities to hasten the 
planned privatization projects in order to channel the revenue towards the reduction of its external debts. Asides 
from speeding up the anticipated sales of the state run airline and its telecommunications firm, the staff also lobbied 
for the state to widen its privatization project in the guise of generating a revenue stream sufficient to sustain the free 




under the discipline of the fixed exchange rate regime and the strict limitation on lending to the 
public sector” (IMF, 1992a). Here, the Executive Board once again sought to raise interest rates 
in order to suppress the consumer demand for credit because of the large margins that had 
accrued at the institutional and wholesale level, as opposed to retail lending (IMF, 1992b).  
Ultimately, the Staff’s primary means of maintaining its preferred deflationary monetary 
policy mix was through the reduction of the deficit, which required deepening fiscal cuts. Herein, 
the Executive Board called for a primary surplus targeted at 2% per year in order for Argentina 
to cover its interest payments while allowing for “a steady decline in the public debt ratios; the 
maintenance of the current exchange rate arrangement and full reserve backing for the monetary 
base; and a deepening of structural reforms” (IMF, 1992a). Directors also perseverated on the 
need for inflation reduction while targeting international levels as the ideal mean (IMF, 1992a). 
Although six years away from the start of their repayment, the topic of fiscal bond consolidations 
was also brought up in order to stress the importance of fiscal retrenchment or otherwise keep the 
coordinative discourse on a strict path of currency appreciation via fiscal consolidation: 
Argentina needed to anticipate these obligations in framing its medium-term fiscal 
plans. Directors noted in this connection the undertaking expressed in the policy 
memorandum to assess the implications of issues of consolidation bonds in the 
context of program reviews. (IMF, 1992b)  
The Staff carried over many of the same conditions from the year prior, as inflation concerns 
remained the linchpin of its monetary policy mix.  Indeed, the fixed exchange rate had fit neatly 
within the IMF’s deflationary discursive tract as they continued to press authorities to focus on 
“raising savings and curbing inflation, as well as increasing the economy's flexibility” (IMF, 
1993a). This latter point was a new wrinkle in their policy advice and also a bit of a stretch. In 




means of stabilizing the exchange rate regime.  Here they asserted that a “successful adherence 
to the fixed exchange rate arrangement adopted by Argentina requires increased flexibility in the 
labor market” (IMF, 1993a). The Board concurred on the need to curb the expansion of credit by 
calling for tighter monetary policy as well as the “the imposition of marginal reserve 
requirements on foreign currency and peso deposits,” which would set a floor on Argentina’s 
foreign reserves, while reducing the velocity of money (IMF, 1993b).  
In 1994, the IMF’s discourse once again used inflation control as an economic imperative 
to crowd out the space for heterodox policies. For instance, the Staff praised the success of 
austerity measures in bringing “inflation under control by eliminating the fiscal deficit, curbing 
central bank credit, abolishing indexation and pegging the exchange rate” (IMF, 1994a). Also in 
line with the thesis’ operationalized policy mix upheld by proponents of neoliberal 
globalization’s logics, the Executive Board followed suit praising the lower, single-digit inflation 
levels; nevertheless, they urged for continued monetary discipline. They also pointed towards 
maintaining interest rates at levels high enough to not only induce, but also sustain domestic 
savings and investments (IMF, 1994b). This complemented the Staff’s suggestion of 
strengthening bank supervision as a means of assuring the stability of the financial sector.  
Additionally, this same line carried over into the 1995 report, wherein the Staff continued to 
praise the positive strides made towards shoring up the banking system, which was credited to 
the authority’s adherence to austerity measures (1995a).   
4.1.2 The IMF’s monetary policy mix during Argentina’s deflationary spiral (1998- 1999)  
Policy blunders due to the inability to entertain heterodox ideas or theories of demand 
also became evident with during the initial stages the Argentina’s deflationary spiral. Granted 




mark a critical inflection point. From this point onwards the Argentine economy found itself 
caught in a deflationary spiral that would not touch bottom until their 2002 default. Moreover, 
the country’s GDP would not return to pre-crisis levels until 2007.  
On path to a monumental collapse, the 1998 Staff Report failed recognize any signs of 
weakness or structural rigidity within the economy, as they continued to praise Argentina’s 
efforts to support the convertibility plan through deflationary measures (IMF, 1998a). In fact, the 
Staff lauded the proposed fiscal adjustment law, which would restrict spending by indexing 
expenditures to a percentage of GDP. Ironically, while the staff made no contingencies for the 
negative effects of deflation, they did preemptively call on the authorities to meet any 
inflationary pressures with “quick and decisive fiscal and credit policy actions to restrain 
domestic demand…” (IMF, 1998a).  
Surprisingly unlike the staff’s appraisal, the 1998 EBM offered less of a consensus on 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, their outlook remained fairly optimistic as they awaited a “gradual 
improvement in subsequent years” (IMF, 1998b). A year later, now faced with an imminent 
currency collapse, which was externalized as being precipitated by the potential devaluation of 
the Brazilian real—the IMF and Argentine authorities began toying with the idea of full 
dollarization of the economy. They reasoned that this initiative would “reduce the currency risk 
premium over the medium term” (IMF, 1999a; IMF, 1999b). The Staff supported the idea in the 
hopes that it would eliminate the massive interest rate mark ups on debt denominated in the 
rapidly depreciating peso (IMF, 1999a). However, this is not to say that they considered 
dollarization as a replacement for their longstanding support for austere monetary and fiscal 
policies— as the Staff argued that further cuts should contribute to the reduction in interest rate 




One of the recurring themes found throughout the IMF’s coordinative discourses on 
monetary policy was its stubborn adherence to orthodox policy prescription, even during period 
wherein it proved to be wholly inappropriate— both in logical and practical senses. For instance 
during, in 1989 the IMF failed to see the link between its deflationary monetary stance and the 
implementation of the peso-dollar convertibility, which it initially resisted, but ultimately came 
to fervently defend. Paradoxically, in the late nineties its obstinate support of convertibility— a 
policy it had initially rebuffed— would catalyze and later prolong Argentina’s deflationary 
spiral.  
Between these two extremes, where its periods of success. What is most interesting about 
the years 1994 to 1995 was that it marked a period of economic growth, which ultimately did 
nothing to alter the IMF’s general stance on monetary policy.  During this time Argentina 
experienced a spike of investment lead growth, which the Fund attributed to the success of 
initiatives to stabilize the peso and the cash infusions stemming from the privatization boon. 
However, these gains did not alter the executive Fund’s monetary policy mix as they advised the 
authorities to continue to follow “sound fiscal policy” in order to sustain the convertibility 
regime and market confidence (IMF, 1995a; IMF, 1995b; IMF, 1996b). Ultimately, this resulted 
in a policy mix that— time and again— precluded the space for heterodox theories and policy 
initiatives.  
4.2 The IMF’s tax advice (1989-1999) 
Figure 2 illustrates that from 1989 to 1999 the totality of the IMF’s tax and tariff advice was not 
only staunchly neoliberal, but patently “globalizing”.  Herein, two of the major prongs within the 
IMF’s policy discourse were identified as appeals that sought to flatten the Argentine tax system 




trade was authoritative and based more on a terse by-the-numbers cognitive logic that provided 
very little in the way of explanations or rationalizations, as opposed to the abovementioned 
issues of monetary policy. 
 
Discussions on tax policy, beginning with the 1989 staff report, advocated for the 
implementation of a “…a generalized value-added tax [VAT], without exemptions, and at a 
single rate of 15 percent…” (IMF, 1989a; IMF, 1989c). In this initial meeting, the Staff also 
praised the savings garnered from “the suspension of subsidies and industrial promotion 
incentives under the Economic Emergency Law…” (IMF, 1989a). In a similar vein, the 1990 
Staff sought the elimination of quantitative import restrictions as well as an across-the-board 
reduction of tariffs and specific “export taxes on agricultural products” (1990a).  
In 1992 the IMF continued to drive its terse discourse focused on liberalizing on 
Argentina’s tax system, via the implementation of a flat or regressive structure, which would also 
Figure 2. The IMF’s tax advice (1989-1999) 
 














































serve as a constraint on fiscal policy. Here, the IMF lent it support to a scheme that proposed to 
only tax the net profit of firms (IEPE TAX), suggesting that it worked similar to a VAT, while 
the Board additionally called for more VAT increases
 
(IMF, 1992a; IMF, 1992b; ).
3  
In 1993, the 
Staff sought to establish a more structural and austere tax reform agenda as it urged for the end 
of demand-inducing tax incentives, additional increases to the VAT, and further fiscal cuts in the 
guise of offsetting this regressive tax structure (1993a).  
Essentially, the logic of the Staff and Executive Board was to squeeze greater margins 
(via fiscal retrenchment) to offset the reduced tax revenue stream (IMF, 1993a; 1993b). 
Specifically, the Staff declared that authorities had exhausted “room for tax cuts and subsidies to 
reduce production costs and promote private investment” (1993a). Herein, the Board explicitly 
urged authorities to end all industry specific subsidies, such as the reduced interest rate program 
for small and medium sized business (1993b). Additionally, the Board also lobbied for the 
removal of capital gains taxes and agricultural tariffs across the provinces (1993b).  
Removing trade barriers was a recurrent issue during the 1990s, which as delineated 
above, fits within the operationalized logics of neoliberal globalization’s “policy paradigm” (Hay 
& Smith, 2005). For example, the 1994 Staff Report explicitly asserted that “international trade 
should be liberalized further” primarily through the removal of tariffs and subsidies in order to 
curb protectionist policies in the “domestic automobile and truck industry” (IMF, 1994a). They 
argued that greater international competition would increase modernization and lower costs 
across the board. Yet at the same time, the Staff posited that “rapid export growth will depend 
heavily on further market penetration of exports of manufactured goods as a result of higher 
investment, improvements in competitiveness and trade deepening through MERCOSUR” 
                                                          
3






 Yet, it is clear that the removal of trade protections would have increased competition 
for the Argentine truck industry—at least in the short-term—by further exposing the market to 
international imports.  
The 1995 Staff Report once again focused on improving tax collections while cutting 
expenditures, as well as those stemming from revenue transfers to the provinces.  One Staff 
supported initiative came in the form of a 3% VAT hike, whose proceeds were to be exempt 
from provincial revenue sharing schemes. This specific VAT increase was “expected to yield 
over 2 percentage points of GDP in 1995,” which to be exclusively earmarked for the servicing 
of its external debt. (1995a). The Chair’s Summary reiterated much of the Staff’s advice, but in a 
much more general manner. Here, they encouraged authorities to implement a tax policy that 
restored “equilibrium in the fiscal balance for 1996” (IMF, 1995b). Additionally, Article IV 
consultations from 1996 and 1998 carried over many of the abovementioned concerns, as they 
too emphasized the need to improve administration protocols in place for VAT collections (IMF, 
1996a; 1996b; IMF, 1998a; IMF, 1998b).  
In 1998 the IMF turned its attention towards extricating Argentina from agreements that 
emphasized regional rather than global trade. Herein, both the Staff and Executive Board called 
for the reversal of a recent tariff increase on imports passed by the fledgling regional block, 
MERCOSUR (IMF, 1998a; IMF, 1998b). Although it was agreed that the 3% increase would not 
bring about any significant protectionist effects, the IMF nonetheless pressed authorities to 
withdraw. Whether or not the Fund acted in a strategic manner, MERCOSUR’s trade policies 
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had the potential to set a dangerous precedent with regards to how and who set future trade 
policy.  
In 1999, the IMF offered its praise of the authority’s success in not only reversing the 
MERCOSUR tariff increases on consumer goods, but also their ability to secure reductions for 
imports (IMF, 1999a; IMF, 1999b). Despite Argentina’s recent efforts, the Staff pushed for 
further liberalization of the tax structure, by drilling down to microeconomic concerns— and of 
all sectors, Argentine footwear (1999a). In their own words, the Staff reported that, “a plan is 
underway to monitor performance of the footwear industry and footwear imports” (1999a). In 
other words, the Staff wanted duties on textiles and footwear imports to be phased out, thereby 
removing any protections for Argentina’s domestic industry (1999a). The board also added its 
desire to see reductions in payroll taxes in the guise of boosting the competitiveness of the wider 
economy (1999b).   
Ultimately, throughout this period tax policy prescriptions faithfully followed the 
orthodox playbook— calling for, trade liberalization, the end of all industry subsidies, a 
regressive tax system, based on the expansion of VAT (See figure 2). In addition, the IMF 
discourse itself had an authoritative tenor with terse, cognitive explanations, which left little in 
the way of normative appeals. Simply put, the discourse barred heterodox ideas and polices.  




From 1989 to 1999, the IMF put together a discourse that once again, steered clear from 
entertaining or offering solutions outside of this thesis’ defined neoliberal goalposts (see figure 
3). Herein, the Fund relied primarily on an authoritative discourse that effectively demanded 
structural reform within all aspects of fiscal policy. The primary goal throughout was to sever the 
budgetary ties between the national and provincial level. Herein, the IMF sought to cut-off 
provinces from national revenue streams and end national social safety net programs.    
 
From 1989 to 1994, the IMF discourse maintained its emphasis on the need for Argentina 
to push ahead a structural reform agenda, based on fiscal consolidation. In particular, the 1989 
Staff Report pressed for the end of the provincial transfer system, which covered overruns in 
fiscal expenditures. The logic herein, was that this would force provincial governments to 
Figure 3. The IMF’s fiscal policy mix (1989-1999) 














































operate within their own means (IMF, 1989a; 1990a).
5
 Between 1992 and 1994, consultations 
redoubled their efforts at effecting sweeping structural reforms. In a complementary effort to cut 
national spending, the Fund now pushed for the decentralization of the administration and 
funding of health and education programs (IMF, 1992a; IMF, 1992b; IMF, 1993a; IMF, 1993b; 
IMF, 1994a). Specifically, the Fund sought the reform of social security and the state run health 
insurance system so that provinces were solely responsible for their management and costs (IMF, 
1992b; IMF, 1994a). 
By 1995 the Staff had cause for celebrating. Not only had authorities delivered on the 
implementation of steep cuts to provincial transfers, but structural changes began to force more 
austere operations, which lowered wages and also opened the door to further possibilities for 
privatization (IMF, 1995a). The following year, the Staff continued to call for the reform of the 
Argentine social security system. They also urged authorities to put together a “budget for 1997 
that would provide for no growth in nominal discretionary government expenditure” (IMF, 
1996a). The Executive Board followed up by attempting to hold provinces to task, as they 
expected immediate progress on the reform of social security, healthcare and privatization. They 
urged authorities to prioritize the reform of provincial financing, in order to structurally limit 
their ability to take on debt (IMF, 1996b; IMF, 1998a). 
The 1998 and 1999 saw the IMF attempt to ostensibly shift away from deliberating on 
fiscal policy altogether by attempting to systematize pro-cyclical policies of retrenchment as a 
preemptive catchall response to future downturns. Specifically, the Article IV consultations 
during this period were very forward looking, as they pushed for the development of policy 
contingencies that effectively automated or programmed future cuts, particularly within 
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education, public health, and social security (IMF, 1998a; 1998b; 1999a). The 1999 Staff Report 
showed their enthusiasm on the prospects of depoliticizing fiscal planning altogether, which 
came about via the proposed, “Fiscal Responsibility Law,” which “set permanent limits on 
public debt…” (IMF, 1999a).
6
  
In the 1999 article IV consultations the IMF began to acknowledge the limitations of its 
deflationary policy advice. Nevertheless, the IMF’s realization or omission that its long favored 
deflationary tactics were not always the best way forward came too late for Argentina’s sake. By 
early 1999 the economy was experiencing alarming rates of capital flight (See Chapter 2).  As 
the Staff’s Appraisal noted, “…further slowing of the economy in 1999 would have a negative 
impact on the public finances and may force a reconsideration of the fiscal plans” (IMF, 1999a). 
The Executive Board Chair also summed up the Fund’s cognitive struggles by noting that “the 
negative effects on the public finances of a slower pace of economic activity may require a 
flexibilization [sic] of the fiscal component of the program” (IMF, 1999b). Yet even while 
explicitly acknowledging the inefficacy of its core strategy centered on deflation— perhaps more 
of a cathartic exercise than an existential reappraisal of its policy biases— the IMF would urge 
authorities to remain on the agreed upon program, centered on fiscal retrenchment (IMF, 1999b). 
Throughout the latter part of the Menem administration, the IMF focused its efforts on 
preserving the convertibility regime through deflationary measures. Overall, retrenchment was 
the common factor within the Fund’s fiscal policy advice— scoring positively on every article 
IV consultation in question. In the late nineties, it became the only acceptable solution to rectify 
Argentina’s growing monetary quandary, which in hindsight diminished the importance of 
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tracking other economic factors— such as, job growth, living standards, and exports. Thus, the 
IMF’s discursive fixation on conserving the monetary peg through austerity, not only crowded 
out the space for ideas or theories that would have confronted the negative effects stemming 
from its deflationary policies, but actually accelerated the spiral—  which culminated in the crisis 
of 2001. 
4.4 Privatization and Regulatory policy advice from 1989-1999 
While the Menem administration was known for its unabashedly liberal stance on 
regulation, the analysis of the coordinative discourses of the Article IV consultations show that 
the Fund left nothing to chance, as discussions which included heterodox ideas or policies were 
largely absent (see figure 4; also see Schmidt, 2008). Specific to the financial privatizations and 
liberalizations, the IMF suggested that this would lead to a more modernized banking model that 
would provide a wider access to lending by tapping global credit markets and ultimately greater 
stability. In general, the IMF rationalized privatizations as a whole as a “beneficial” imperative 
towards economic modernization and efficiency, which carries these hyperglobalist 
characteristics or set of values and logics ala Hay and Smith (Hay & Smith, 2005; Smith, 2005).  
Also present was the IMF’s go-to deflationary rationale, which explicitly tied liberalization and 
the proceeds of privatization to its monetary policy goals.  
During this period, the Fund not only supported deregulation and privatization projects, 
but also sought to hasten their implementation. Privatization itself appeared to be a relatively 
new dynamic within the IMF-Argentine consultations as it was only mentioned on just two 
occasions before the start of the Menem administration (IMF 1986 & IMF 1987b).  However, 
During the Menem administration, appeals to liquidate state assets were present in all 18 of the 




present on 13 separate occasions. Some of the arguments for privatization included the promise 
of greater efficiency and a greater reserves, which would ease pressure on monetary policy.  
 
In 1989, the Staff sought to broaden the scope of the nascent privatization program by 
lending support to proposals that sprung from the “Law of Reform of the State,” which called for 
the sale of its national telephone company.  In defense of the plan, the Staff argued that 
privatization would not only lead to greater efficiency, but that the generation of capital 
produced by the sale would help curtail the state’s reliance on transfers from the treasury (IMF, 
1989a). However, the Staff and the Board of Directors pushed for the expansion of the 
privatization program, going as far as specifically targeting YPF, the state’s oil firm (IMF, 
1989a; IMF, 1989c). The IMF also praised the authority’s own initiative to involve of 
commercial banks in the privatization program, wherein they helped provide debt waivers in 
exchange for equity shares of privatized assets (IMF, 1990a).  
Figure 4. Regulatory Policy Mix 1989-1999   
 














































The developing hallmarks of the IMF’s advice was the consistency of its heterodox 
policy advice, as well as its inability to entertain ideas outside of its liberalizing discourse, even 
when objectives were met. In 1992, the IMF would suggest that authorities privatize Argentina’s 
social security programs as a way to not only lower costs, but also bolster capital investments 
from the formation of private pension funds (IMF, 1992b; IMF, 1994a). In the following year’s 
consultation, the Staff effectively declared victory noting that, “public finances have been 
strengthened, the economy has been liberalized, and the privatization process accelerated” (IMF, 
1993a). However, less than a month later the Executive Board was offering the authorities advice 
on managing the proceeds from the YPF sale so that it did not stimulate demand (IMF, 1993b). 
Additionally, the Board took their deflationary focus a step further, as they made the case for yet 
another fiscal retrenchment plan that would cancel out or offset the sale’s proceeds by making 
cuts in the equivalent amount (IMF, 1993b). 
Although just a year earlier the Staff declared the privatization program a success, the 
Executive Board continued to lobby for more government selloffs, especially at the provincial 
level (IMF, 1994b). This board meeting also voiced the Fund’s displeasure with the pace of the 
social security reform efforts. In particular, they sought to pressure authorities into moving 
forward with the proposed plan to transform social security from a consolidated, state controlled 
pool into individual accounts that could be sold off and managed by private pension funds (IMF, 
1994a). In an attempt to capitalize on the momentum to privatize, the Staff recommended that 
the national health insurance system be reformed in a similar manner to pensions (IMF, 1994a). 
In 1995, the Staff celebrated the Central Bank’s role in facilitating the consolidation the 
banking sector, wherein it lead the dissolution of 30 separate institutions, through mergers and 




seven provincial banks— while also notably mentioning the ten more that remained in the 
process of privatization. Yet despite the massive transformation of Argentine finance, the Staff 
and Board felt the need to spur on a “further impetus” in the consolidation of the private as well 
as provincial banks (IMF, 1995a; IMF, 1995b). In a rare turn, there was some dissention from a 
single IMF board member (A. Guillermo Zoccali) who linked the drop in demand for 
employment to the privatizations and the deregulation of labor laws. However, in true 
neoclassical form, his solution for this was a combination labor “flexibilization” and lower 
wages, along with plans to re-educate workers (IMF, 1995b).  
With the privatization of Argentine banks well in place, the 1996 Executive Board 
meeting sought the creation of an emergency liquidity fund, which would serve as a means to 
rescue the private banking sector from any future credit crunches (IMF, 1996b). Ironically, this 
emergency fund would have no effect on the massive liquidity crisis that would develop just 
three years after. Despite the negligible concerns voiced the year prior, the 1996 Staff Report 
sought to deepen the privatization of finance by not only pressing for the privatization of the 
remaining provincial banks, but now lobbied for the sale of Argentina’s largest national bank, 
Banco Nación (IMF, 1996a; IMF, 1998a). Going forward, more ramped up calls for the 
deregulation and privatization of the provincial and national banks continued through the 
remainder of the Menem administration (IMF, 1998a; IMF, 1998b; IMF, 1999b; IMF, 1999a). 
Outside of their efforts to privatize the financial sector, the Staff also took a supportive 
role of the authorities’ move to liquidate the State’s power grid, specifically its hydroelectric and 
nuclear power plants (IMF, 1996a). They also praised the privatization of the postal system and 
the sale of the state’s residual stake in YPF. The ‘98 Report also noted that, “Additional nontax 




1998a). Although they hoped for a quick-paced liquidation of the Argentine government’s asset, 
the Staff became displeased with the privatization program’s slowdown in 1997, due to mounting 
political opposition (IMF, 1998a).  
4.4.1 The IMF’s regulatory policy mix: liberalizing labor, finance, and bankruptcy protection   
Another way the IMF’s coordinative discourse guided regulatory policy deliberations 
was by consistently calling for rollbacks of Argentina’s regulatory framework in the areas of 
labor, finance and general business practices (Schmidt, 2008). For instance, the 1989 Staff report 
came out in support of the Argentine authorities’ proposals to follow flexible income guidelines 
(IMF, 1989a). In 1993, the IMF restated its support of proposals to liberalize labor regulations, 
which in their view allowed the market to act more responsively to economic fluctuations via the 
facilitation of “labor mobility” and the promotion “of more flexible employment conditions”  
(IMF, 1993a; IMF, 1993b). Not much had changed within the 1994 and 1995 consultations, 
which explicitly advised the authorities to “reduce restrictions on dismissals and promote more 
effective decentralization of the collective bargaining process” (IMF, 1994a; IMF, 1994b; IMF, 
1995a).  
In 1995, falling employment figures appeared to alter the IMF’s authoritative and terse 
discourse, as it began to search for justifications to its labor ineffective labor policies. Herein, the 
IMF put forth an externalizing discourse that shifted the shifted blame outside of Argentina’s 
borders. Specifically, the staff made the case that the slump in job market figures was due to 
distortions in labor statistics, which were in fact caused by the influx of migrant workers, which 
had expanded the supply of labor. In effect the staff went on to blame the spike in jobless claims 
on “… illegal immigrants from neighboring countries…” who had otherwise “…absorbed jobs 




The deregulation of finance and bankruptcy protection were two other regularly advanced 
prongs during the Menem administration. In 1994, the staff made the case for the liberalization 
of bankruptcy protection rules, citing the prospective benefits of added flexibility and 
competitiveness (IMF, 1994a). The Executive Board concurred with the Staffs assessment, while 
more broadly noting their desire for deeper deregulation that actually reached the provincial level 
(IMF, 1994b). In 1995, the staff praised the ratification of a sweeping mix of structural reforms 
that sought to hasten initiatives to liberalize labor and bankruptcy regulation (IMF, 1995a).  
However, this did not stop the following staff report from again calling on the authorities to 
muster greater resolve liberalize labor (IMF, 1996a). 
The authorities are continuing their efforts to obtain congressional approval of a reform 
of the system that, at least, would significantly reduce dismissal costs, eliminate the 
“ultra-actividad” and special labor statutes over time, and promote increased competition 
among union-run health care organizations. The enactment of such a reform will be a 
precondition for the conclusion of the first review of the program. (IMF, 1998a)  
 
Once again, the IMF discourse used different means to press for laxer regulation. For 
instance, the 1998 Staff Report was strikingly authoritative in its demands by making labor 
reform a precondition for Argentina’s debt rollover (IMF, 1998a). In contrast to the Staff’s 
bluntness, the Executive Board took a more tempered approach, instead focusing on the potential 
“benefits” of the “early passage of a labor market reform package” (IMF, 1998b). Herein, one of 
the Board’s more pressing concerns herein was the elimination of the law of Ultra Actividad, 
which guaranteed the renewal of contracts for union members during labor disputes (IMF, 
1998b).
7
 Ultimately, the IMF’s labor reform package was ultimately passed in September of 
1998. Just a year later, the IMF was in search of even deeper labor reforms, this it focused on 
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specifically on easing dismissal practices, in the guise of stimulating labor demand and 
“competition” (IMF, 1999a; IMF, 1999b).  
Ultimately, the IMF’s regulatory advice, both in terms of its staunch support of 
privatization as well as its deregulation agenda clearly shows that the space for heterodox 
solutions was wholly crowded out by the Fund’s neoclassical biases (see figure 4). While the 
rationales and/or arguments for the abovementioned policies of liberalization and privatization 
were conspicuously varied, the desired policy outcomes were consistently neoliberal. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Throughout the decade of the nineties, the IMF-Argentine discourses were consistent with the 
thesis’ operational definition of a neoliberal policy paradigm— along all four dimensions 
examined (e.g., monetary, tax, fiscal, and regulatory). Remarkably, how the coordinative 
discourse of the IMF promoted or rationalized their preferred policies was quite varied, as 
appeals or justifications tying back to hyperglobalist logics, which set out external constraints 
were less frequent within the Article IV deliberations (Schmidt, 2008). However, in its place was 
a much more technical and authoritative rationale centered on reducing inflation, which 
nonetheless, provided that external threat or constraint—via the exchange rate— that social 
constructivists would normally attach to the “globalization” discourse (Hay & Watson, 2003; 
Hay & Smith, 2005).   
Moreover, touching on Marsh’s need for balance between the material and ideational, the 
structural aspects of the convertibility regime itself effectively depoliticized the continued use of 
neoliberal policies, while also shielding foreign investments from incurring losses on their 




technically fit the conventional liberal mold it nonetheless coincided with the externalizing logics 
of globalization, and ultimately served to buttress its neoliberal policy mix (Hay & Marsh, 2003; 
Hay & Rosamond, 2002). For instance, this study found that fiscal retrenchment was its most 
consistent condition—scoring positively on every article IV consultation in question from 1989 
to 1999.  
Moreover, the maintenance of the peso’s convertibility also became the basis for the 
advancement of neoliberal initiatives falling into the other dimensions covered—namely, tax and 
trade, as well as its stance on liberalization and privatization.  In terms of tax advice, the data 
showed that the IMF’s patently liberal schemes not only focused on deploying a regressive tax 
structure that relied more heavily on VAT revenues, but also on extricating Argentina from 
MERCOSUR’s regionally focused tariff scheme in order to open it up to global trade. During 
this period in question, 13 out of 18 consultations had the IMF explicitly seeking to either raise 
the VAT or reduce income tax.   
Throughout the Menem administration, the IMF displayed a deep commitment to 
advance the privatization agenda, the deregulation of labor and finance, as well as the 
augmentation of creditor rights via reforms of the judicial system. In total, the IMF sought 
privatization initiatives in all 18 consultations examined. The latter half of the 1990’s saw the 
IMF roll out an all-out blitzkrieg for the wholesale liquidation of Argentine government assets. 
From 1996 to 1999, the IMF specifically lobbied for the privatization of Argentina’s electrical 
grid, postal system, air transit, and telecommunications infrastructure— all under the guise of 




Midway through the Menem administration the Staff did make one perplexing omission 
by acknowledging that potentially harmful effects on demand from its liberalization and 
privatization project (1995b). In a later report the Staff recommended that revenues from 
privatizations should go towards high return investments, rather than the financing current 
expenditures, which includes interest payments on sovereign debt (IMF, 1998a). However, this 
acknowledgement was duplicitous, as the privatized firms were generating returns for the state, 
in the form of subsidized consumer costs and its net positive effect on the national employment 
rate.  
Despite their tacit acknowledgement, consultations in the thick of the Argentine Great 
Depression chose to put the onus solely on external circumstances. In the Fund’s view, the 
Brazilian devaluation was the root cause of Argentina’s massive unemployment, as well as the 
rapidly deteriorating conditions (IMF, 1999a; IMF, 2000a). Therefore by externalizing 
Argentina’s deflationary spiral, the Fund was able to take attention off of the endogenously 
created institutional failures, as well as the effects of its own advice. Altogether, the Fund’s 
advice read as a veritable barrage of neoclassical demands, which preempted alternative ideas 
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5. A requiem for flexibility: policy bias during Argentina’s Great 
Depression (2000-2006) 
Chapter 5 carries the content analysis on the IMF’s coordinative discourses forward by 
chronicling the period of 2000-2006 (Schmidt, 2008). It again stands on the premise that the 
scope of the institutional deliberations, as well their general disposition are very much indicative 
of policy outcomes. Therefore towards the case of the IMF-Argentine negotiations this analysis 
should help reveal the extent of the Fund’s flexibility. The goal of this chapter— like that of the 
past two— is to further establish whether or not space for alternative policies was ever afforded 
to Argentina. In order to deliver on its aims, this chapter first provides a chronological mapping 
of the discursive space provided by the Fund.  
Asides from addressing the space for ideas within policy-making institutions, the results 
from this chapter inquiry on the coordinative discourses of the IMF-Argentine consultations also 
contributes to the empirical debates on the Fund itself by testing the veracity of the claims made 
by IMF scholars who suggest that the 2000s ushered in a temporary “experimentalist” phase 
(Schmidt, 2008; also see Broome, 2010; Dieter, 2006; Graham & Masson, 2002). This second 
point speaks to the recent intuitionalist counter, which argues that the IMF was not simply a 
champion of the Washington Consensus or neoliberalism in general, but that it had in fact 
demonstrated outward signs of flexibility. In other words, these authors posit that there was 
indeed some ideational or discursive space for heterodox approaches— as early as 2002 
(Broome, 2010; also see chapter 2).
 1
 
                                                          
1
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dropped at onset of the 2008 crises— due in part to the resurgence of demand for loans. Herein, then a historical 
tracing of the IMF-Argentine negotiations can serve as a rigorous test case for the flexible thesis. In the event that no 




5.1 Monetary policy advice under De la Rua (2000- 2001) 
During the short-lived De la Rua presidency, the IMF was unwilling to reflect on the failures of 
the past 25 years of neoclassical rigidity as it continued to insist on a monetary model in 
reducing demand, which culminated in Argentina’s 2001 financial crisis (see figure 1). During 
this period, the Article IV consultations also show an inability to effectively monitor and assess 
the changing economic conditions. Moreover, it was during these early stages of the crisis that 
the Fund’s intransigence was on full display as it deflected all culpability by blaming the 
economic difficulties on external monetary shocks, in both Brazil and Russia, as well as the 
Argentine government’s failure curtail spending. While this explained the deflationary pressure 
on the peso itself, it did not acknowledge the role of financial liberalization in facilitating capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
findings should serve temporally truncate the notion that the IMF entertained or provided the space to maneuver 
outside of the orthodoxy. Considering Argentina’s last Article IV consultation took place in July of 2006, a negative 
result would essentially narrow the Fund’s ‘experimentalist’ window from approximately 6 years to a 2 year span.   
Figure 1. Monetary policy advice under De la Rua (2000- 2001) 
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exit flows, nor did it account for the growing unemployment, which was a direct cause of the 
privatization policies (see chapter 2).
2
 
The latter part of this assertion is quite problematic, since the Menem administration was 
heralded by the IMF’s managing director, Michel Camdessus, as a model state due to its faithful 
adherence to conditionality reforms, which slashed fiscal spending and regulations, while also 
pushing through the privatization program (Camdessus, 1998; also see chapters 2 and 4). 
Overall, the Article IV consultations failed to consider the potential links between the structural 
adjustment polices it had endorsed and Argentina’s growing dependence on foreign financing as 
well as its skyrocketing unemployment rate, which stood at 18.3% in 2001 (IMF, 2000a; IMF, 
2000c; World Bank 2016). What the IMF did do was present a discourse that externalized the 
causes of Argentina’s economic downturn. 
Its inability to self-assess the efficacy of its policy advice was also compounded by its 
apparent unawareness of the economic conditions, as on the precipice of Argentina’s 
monumental economic collapse the IMF staff forecasted a generally positive outlook. In the 
Staff’s own words, “The Argentine economy is now in a better underlying position than in recent 
years to achieve moderate growth, with price stability, and sustainable external deficits over the 
short and the medium term” (IMF, 2000c). In hindsight, this assessment proved that the IMF had 
a very limited capacity to act as monitor of the macro economy, although it continues to be 
touted as perhaps their second competency, following its core role as lender of last resort. 
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 Drawing from the data of Ennis and Pinto, McKenzie and Mookherjee estimated a 75% cut in jobs at privatized 
firms (McKenzie & Mookherjee 2003, 21; Ennis & Pinto 2002). McKenzie and Mookherjee further note that 
privatizations “in the utilities (electricity, natural gas, water, telecommunications, airlines, railways and oil) between 
1987-1990 and 1997 are estimated to have constituted 13% of the increased unemployment of the economy” 




Ultimately, what they were able to monitor effectively was the extent to which Argentina 
implemented its neoliberal prescriptions. 
During De la Rua’s short reign, one of the more pronounced and consistent demands 
from the IMF was the maintenance of the Peso’s US Dollar convertibility. In 2000, the IMF 
warned that any move away from the currency board’s virtual dollar peg would lead to greater 
inflationary pressures and loss of investor confidence (IMF, 2000c; IMF, 2000b). The logic 
behind this argument was that although the state would gain autonomy by printing more, it 
would debase the real value of its currency, as well as outstanding debts denominated in pesos. 
For private creditors— the overall value of their receivable accounts would suffer, especially on 
the global market. Thus staying true to its hyperglobalist world view, the IMF effectively 
concluded that external effects weighed more heavily than the internal economic dynamics (e.g., 
the spike in unemployment and the virtual cessation of private lending) (IMF, 2000c; IMF, 
2000b). 
Although economists of a heterodox suasion would argue the contrary, the IMF remained 
adamant on the view that the convertibility had in fact shielded the Argentine state from external 
shocks. “Directors noted that the convertibility regime, together with a strong financial system 
had served Argentina well in weathering the major external shocks that had affected it in recent 
years” (IMF, 2000d). As duplicitous as it might sound, the Board “further emphasized that a 
viable external position will be crucial to support the convertibility regime, which continues to 
serve the economy well” (IMF, 2001b). Perhaps even more indicting was the Board’s 
incongruous adherence to pro-cyclical logics, which suggested that “the resumption of 
sustainable growth depended crucially on credible further [sic] progress in fiscal consolidation 




Argentine economy from an external or a “global” perspective, it not only neglected its internal 
dynamics, but actually accelerated its decline.  
The IMF’s inability to provide space to heterodox ideas was further evidenced by its 
responses to Argentine proposals. For instance, in what appeared to be an act of sheer 
desperation the Argentine authorities proposed to introduce the uniquely Keynesian notion of 
tying the peso to a basket of currencies in the hopes of bringing down the costs of maintaining its 
peg. However, the IMF quickly shot this down and retorted by insisting that authorities pledge to 
uphold the convertibility regime.  Despite the deflationary spiral, the Staff’s view was that any 
deviation from the convertibility scheme could send the economy into hyperinflation and also 
hurt private investments (IMF, 2001a). The Board followed the staff’s lead, presenting 
convertibility as the only way forward. Additionally they implored the Argentine authorities to 
find the resolve to implement even more unpopular cuts to sustain the monetary regime.  
In 2001, the IMF attempted to quash any further rumblings that suggested a move away 
from convertibility when they effectively apologized on behalf of the Argentine government. 
The Staff began by critiquing the feasibility and timing of the authority’s proposal to realign the 
peso, while cynically praising their renewed commitment to convertibility (IMF, 2001c).  In an 
attempt to regain control of Argentina’s monetary policy debate, brought the focus of the 
discussion back to the application of austerity measures, which it saw as a first step in restoring 
confidence in the convertibility regime. “Directors agreed that the first priority was to restore the 
credibility of the fiscal position and the convertibility regime, and that this will depend critically 
on determined implementation of the zero budget deficit strategy” (IMF, 2001e). From 2000-




technically lead to a devaluation of Argentina’s peso denominated liabilities (IMF, 2001c; IMF, 
2001b; IMF, 2001d).  
Directors noted the proposal to modify the convertibility regime by linking the peso to a 
basket including the euro alongside the U.S. dollar, in order to reduce the volatility of the 
effective exchange rate. They expressed some concern about the timing of the 
announcement, and welcomed the authorities, reiteration of their commitment to the 
convertibility regime, in view of the importance of maintaining confidence. (IMF, 2001b; 
IMF, 2001d)  
Coinciding with the thesis’ operationalized logics of globalization, Central Bank independence 
and directives for supply-side monetary easing were other important prongs within the Fund’s 
monetary policy mix (Hay & Smith, 2005; see chapter 2). However, before calling for further 
support of the financial sector or the ACB, the Executive Board delineated its position clearly. 
Here the Chair highlighted the Board’s consensus, which “stressed that the authorities should not 
attempt to influence the allocation of credit, and should especially avoid using financial 
institutions to support specific sectors or categories” (IMF, 2000b). Yet, prior meetings in 2000 
had already set the foundation for the government’s support of the banking consolidation and the 
independence of the Central Bank.  
Another major IMF policy position that was consistent throughout the previous chapters 
and also present in the 2000-2001 monetary policy mix, was the focus on reducing inflation 
through deficit reduction. In 2000, the Staff did this by tying Argentina's monetary stability to its 
relative degree of fiscal cuts (IMF, 2000c). However, during the Executive Board Meeting, a 
brief moment of introspection occurred when the Chair challenged the efficacy of seeking to 
achieve growth through deflationary policies (IMF, 2000d). Nevertheless, the 2001 staff report 
was much more subtle as opposed to the Chair’s more critical reflections. Here, the staff praised 
the authority’s headway in reducing the current account deficit— albeit that it was mostly 




least in part due to the effects of the State’s import substitution practices, which had nonetheless 
been strongly opposed in terms of the IMF’s preferred trade policy mix (IMF, 2001a).  
Thus, the IMF’s desired ends of smaller deficits and lower inflation were not the result of 
their austere policies, but rather a patchwork use of heterodox solutions that they had 
consistently opposed. Despite the acknowledged success of the import substitution scheme, the 
Staff attempted to steer the Argentine government back towards its preferred orthodox policy 
mix. Specifically, they called on the state to shore up political resolve in order to further tighten 
its fiscal policy (IMF, 2001c). In September, the Board echoed to the Staff’s position by calling 
on authorities to reaffirm their commitment to reducing the balance of payments deficits through 
the continued use of austerity measures, as they warned that the convertibility regime was at 
stake. Moreover, the Board made it clear that they wanted these measures to be applied 
“forcefully” (IMF, 2001e). Although not what the IMF’s board had in mind, these words 
ominously foreshadowed the tragic events that occurred on December 20
th
— when 26 protestors 
died at the hands of riot police in Buenos Aires.    
5.1.1 Tax policy advice under De la Rua  
 
Between 2000 and 2001, the IMF’s tax advice focused on the liberalization of trade and 
implementing better compliance directives (see figure 2). In terms of tax compliance, the IMF 
emphasized the elimination of loopholes and reporting in the hopes that it would bolster the 
state’s collection efforts. The IMF also consistently appealed for further liberalization of trade 
across the board in the hopes of further opening up Argentina to global, rather than regional 
markets. Herein, they specifically sought Argentina’s withdraw from its regional trade 




the IMF’s coordinative discourse on tax policy once again maintained a rigidly orthodox tenor 
(Schmidt, 2008). 
 
On the domestic front, the IMF urged the authorities to work on eliminating subsidies, 
such as exemptions and loopholes (IMF, 2001a). From 2000-2001, the Fund’s tax advice 
centered on compliance and the elimination of subsidies rather than any specific changes to its 
VAT or income tax ratios (IMF, 2000d; IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2001c). Nevertheless, there were no 
actual instances of support for countercyclical tax schemes outside of some minor tweaks that 
benefited finance. Additionally, there was a call for the removal of the financial transaction tax, 
which essentially poached small banking transactions (IMF, 2001c). The Staff also praised “tax 
incentives and regulatory changes aimed at promoting a recovery of investment and sustainable 
output growth” (IMF, 2001c). 
Figure 2. Tax policy advice under De la Rua (2000- 2001) 
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Outside of finance however, the Board of Directors made the call for greater transparency 
and competition in domestic markets as they urged authorities to “continue abiding by WTO 
rulings and to resist protectionist pressures” (IMF, 2000d). However, this call to liberalize 
consumer markets came four months prior to the abovementioned praises, wherein the staff 
acknowledged that Argentina’s import substitution policies had in fact cut deficits from prior 
trade imbalances (IMF, 2001a). However, going forward the Executive Board sought to open up 
Argentina via the liberalization of tariffs and trade agreements (IMF, 2001b). Their first request 
was that Argentina exit from MERCOSUR, the burgeoning South American trade block. They 
had taken issue with the block’s reduced common trade tariff, which was exclusive to member 
states. In terms of MERCOSUR, the IMF remained adamant as it called on authorities to rescind 
this trade agreement on two separate occasions (IMF, 2001c; IMF, 2001d).  
5.1.2 Fiscal policy advice under De la Rua  
 
Figure 3. The IMF’s fiscal policy mix (2000-2001) 
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The IMF’s fiscal policy mix during the De la Rua administration once again followed the logics 
of neoliberal globalization, by consistently proposing progressively deeper fiscal cuts as a means 
of economic stimulus (see figure 3; Hay & Smith, 2005). Overall, the IMF’s fiscal policy 
discourse consistently and incrementally pressed for austerity (Schmidt, 2008). Herein, the IMF 
demanded specific cuts that targeted social security, pensions, and healthcare. Latter appeals 
continued to call for even more austerity reasoning that the dismal state of the economy was in 
fact due to Argentina’s fiscal largesse, despite all its past efforts to drastically reform its social 
safety nets. When coupled with the earlier Article IV advice under the Menem administration it 
would appear that for the IMF, the perpetual bouts ever deepening retrenchment was an end in its 
own right, rather than the means to a stable “equilibrium.”  
In 2000, the staff pushed for legislation that would enact deeper reforms to the social 
security system, citing the programs long-term sustainability as the primary motive for the cuts 
(IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2000c; IMF, 2000b; IMF, 2001a). In 2000 and 2001, the IMF pressed 
Argentine authorities to expeditiously push these reforms through congress (IMF, 2000d; IMF, 
2001a). At least in part due to the pressure exerted by the IMF, De la Rua invoked his executive 
powers to initiate the reform of Argentina’s pension and healthcare system, while the use of line-
item vetoes allowed him to make deep cuts to the 2001 budget. Indeed, the Executive Board was 
pleased with De la Rua’s resolve as they openly praised his use of executive decree (IMF, 
2001b).  However, these bold and somewhat undemocratic moves did not make the transition 
any less arduous, as just two months later authorities found themselves embroiled in legal battles 
related to the planned healthcare and pension reforms that it had hoped to expedite (IMF, 2001e). 
In 2001, the IMF explained the economic decline as the direct result of lax fiscal policies, 




fiscal budget. The staff kicked off the year by praising the Central Bank’s efforts to increase 
interest rates, which in their view served as a signal to creditors of their commitment to austerity. 
Yet, in an unanticipated shift, the staff noted that perhaps fiscal targets should be eased due to 
the slower than anticipated recovery. However, it is hard to make much of their reflections as this 
same report strongly supported initiatives for a general spending freeze, which not only halted 
provincial transfers, but also ushered in proposals to make further cuts to the social security 
system (IMF, 2001a). Moreover, the rest of the Article IV consultations that year put forth their 
retrospective discourse, which effectively pinned Argentina’s economic woes on lax fiscal 
policies— while offering further austerity as the only way to manage the waning confidence of 
international financiers (IMF, 2001c; IMF, 2001d). 
5.1.3 Regulatory policy under De la Rua  
The IMF’s regulatory advice during the De la Rua administration again coincided with the logics 
of neoliberal globalization as it push forward an policy paradigm of deregulation, privatization 
and austerity as a means to stimulate the Argentine economy. For instance, the IMF’s solution to 
the brisk rise in unemployment was the liberalization of Argentina’s longstanding labor laws in 
the hopes that more flexible dismissal practices would encourage firms to hire. Naturally the 
Figure 4. Regulatory policy under De la Rua (2000-2001) 
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counter argument to this is that— under the current conditions— it would initially facilitate 
further purges in the labor ranks. As figure 4 illustrates, the consistent focus on both labor and 
financial liberalization during this period, once again lead to a coordinative discourse that 
precluded the space for alternatives.  
Like it had throughout the 1990s, the IMF continued to suggest that the Argentine 
economy would benefit from a greater focus on “domestic deregulation,” which in their view 
would, “help promote the competitiveness of the economy” (IMF, 2000b: IMF, 2000d; IMF, 
2001d). One of the best ways for the IMF to supported additional liberalization of domestic 
markets was through its support of the labor reform bill that was making its way through the 
Argentine congress. Herein, the staff cited the need to curb growing non-wage labor costs as well 
as other “rigidities” tied to employee rights. These non-wage labor costs singled out by the IMF 
essentially targeted labor regulation, such as unemployment laws and social security benefits, 
which included the state run private pension system (IMF, 2000a). In the IMF’s view, the state’s 
laws on employee dismissals were depressing demands for labor, which— in their view—
remained the primary hindrance to a turnaround in the unemployment figures (IMF, 2000c). In 
2001, the Executive Board’s tune shifted when it quietly admitted that the convertibility 
scheme’s deflationary effects were weakening demand for labor. Nevertheless, their solution was 
not to soften its monetary policy, which effectively pegged the peso to the dollar, but rather this 
served as more reason to cut benefits and liberalize labor laws (IMF, 2001e).  
The liberalization of finance was another facet of the IMF’s coordinative discourse that 
followed the neoliberal logics of globalization, as it not only facilitated the free flow of capital 
but it also served to uphold foreign and domestic claims on debts (Hay & Smith, 2005; Schmidt, 




dollar convertibility. Herein, they explicitly noted that any future devaluation of the peso would 
be taken as an infringement to the rights of creditors, whose receivables would be adversely 
affected (IMF, 2000a). On top of this, the IMF advised that the private sector should have direct 
access to the contingent repo facility, which effectively depoliticized future financial bailouts 
(IMF, 2001e). Altogether, they sought greater state backing of the private sector and in 
particular, finance. 
Asides from recommending that the Argentine state redouble its efforts to liberalize labor 
laws and cut fiscal expenditures, the IMF also lobbied for the privatization of the remaining state 
controlled assets. However, the past 12 years of Argentine policy suggested that continuing 
down this same pro-cyclical path would eventually bring the already decelerating economy to a 
complete standstill. Nevertheless, the IMF now pressed the state to sell off more of its assets 
including the national pension fund, the public healthcare system and public banks. In effect, the 
Fund never meaningfully considered whether the privatizations of the 1990’s— whose proceeds 
were followed by corporate restructurings that directly increased unemployment— were actually 
producing additional deflationary effects. A second factor overlooked with regards to 
privatizations was its long-term effects on deficits, as the loss of revenue streams were 
compounded by the dual effects of increased unemployment, which not only reduced the tax 
base, but also diverted more funds directly from the budgets in the form of transfer payments.  
Regardless of the problematic logic behind their assessment, Argentina was now 
negotiating with an IMF that sought the privatization of its pension funds, healthcare, 
telecommunications infrastructure and Argentina’s largest state owned bank (IMF, 2000d; IMF, 
2001b). In 2000, the staff specifically advocated for a shift towards a more Americanized style of 




organizations (HMOs) (IMF, 2000c). However, with economic conditions worsening, the 
Executive Board explicitly urged authorities to first begin by fomenting support for its envisaged 
reforms as they anticipated that this latest round of austerity would likely run into to political and 
institutional resistance. Interestingly, this was an explicit call for the politicization of policy, 
wherein the IMF itself openly acknowledged the critical nexus between ideas (public 
understandings) and policy outcomes.  
From 2000-2001, the IMF’s impetus to privatize provincial banks and the nationally 
owned, Banco Nación was slightly less politicized, yet in hindsight it would turn out to be much 
more structurally important, as private finance had effectively ceased lending in the months 
leading up to the 2001 financial crisis (see chapter 2) (IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2001e). In the IMF’s 
view however, the first step towards the privatization of the state bank was to get congress to 
approve legislation that authorized the “transformation of the Banco Nation into a federally-
owned corporation...” (IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2000b; IMF, 2001b).  Essentially, the IMF wanted to 
legally untangle the bank’s assets from that of the state, in order to prime or simplify its eventual 
privatization. In May of 2001, just three months after this proposal, the IMF Staff went as far as 
showering praise on the stability of the foreign banking sector, while putting into question the 
viability of publicly owned banks (IMF, 2001c). 
Ultimately, the discursive analysis found that the Fund had continued its path of 
liberalization. Clearly, this fit well with their long-term inclination to advocate for further 
privatization of state owned assets, as well as its current designs for Banco Nación. Yet, during 
this same period the highly regarded multinational banks were silently repatriating massive 
amounts of cash holdings (see chapter 2). Moreover, the larger international financiers would 




Agricole and Scotia Bank chose to abandon the market outright. (See section 2) Ironically, it 
would only take 7 months to once again, negate the Fund’s findings, as these same domestic 
banks that the staff had chastised proved to be Argentina’s last line of defense as financial 
markets evaporated.   
5.2 Monetary policy advice under Duhalde (2002-2003) 
During the interim presidency of Eduardo Duhalde the IMF’s monetary policy advice harped on 
two main points. First, they argued that the stability of Argentina’s currency depended on its 
ability to stave off inflation through fiscal and monetary restraint. The second prong in its 
monetary discourse was its push for greater central bank independence. Both of these liberal 
truisms would carry through the peso’s devaluation. Figure 5 shows that the IMF’s coordinative 
discourse on monetary policy once again strictly adhered to logics of globalization for the 
formulation of its advice.  
 
Figure 5. Monetary policy advice under Duhalde (2002-2003)   
 







1/11/2002 1/16/2002 5/16/2002 7/9/2002 12/17/2002 1/23/2003 2/5/2003 3/10/2003 3/19/2003




In January of 2002, just weeks after the corralito (banking freeze) the staff was pleased to 
note that Argentine authorities were now working on, yet another “economic program based on 
fiscal restraint and monetary discipline, aimed at setting the basis for sustainable growth” (IMF, 
2002a). Duhalde’s decision to devalue the peso at a fixed rate of 1:1.40 was perhaps the 
underlying reason why the Fund chose to set aside any discussions of growth, as it concentrated 
on keeping the state from any further devaluations. However, it appeared that neither the IMF, 
nor Argentine authorities gave much thought into the potential compounding effect these 
initiatives could have on the already stagnant economy. In turn, the ideational predominance of 
neoliberal globalization’s logics within the discourse obscured the pro-cyclical and deflationary 
implications posed by further monetary and fiscal restrictions.
3
  
Five months later, the staff provided a more accurate account of its goals as they appeared to 
downplay the exigency of economic growth, by concentrating on explaining their deflationary 
plan, which “aimed at maintaining discipline and the necessary balances to avoid excessive price 
increases and instability in the foreign exchange market” (IMF, 2002c). In other words, the Fund 
officially shelved any talk of growth as it concentrated on keeping the exchange rate stable, 
while also avoiding any other devaluations. In July, the staff continued to tether their narrative 
around the promotion of deflationary monetary policies. They urged the state to establish a 
“monetary anchor,” which meant that some sort of quasi-dollar peg should be reestablished 
(IMF, 2002d). This same staff report also expressed its eagerness to gauge the success of the 
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 In his treatise on the England’s return to the gold standard, Keynes posited that an appreciation in the stock of 
money only benefits the holders of paper, which comes at the expense of not only borrowers— whose outstanding 
debt burden is increased— but also the slowdown of productive sectors of the economy since “stock and raw 
materials will steadily depreciate” (Keynes Essays 102-103). As a result, deflationary effects incentivize people to 
hoard, both cash in order to collect higher returns on interest as well as assets (previously bought at higher prices) in 





ongoing scheme that securitized bank deposits, which posed to be a potential offshoot of the 
expanded banking freeze now know known as the “corralón”, or big corral (IMF, 2002d).  
Asides from trying to revert to lighter version of the same regressive policies, which had 
already proven to be catastrophic, the staff now redoubled its efforts at drawing a causal link 
from Argentina’s currency woes to its growing fiscal deficits. Specifically, the staff blamed the 
failure of the convertibility regime on the accrual of fiscal deficits, which it simply noted as 
beginning in the second half of the 1990s (IMF, 2002e). Although the staff’s reductive argument 
positively identified the inflection point in the economy’s trajectory, the growth of fiscal deficits 
and the devaluation itself was much more complex— and ultimately the cause of multiple 
factors. In turn, it left out any sort of introspective analysis that considered the fiscal costs 
associated with the surge in unemployment from the privatization, as well as opportunity costs 
from the sales, which diminished the state’s ability to generate revenue from the rents and 
income taxes associated with its now foregone assets. 
Independence for the Argentine Central Bank was a second talking point advanced by the 
IMF, which also coincides with the “common policy paradigm” of neoliberal globalization. 
(IMF, 2002d; IMF, 2003b). To this end, the Board supported the passage of current legislation 
that would indemnify public officials, including those within the ACB, from any liabilities 
resulting from their part in the resolution of the financial crisis (IMF, 2003a). Additionally, the 
Board called for a crackdown on the use of locally created currencies— which had sprung up 
during the liquidity crisis— in the hopes of reestablishing the Central Bank’s absolute control 
over the issuance of currency (IMF, 2003a). In March of 2003, the IMF offered a new set of 
suggestions on how to further assert the ACB’s independence. Here, the staff proposed that the 




demand for Central Bank bonds (IMF, 2003c). Overall, the Executive Board took a more general 
stance, which did appear to incorporate some the staff’s broader themes as it called on the state 
to curtail financial regulation as well as urging for greater Central Bank autonomy in the hopes 
of fostering “greater credibility to monetary policy” (IMF, 2003d). Altogether, the discourse, 
ideas therein as well as the policies discussed all remained rigidly anchored to the thesis’ 
operationally defined logics of neoliberal globalization.  
5.2.1 Tax policy advice under Duhalde  
 
Tax under policy advice under Duhalde began with the staff encouraging the Argentine 
authorities to put together “a comprehensive reform that modernizes and simplifies the tax 
system while encouraging investment, discouraging tax evasion and avoidance, and [sic] 
smuggling” (IMF, 2002c). As figure 6 illustrates, early in the Duhalde administration the Fund 
remained neutral with regards to tax policy, mostly by way of silence on the issues. In fact, it 
was not until December of 2002 that the IMF would revert to a discourse that explicitly 
Figure 6. Tax policy advice under Duhalde (2002-2003)   
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promoted supply-side or neoliberal policies. For example, their initial focus was on ending the 
recently introduced income tax and VAT cuts, which were aimed at stimulating aggregate 
demand (IMF, 2002e).  
Although the IMF sought to strengthen domestic tax collection, they preferred liberal 
trade policies, which in their view would help integrate Argentina’s economy into the global 
market. To this end, the January Chair’s Summary emphasized the pressing need for sweeping 
reforms of all trade tariffs— with the long-term objective of removing all trade barriers and 
export taxes (IMF, 2003a). In March, the IMF came out against the use of income tax 
exemptions on export rebates, essentially chipping away at the protectionist aspects of 
Argentina’s tariff scheme (IMF, 2003c; IMF, 2003d).   
5.2.2 Fiscal policy advice under Duhalde  
The IMF’s fiscal policy advice during the Duhalde administration was focused on 
institutionalizing austerity via systemization. For instance, the first Staff Report under the 
Duhalde administration set the tone for later negotiations, as the discussion centered on pressing 
for the development of “an economic program based on fiscal restraint and monetary discipline, 
aimed at setting the basis for sustainable growth” (IMF, 2002a; 2002b). This immediately 
constrained Duhalde’s economic latitude as it telegraphed exactly what the IMF would deem 
acceptable in terms of fiscal policy. By mid-May, the IMF Staff began displaying signs of 
frustration with the lack of headway made. Their remarks once again politely reminded the 
administration that the implementation of a “strong adjustment policy,” would lead to additional 
financing (IMF, 2002c).  In July, the staff would once again resort to these tactics as IMF funds 




The decision by Executive Directors to provide SRF resources to help Argentina cope 
with its balance of payments difficulties presumed that, within a short period of time, a 
strong adjustment policy would be implemented and adequate financing for the program 
would be forthcoming. (IMF, 2002d)  
In January of 2003, the IMF again pressed for structural reforms which not only targeted the 
provincial governments, but also depoliticized austerity therein by seeking the end of fiscal 
transfers from Buenos Aires. In the Executive Boards words, [the provinces] “need to be firmly 
anchored in the adjustment effort in order to achieve fiscal sustainability” (IMF, 2003a). They 
would reiterate these sentiments in February, as they now expressed their eagerness to receive 
“the authorities’ plans to begin preparation of legislation aimed at... reforming intergovernmental 
relations with a view to entrench fiscal discipline in the provinces” (IMF, 2003b). At the other 
end, the state worked quickly to appease the IMF’s wishes as by March, it had managed to reach 
agreements that consolidated fiscal policy with the majority of provincial governors (IMF, 
2003c; IMF, 2003d).  
Figure 7. Fiscal policy advice under Duhalde (2002-2003)  
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 The Fund’s proposals for structural reform did not stop with the passage of the 
provincial agreements, as they now lobbied for fiscal policy to be vertically integrated. This 
centralization of fiscal budgets stood to grant the national government a greater direct control of 
provinces. The IMF’s rationale for such extreme reforms was that the upcoming elections could 
potentially lead to politically motivated fiscal overruns (IMF, 2003c). Asides from its inherent 
rigidity, the Fund’s advocacy of command and control initiatives epitomize how neoclassical 
economics transcends the dichotomous arguments that juxtapose market liberal reforms with the 
managed approaches. The staff even took into consideration the political largesse that could 
result from Argentina’s election cycle, as they urged authorities to “enforce expenditure control 
at all levels of government given that presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections are 
all scheduled this year” (IMF, 2003c). Overall, IMF policy advice during the Duhalde 
administration consistently advocated for an austere fiscal policy mix, which later intensified in 
2003 (see figure 7). 
5.2.3 Regulatory & privatization policy under Duhalde  
During the Duhalde administration the IMF continued to push for a liberalizing regulatory policy 
mix that sought out to strengthen private finance and creditor rights. In terms of its privatization 
strategy, the IMF, again called on the state to “reform, restructure, and downsize public banks” 
(IMF, 2002d). Interestingly, this euphemistic way of calling for greater private sector control of 
Argentine finance was also flanked by the IMF’s support for more regulation and monitoring of 
financial institutions (IMF, 2003b).  Of course the catch for the promise of a stronger regulatory 
framework was the presumption that private finance would be taking on a larger share of 




However, the IMF’s push for the privatization of finance was quickly sidetracked as their 
focused turned to renegotiating the rescinded utilities contracts, as this not only jeopardized the 
inroads made under Menem administration, but also the leg on which further privatizations 
stood. In March, the Staff recommended that the Argentine state renegotiate its rescinded 
contracts.
4
 They argued that the successful negotiations would help the government “…avoid a 
deterioration of services…” and “…fully restore investor confidence” (IMF, 2003c). The 
executive board followed up the staff’s appraisal by adding that the privatized utility companies 
would benefit from a strengthened regulatory framework (IMF, 2003d). Nonetheless, the 
stronger regulations offered for utilities— just as those suggested for finance— appeared to be 
more of conciliatory tradeoff to sustain its privatization program.  
Again here, the IMF’s general stance supported a liberal regulatory policy mix 
throughout the Duhalde administration, in the guise of enticing greater FDI (See figure 8). Most 
of the regulatory advice centered on the deregulation of trade and the liberalization of laws that 
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 These contracts were actually lend leases that allowed these private sector firms to operate these municipally 
owned facilities. (See chapter 2) 
Figure 8. Regulatory & privatization policy under Duhalde (2002-2003) 
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protected debtors, which in turn gave creditors greater recourse in their collection efforts. The 
staff even went as far as chiding both, the state’s decision to devalue, as well as the purported ill-
effects that stemmed from the now repealed “law of economic subversion,” both of which were 
taken as a boon to debtors coming at the expense of the private sector (IMF, 2002e).  
In February of 2003, the Board of directors called for further liberalization of debt laws 
that went beyond the recent repeal of the “law of economic subversion”. As noted in the Chair’s 
summary, the Executive Board “underscored the importance of moving expeditiously with 
measures to fully restore legal certainty, as this will be key to rebuilding investor confidence” 
(IMF, 2003b). In March, the IMF added to their list of demands the need for greater creditor 
rights, which they argued would facilitate the restructuring of private debt (IMF, 2003c; IMF, 
2003d). This policy recombination essentially stacked the deck in favor of creditors by curtailing 
the recourses for debtors during private debt restructuring. What figure 8 illustrates is the Fund’s 
initial relaxation, which came at the nadir of the Argentine depression. It also shows the 
subsequent reversion to appeals for liberalization that sought to rollback Argentina’s legal 
framework back to its pre-crisis form. 
5.3 The IMF’s monetary policy mix during the Kirchner’s administration (2003- 2006) 
Less than two months into Nestor Kirchner’s administration the IMF began reasserting its 
deflationary monetary advice, which was seamlessly carried over from the article IV 
consultations that took place during the Duhalde administration. In terms of specific deflationary 
measures, the Fund sought to raise interest rates, tighten fiscal policy, and lastly, find ways to 
depoliticize or institutionalize austerity. The push for greater Central Bank independence was 
another direct carry over from, both the De La Rua and Duhalde administrations. Altogether, 




globalization. The discourse itself reaffirmed that economic success hinged on greater Central 
Bank independence, greater deflationary measures, while also retrospectively rationalizing the 
failed convertibility regime, which it blamed on lax fiscal policy. 
As early as two months into the Kirchner administration the article IV consultations 
began their usual calls for “structural reform” in the guise of combating inflation (IMF, 2003e). 
However, with growing reserves the Executive Board was more open to Argentina’s decision to 
expand the money supply, although they nevertheless “counseled the authorities to remain alert 
to signs of emerging inflation pressures” (IMF, 2003f). Six months later the Board “welcomed 
the larger-than-programmed accumulation of gross international reserves,” which they attributed 
to austere initiatives meant to keep inflation low (IMF, 2004a). Nonetheless by March, the 
Executive Board was lobbying to divert surpluses towards the reduction of external debts (IMF, 
2004b). 
Despite the rise in Argentine reserves, the Fund continued to press for more austere 
monetary controls.  As throughout this ostensibly lax period they continued to assert their own 
authority in terms of scrutinizing the efficacy of Argentina’s monetary policy (IMF, 2003g; IMF, 
2004c). By 2005 the IMF was once again calling for “a further rise in interest rates” (IMF, 
2005a). Their rationale for the increase rested on the fact that “nominal interest rates have risen 
more slowly than inflation expectations and real rates remain in negative territory” (IMF, 2005a). 
In July of 2006, the staff again recommended a rate hike as inflation rose to upwards of 11% 
(IMF, 2006a). The board reiterated their calls noting that as it stood, Argentina was effectively 
operating under negative interest rates, thus it urged authorities to bring “real interest rates into 




The IMF’s consistent appeals for deeper retrenchment efforts was another important facet 
in its deflationary narrative.  As noted above— the growing reserves were a sure sign for the 
IMF that economic conditions in Argentina were improving. Nevertheless, they continued to 
push for a more structurally austere policy mix with the aim of furthering deflationary effects. 
What was clear was that Executive Board not only sought to assure that the bulk of the surpluses 
were channeled towards paying the external debt, but also further pare down funds being 
diverted to transfer payments or other demand creation initiatives.  In their view, more austerity 
remained the best route to ensure fiscal sustainability (IMF, 2004a).  In March, the Executive 
Board reiterated these sentiments by noting that going forward Argentina should set its target for 
fiscal surpluses to “levels sufficient to cover debt service payments on performing and 
restructured debt, in order to achieve fiscal sustainability” (IMF, 2004b). This of course would 
entail additional retrenchment efforts on the part of authorities. 
The Fund, for its part, erred by supporting Argentina’s weak and inconsistent policies for 
too long, even after it became evident that the political ability to deliver the supporting 
fiscal discipline and structural reforms was lacking. (IMF, 2004c) 
In July, the push for fiscal retrenchment was ramped up as the Board of Directors discussed 
methods to prevent over indebtedness by setting IMF loan limits and thresholds on budget 
deficits. Specifically, the directors contemplated the implementation of a contingent, stop-loss 
strategy that would, in their estimations, “help determine if the initial strategy is working and 
signal whether a change in approach is needed” (IMF, 2004c). It is important to make clear that 
these stop-loss rules were not a two-way street (i.e., an opening for alternative solutions), but 
rather a means by which the IMF could simply cut off funds if its stipulations were not being 
met. Herein the Chair went on to assert that, “the Fund’s conditionality and program reviews 




long as the policies envisaged are being implemented and are on track to achieve their 
objectives” (IMF, 2004c).  
On the other hand, the authorities were unable to garner support for the large fiscal 
adjustment that would have been needed to arrest the adverse debt dynamics. Ultimately, 
they could find no way out but to abandon the exchange rate peg and default on their debt 
service obligations. (IMF, 2003g) 
Calls for the expansion of the Argentine Central Bank’s powers were a staple of the IMF’s policy 
advice from De la Rua to Kirchner. During the Kirchner administration in particular, the IMF 
kicked off its appeals by calling for the elimination of all quasi-monies in circulation. Although 
both of these requests were consistently present throughout this period, their initial meetings 
focused on eradicating quasi-monies from the provinces (IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; 
IMF, 2004b). The Fund saw this as a prerequisite, first-step towards reestablishing the central 
bank’s full control of the money supply. Thereafter, the Board of Directors praised Argentina’s 
“cautious monetary policy, which has contributed importantly to maintaining low inflation and 
restoring stability in financial markets, while eliminating virtually all quasi-monies” (IMF, 
2004a; IMF, 2006b). 
General calls for Central Bank autonomy were regularly made during the Kirchner 
administration.  In all, 7 out of the 11 article IV consultations examined in this period made 
appeals for greater central bank powers.  The earliest requests found came in July of 2003 when 
the Board urged “authorities to advance the restructuring plans for the largest public banks and to 
continue working with congress on a revised financial institutions law that would strengthen the 
institutional framework for central bank autonomy and bank resolution” (IMF, 2003e). In a 
follow-up report in July the IMF essentially sought to cut down any potential threats to the 




banks, the elimination of quasi-monies, and getting legislation through that strengthened the 
central bank’s autonomy (IMF, 2003f). Hereafter, the Board continued with its generalized 
appeals for Central Bank autonomy typically in the guise of better managing inflationary 
pressures (IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a). 
One of the IMF’s most explicit attempts to depoliticize Argentine monetary policy 
occurred in 2005. Herein, the Staff made more specific demands, as it “recommended that the 
authorities clarify publicly that the prime objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of 
price stability and that the central bank has the necessary operational autonomy to effectively 
combat inflation” (IMF, 2005a).  In other words, the staff recommended that the Argentine 
government work towards convincing the general public that monetary policy should have a 
more acute focus, which should be directed at the sole discretion of the Central Bank.  
Another facet of the Fund’s monetary policy discourse was its retrospective view, which 
posited that lax fiscal policy had caused the convertibility regime’s failure. Herein, the Board of 
Directors did acknowledge that its experiences with the Argentine crisis exposed its own 
inability to accurately assess the creditworthiness of its borrowers. As a result of this epiphany, 
they declared the Fund would need to implement a framework with a “strengthened analysis of 
balance-sheet weaknesses, notably currency mismatches—with a view to making careful 
assessments of what level of debt is sustainable taking into account country-specific constraints, 
including foreign currency constraints” (IMF, 2003g). In hindsight the board saw Argentina’s 
public debt dynamics as “playing a central role” in its default, although they would ultimately 
admit that there just was no political support for deepening cuts further than they government 




However, it became a handicap to adjustment in the face of the adverse shocks of the late 
1990s, and by lending credibility to the exchange rate peg, it allowed Argentina’s public 
sector to borrow excessively in the international capital markets, thereby raising the cost 




Showing signs of a duplicitous or circular logic, the same Board meeting went on to suggest that 
the convertibility scheme itself hindered the application of adjustment policies. Their reasoning 
here was that the virtual dollar peg provided Argentina with unwarranted credibility in 
international markets, which enabled the economy to rely on external debt (IMF, 2003g). Going 
forward the directors requested that the staff to look for ways in which future exchange rate 
regimes could encourage fiscal restraint (IMF, 2003g). Paradoxically, and as illustrated in figure 
9, the common factor found within the Article IV deliberations was its consistent appeals for 
fiscal austerity, which resulted in a staunchly orthodox stance. Yet, despite the apparent bouts of 
cognitive dissonance it failed to examine the potential negative effects of its liberalization 
agenda, the massive unemployment rolls from the privatizations of the 1990s, and its 
overreliance on  austerity itself— which was tautologically adopted as both a means and an end.  
Figure 9. Monetary policy mix during the Kirchner’s administration (2003- 2006) 
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5.3.1 Tax policy advice under Nestor Kirchner 
The IMF’s tax policy advice during the Kirchner administration emphasized a liberalizing mix, 
which sought to reduce tax credits, subsidies to industry, as well as the elimination of the 
financial transaction tax (see figure 10). In 2003, the Executive Board sought to reduce subsidies 
to Argentina’s domestic media and transport industries (IMF, 2003e). The follow up consultation 
at the end of July made focused on compensating exporters via liberal means when it 
recommended a reduction in export tariffs (IMF, 2003f).  
In 2004, the Board not only praised Argentina’s progress in eliminating industrial 
subsidies, but called for the widening of the scope of its initial (2003) appeals by calling for the 
end of all tax incentives and subsidies. This January consultation provided a much more 
comprehensive tax policy mix, as it also lobbied for increased VAT collections and the removal 
of the state’s financial transaction tax (IMF, 2004a). From June of 2005 onwards, the Fund’s tax 
policy advice consistently focused its efforts on getting Argentina to remove, both the financial 
transaction tax and all export subsidies (IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b).  
Figure 10. Tax policy advice under Nestor Kirchner (2003-2006) 
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5.3.2 Fiscal policy advice under Kirchner  
During the Kirchner administration the IMF called for sweeping reforms that would 
drastically alter the way Argentina administered its fiscal policy. The overarching aim of which 
was to institutionalize austere fiscal policies in the hopes that surpluses would be used to support 
high finance— by paying down external debts, removing financial transaction taxes (IMF, 
2003e; IMF, 2003g; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b; also see 
figure 11). For the IMF, one of the most important ways to achieve further cuts was through the 
curtailment of transfers to the provincial governments. The IMF actually recommended this on 5 
of the 10 article IV meetings published during Kirchner’s administration (IMF, 2003e; IMF, 
2004b; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a).  
 
As figure 11 illustrates, the coordinative discourse on Argentina’s fiscal policy during 
this period was marked by the Fund’s emphasis in managing the government’s newfound 
surpluses via austere initiatives (Schmidt, 2008). For example, paying down external debts 
Figure 11. Fiscal policy advice under Kirchner (2003-2006) 
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through fiscal surpluses was recommended in 3 out of the 10 article IV negotiations documents 
examined (IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2003g; IMF, 2006b). In 2004, the Board urged officials to “resist 
spending pressures, especially on wages and pensions” in the hopes that surpluses could instead 
be earmarked for the lifting of the financial transaction tax (IMF, 2004a). Additionally, the IMF 
made 5 less explicit calls, which nonetheless recommended further fiscal retrenchment in the 
guise of debt sustainability (IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b).  
Overall, the space for heterodox ideas continued to be crowded out by the IMF’s austere program 
even as the economic conditions had begun to change.  
5.3.3 Regulatory Policy Advice under Kirchner  
The IMF’s regulatory policy deliberations under Kirchner carried over many of the 
appeals made during the Duhalde administration. As figure 12 illustrates, the coordinative 
discourse on regulatory policy rigidly carried the hallmarks of neoliberal globalization “common 
policy paradigm,” as it scored an average of 5.5, with just one under Article IV consultation 
scoring under the maximum score of 6 (IMF, 2003c; Hay & Smith, 2005). The Fund’s orthodox 
bias during this period proved to be the staunchest out of the entire 30 year study (See figure 12). 
These included the need for greater creditor rights, more liberal trade policies, and also the 
Figure 12. Regulatory Policy Advice under Kirchner (2003-2006) 
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renegotiation of the privatized utilities contracts (IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 
2004b; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a). Reducing the role and operational footprint of state banks 
went further back, as the IMF urged this particular initiative in all three of the administrations 
examined during this period.  
 
Asides from these initiatives that coincide with the IMF’s long-term discursive agenda, 
during the Kirchner administration the IMF also made some new demands. First, the IMF urged 
for the repeal of recent regulations imposed on the media. Two other less concerted policy 
recommendations also arose. Precisely, these called for the repeal of price controls and more 
general appeals for less private sector regulation.  
While the IMF ostensibly appeared to support the need for greater financial regulation, its 
ultimate endgame was the privatization of Banco Nación, Argentina’s largest state owned 
bank— which would have been a monumentally neoliberal feat in itself. In July of 2003, the IMF 
praised Argentina’s “transitory prudential framework” that was not only said to bolster its 
capacity to monitor bank performance, but also increased capital requirements (IMF, 2003e). 
Although this was clearly a push for greater regulation this same Board meeting called for the 
restructuring of the largest public banks, while also urging the expedited disbursement of state 
funds that would go towards “…compensating banks for losses incurred from ‘amparos’ and 
asymmetric pesoization [sic] ” (IMF, 2004a). Consequently, these calls for the recompense of 
banks were made on 4 distinct occasions (IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b).
5
 
The IMF also lobbied hard for the restructuring of state owned banks as the issue was pressed in 
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 The amparos were court injunctions that lifted the freeze for claimants—typically elderly, disabled, or infirm— 




5 out of 10 article IV consultations covered during the Kirchner administration (IMF, 2004a; 
IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005a). 
In July, the IMF twice called for the reform of public banks; the later meeting voiced its 
optimism with the steps taken by Argentina to commence the due-diligence process (IMF, 
2003f). However, the article IV consultations that took place in both the January and March— 
just six months after its initial praises—began voicing their frustrations with the pace of reform 
efforts (IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b). The January’s Chair’s Summary in particular, captured the 
board’s displeasure with the “the continued delays with restructuring the public banks, and urged 
the authorities to intensify their efforts to move ahead expeditiously, starting with the selection 
of international advisors to undertake due diligence and strategic reviews of the two largest 
public banks” (IMF, 2004a). The final mention of public bank reform came in a staff report, 
which again appeared to take a confrontational stance as it pressed authorities to explain the 
strategic roles for two its largest public banks, Banco Nación and Banco Provincia (IMF, 2005a). 
 
During this period the IMF also sought to support or sustain the presence of what were 
international or quasi-global firms operating within Argentina. In January of 2004, the IMF 
optimistically advised the state to successfully legislate a path toward the renegotiation of the 
rescinded utilities contracts (IMF, 2004a). By March, the IMF’s Board of Directors attempted to 
directly intervene on behalf of international firms, as it specifically pressed the state to appease 
the private sector with “…the implementation of tariff increases for the regulated 
concessionaires, in order to restore the financial viability of the utilities sector as a whole and 
attract needed private investment…” (IMF, 2004b). The June staff report reiterated earlier pleas 




disapproval with the “…recent attempts to unilaterally impose new contracts” on these 
international firms who now threatened to exit Argentina outright (IMF, 2005a). The Board 
reiterated the Staff’s position in June— while in July, it would again explicitly call on the state to 
increase the consumer rates for utilities (IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006b). Living up to its reputation as 
a “globalizer,” the IMF was effectively making consumers and the national government bear the 
cost of sustaining an international presence within its borders (Woods, 2006).   
One peculiar area that shows the IMF extending its reach beyond the coordinative 
discourse and into the domain of what Schmidt considers the communicative discourse, was their 
pursuit to repeal media regulations, which were enacted under Nestor Kirchner (Schmidt, 2010). 
From the very first article IV consultation examined under the Kirchner administration, the 
Board of Directors voiced their displeasure with “…the introduction of recent legislation for 
media companies…” (IMF, 2003d). A follow up Board meeting coming at the end of July 
reiterated its disapproval of the restrictions on foreign ownership of the press. Asides from this, 
the Board also took issue with the cram down provision attached to recent bankruptcy reforms, 
which allowed debts to be restructured by bankruptcy courts (IMF, 2003f).
6
  
5.4 Collating the results   
In order to illustrate the long-term trends that developed within the over the 17 years covered 
within this chapter, it is perhaps useful to collate the results. From 2000-2006 the IMF’s held an 
average discursive bias score of 3.35, which was a slight drop off from the 3.58 average of the 
1990s. However, breaking down the scores from the various administrations that governed from 
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 A cram down provision allows courts to modify and in some cases reduce outstanding debts in bankruptcy cases 
with more than one creditor. The aim of the provision is to mitigate and equitably apportion claims on outstanding 




2000- 2006 not only contextualizes the apparent increase in flexibility— but actually confines it 
to the period of Argentina’s default— under Duhalde (2002-2003).  
For instance, under De la Rua (2000-2001) the IMF’s advice averaged a score of 3.61, 
slightly above the 1990s average. However, during Duhalde’s interim administration (2002- 
2003), which confronted the fallout of the Argentine Great Depression, the average score 
dropped significantly to 2.22. During this period, policy advice was limited as the Fund was 
faced with Argentina’s immanent default. Nevertheless, no single period during the Duhalde 
administration actually crossed below the X-axis— that represented a policy discourse that can 
be considered “heterodox” by this thesis’ standards (see chapter 2).  
Interestingly, under Kirchner (2003- 2006) — which overlaps the so-called 
“experimentalist” period— the data reveals that the average score rebounded significantly, 
increasing to 4.22. Moreover, the IMF’s neoliberal bias during both the De la Rua and Kirchner 
administrations (3.61 and 4.22, respectively) actually surpassed that of the Menem 
administration’s score of 3.58 (Broome, 2015). Interestingly, the spatiotemporal sensitivity of 
this study on the IMF-Argentine consultations provides empirical evidence to the IMF debate 
itself showing that the 1990s was not the high watermark for neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 
2012).  
Moreover, the findings suggest that the IMF’s policy rigidity and role as a “globalizing 
institution” has in fact “continued unabated” (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Woods, 2006). Taking a 
step back, it should be duly noted that throughout these 17 years (1989-2006) none of the four 
policy dimensions analyzed ever once crossed into the negative (heterodox) territory. This is the 




of the abovementioned periods could be considered as “flexible,” either individually or when 
taken as a whole.   
5.4.1 Conclusion  
In the late 1990s, Argentina found itself caught in a deflationary spiral, due in large part to the 
combination of maintaining the peso’s convertibility with the US dollar, along with Menem’s 
structural adjustment project, which systemically suppressed demand.
7
 Despite of the obvious 
lack of demand and growing public discord, maintaining the Peso-Dollar convertibility system 
remained a central pillar of the IMF’s coordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2008). Moreover, their 
initial warnings suggested that any deviation— whether in the form of devaluation or 
delinking— would lead to substantial inflationary pressures (IMF, 2000c; IMF, 2000b; IMF, 
2000d). The IMF even went as far as to outwardly block a proposal seeking to ease deflationary 
pressures by making an orderly exit out of the dollar and into a basket of currencies (IMF, 2001a; 
IMF, 2001c). This is one particular instance wherein the Fund openly denied Argentina the 
liberty to entertain what was clearly an “experimentalist,” and traditionally Keynesian approach 
to monetary policy.  
Even after the Duhalde administration intervened by pushing through a managed 
devaluation, which set the peso at a ratio of 1:1.40, the IMF’s express aim was to prevent any 
further devaluations by making sure that Argentina adhered to a sound fiscal policy mix (IMF, 
2002c). Moreover, the data shows that— throughout the 2000s— the IMF discourse firmly 
insisted on the suppression of internal demand via austerity measures for the explicit goal of 
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 The Fund had explicitly acknowledged the potential loss of demand due to its proposed privatization and 
liberalization project in a 1995 Staff report, yet they continued to urge Argentina to advance these deflationary 






 The overarching aim of these demands was the de-politicization or 
institutionalization of austere fiscal policies, in the hopes that surpluses could eventually go to 
support high finance— by paying down external debts (i.e., loans) and removing financial 
transaction taxes.
9
 Additionally, from 2000 to 2006, assuring the Argentine Central Bank’s 
autonomy was another consistent demand found within the Article IV consultations.
10
  
In terms of tax policy, the IMF’s advice sought the liberalization of trade tariffs as well as 
a more regressive tax regime. First, they sought to liberalize trade through the elimination of 
subsidies and tax breaks to exporters (IMF, 2001a; IMF, 2000d; IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2001c; IMF, 
2001b; IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b). In 2001, 
they even went as far as explicitly requesting Argentina to exit from the South American trade 
bloc, MERCOSUR (IMF, 2001c; IMF, 2001d). The removal of Argentina’s financial transaction 
tax was also found to be a consistent demand within the Article IV consultations (IMF, 2001c; 
IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b). Under Duhalde, the Staff reiterated the 
need for sweeping reforms, while also protesting recent cuts to both the income tax and VAT 
(IMF, 2002e). From 2005-2006, the IMF kept a steady mix of orthodox suggestions, which 
carried forward its efforts to remove both, the financial transaction tax and all export subsidies 
(IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b). 
In terms of regulatory policy, the IMF consistently lobbied for two major policy 
prescriptions: the strengthening of creditor rights and the weakening of labor laws (IMF, 2000b; 
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 IMF advice calling for the appreciation of the Peso via fiscal cuts or calls for a more comprehensive structural 
adjustment programs were found in the following Article IV consultations:  IMF, 2001e; IMF, 2001c; IMF, 2001b; 
IMF, 2001d; IMF, 2000c; IMF, 2002a; IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2004c). 
9
 The Fund explicitly proposed that Argentina earmark the potential surpluses from its austerity to paying down the 
external debt on 6 separate occasions (IMF, 2003g; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a; IMF, 
2006b). 
10
  Central bank independence was called for on 14 separate occasions including: IMF, 2001c; 2001d; IMF, 2002d; 




IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2000d; IMF, 2001d; IMF, 2000c; IMF, 2001e). In other words, while the IMF 
sought to weaken laws that protected the rights of Argentine workers, they simultaneously 
lobbied to strengthen those of their creditors by rolling back debtor safety nets and recourses.
11
 
In 2003, the Board posited that stronger creditor rights would, in turn restore “investor 
confidence” and also facilitate the restructuring of private debt (IMF, 2003b; IMF, 2003c; IMF, 
2003d). Under Kirchner, the Article IV meetings carried over many of the same appeals for 
expanding creditor rights that had been made during the Duhalde administration, but with greater 
frequency.
12
 In all, the IMF’s aim was to rollback Argentina’s regulatory framework back to its 
pre-crisis form. 
Privatization proved to be a perennial component of the Fund’s advice throughout the 
2000s as it had during the 1990s. However, during this period the IMF’s disregard for Argentine 
economic conditions became evident as it almost callously pushed its privatization program 
forward, despite technical complications, as well the consequential dislocation of labor that 
resulted from firms downsizing in order to increase their profit margins. Under De la Rua, the 
IMF sought the privatization of Argentina’s pension funds, healthcare, telecommunications 
infrastructure and its largest state owned bank, Banco Nación (IMF, 2000d; IMF, 2001b). The 
staff also advocated for a shift towards a more Americanized, for-profit healthcare system, which 
was centered on the introductions of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (IMF, 2000c; 
IMF, 2001b).  
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 This particular policy mix was found in 11 Article IV consultations (IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2002e; IMF, 2003b; IMF, 
2003c; IMF, 2003d; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006a). 
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  A total of 7 out of the 11 IMF calls for expanding creditor rights (i.e., sustaining claims on debts) came during the 





From 2000-2001, the IMF continued to zealously push for the privatization of provincial 
and state owned banks, despite the fact that international banks had been quietly repatriating 
massive amounts of cash holdings (IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2001e; IMF, 2000a; IMF, 2000b; IMF, 
2001b; IMF, 2001c; also see chapter 2). This particular point puts into question the Fund’s 
capacity to serve as a credible monitor of economic trends or at the very least, its inherent 
inflexibility in the face of new information. The Fund’s inability to monitor Argentina’s 
economic realities continued throughout 2001. In May, the staff paradoxically touted the stability 
of the foreign banking sector, while at the same time putting into question the viability of 
publicly owned banks (IMF, 2001c). Unfortunately, their bullish assessment was wholly 
debunked just 7 months later when foreign banks made a mad dash out of Argentina, whilst 
Argentina’s public banks served as a backstop to the spiraling financial system. Henceforth, the 
larger international financiers began announcing their plans to reduce their Argentine holdings 
(e.g., Citibank) while others such as Credit Agricole and Scotiabank chose to abandon the market 
outright (see chapters 6-8).  
Nevertheless, the push to privatize public banks did not end with the financial exodus, as 
the IMF continued to make appeals that sought to “reform, restructure, and downsize public 
banks” (IMF, 2002d; IMF, 2003b; IMF, 2003d). One anomaly during this time was that the Fund 
called for a stronger regulatory framework, although their language presumed that private 
finance would be assuming a larger role in the banking system. An additional response to the 
2001 banking freeze, was the Fund’s endorsement of the securitization of bank deposits, which 
set the framework for future bail-ins, which essentially shifted the risk from the banks to account 




The latter portion of the 2000s saw discussions on the privatizations shift back and forth 
from finance to the renegotiation of rescinded utilities contracts— the latter of which not only 
threatened the inroads made under Menem administration, but also the leg on which further 
privatizations stood (IMF, 2003c; IMF, 2003d; IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 
2005b; IMF, 2006b). During the initial months of the Kirchner administration the IMF also 
returned to the question of finance. Consequently, calls for the recompense of banks were made 
on 4 distinct occasions (IMF, 2004a; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2005a; IMF, 2005b). The IMF also 
lobbied hard for the restructuring of state owned banks, which included priming the banks for 
their sale by performing “due diligence and strategic reviews” (IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a).  
In all, the issue of banking privatization was pressed in 5 out of 10 article IV 
consultations covered during the Kirchner administration (IMF, 2003e; IMF, 2003f; IMF, 2004a; 
IMF, 2004b; IMF, 2005a). Overall, none of the abovementioned periods, nor any of the 4 facets 
of policy analyzed within the IMF discourse provided any significant degree of policy space for 
heterodox theories or ideas. And regardless of whether the results are indicative of the Fund’s 
broader portfolio, the case of Argentina pierces through the aforementioned theories to show, not 
only that the IMF advice has not gotten laxer since the 1990s, but that the idea of a flexible IMF 
or one that provides space for heterodox policy is subject to spatial-temporal limitations (Peck & 





6. From mergers to early fissures: the case of Scotiabank and 
Citibank (1997-2001) 
This chapter is the first of three within this thesis’ second empirical section that turns to tracking 
the communicative discourses just before, during, and after the Argentine Great Depression 
(Schmidt, 2008).
1
 It chronicles the constructed narratives of international finance within the 
Argentine press, who served as interlocutors between the financial executives and the wider 
public on the respective issues of financial consolidation (chapter 6), bank recapitalization and 
defaults (chapter 7), as well as the periods of reform (chapter 8). Like the previous section on the 
IMF, the overarching aim herein is to gauge if (and how) the adherence to neoliberal 
globalization’s logics precluded the space for alternative, heterodox policies. 
However, specific to this section is the focus on how narratives are constructed, and 
aimed to shape or temper the public discourse.  This chapter in particular begins by retracing the 
early communicative discourses covering the initial entry and consolidations made by foreign 
financial institutions— namely, those of Citibank and Scotiabank (see Schmidt, 2008).
2
 One 
specific question within this chapter’s analysis on the entry of international finance into 
Argentina, which ties directly to constructivists accounts on the externalizing logics of 
globalization, is how and if these narratives were used to introduce an account that externalized 
economic imperatives via the use of “global” or “international” constraints (see chapter 1; Hay & 
Rosamond, 2002).  
                                                          
1
 This chapter in particular covers the early period of financial consolidation (1997-1998), as well as some of the 
early fissures leading up to Argentina’s financial crisis (1998-2001). Overall, this section’s empirical examination 
(chapters 6-8) covers the periods from 1997 to 2006. 
2
 Scotiabank entered Argentine banking in 1997 via its acquisition of Quilmes. However, Citibank had a storied 
history within Argentine finance going back to 1914, when it opened its first branch in Buenos Aires (Zlotogwiazda 




From the start, it should be readily apparent that the communicative discourses were 
much more dynamic (Schmidt, 2008, 2012). Yet, this dynamism did not translate into 
“flexibility” in terms of ideas about policy per say. In other words, compared to the IMF’s 
discourse— the press’ writings appeared much more fluid, oscillating through various positions, 
yet its broader message managed to stay within the study’s neoliberal globalization’s goalposts 
(see chapter 2). A quintessential example of this is found within the early writings that 
effectively welcomed the initial influx of international banks, while simultaneously emphasizing 
the endogenous factors that a potentially larger supply of credit would provide. In a similar 
manner to how Hay and Smith described one of several discursive tracts of globalization, in this 
case the entry of international financiers was portrayed as a beneficial and desirable (Hay & 
Smith, 2005).  
Specifically, the press posited that their presence in Argentina would modernize 
Argentine banking practices, leading to wider access to credit.  Nonetheless, when these 
institutions failed to live up to their billing—particularly in terms of extending credit— the press 
shifted the blame to external factors. This “externalizing logic,” which is attributed to 
globalization discourse, became a pattern throughout as the press’ overarching narrative, 
remaining anchored to the promotion private finance, along with classical and neoclassical 
theories (Hay & Rosamond, 2002).  
6.1 Press coverage during the initial phase of the consolidation of Argentine finance  
During its initial phase, the mainstream Argentine press effectively towed the hyperglobalist line 
by presenting the financial consolidation stemming from the increased foreign investment as 
“unambiguously positive” (Hay & Smith, 2005). In 1997, La Nación’s Javier Blanco published 




meeting the more rigorous Central Bank standards, but would also lower interest rates over the 
long run (Blanco, 1997, June 4; Blanco, 1997, March 4). Conversely, the Clarín took a different 
approach when it came to Scotiabank’s entry into the Argentine market, as it refrained from 
directly opining on the matter. Rather than editorializing, it instead offered wire-like updates on 
the company’s stock price fluctuations and percentage shifts in equity stakes— ostensibly, their 
deference let the market speak for itself. This microeconomic focus honed in on figures such as 
the firm’s book, which had active accounts estimated at 224 billion USD as well as the 
competition for market share amongst foreign banks (Clarín, 1997, October 1; Clarín, 1997, 
October 21). Regardless of the means however, both La Nación and Clarín presented a rosy 
picture for the entry of Scotiabank— effectively supporting the bank consolidations.  
In December of 1997, Scotiabank finalized its bid to take a controlling interest in 
Quilmes. Two months later in February of 1998, La Nación interviewed the vice president of 
Scotiabank, Anatol von Han who billed the early stages of the acquisition as a period that would 
focus on educating not just its Argentine staff, but consumers on Scotia’s brand. He went on to 
tout its recent settlements of the bank’s back taxes, as well the technological and industry 
“knowhow” that Scotiabank brought to the table (La Nación, 1998, Feb 7). In hindsight of the 
2007 subprime mortgage collapse, an ominous revelation of the Argentine financial sector’s fate 
was telegraphed by Javier Blanco, wherein he praised Scotiabank’s plan to import Wall Street 
derivative specialists in order to put together a commercial investment wing catering to 
wholesale accounts, such as pensions and retirements (Blanco 1999, March 31). The ideational 
aspects of global finance began to emerge in Javier Blanco’s writing when he touted the potential 
boost in investor confidence that Scotiabank’s entry would bring. Moreover, Blanco suggested 




noting that local savers would perceive Scotia’s global scale as a sign of strength (1999, March 
31).  
In all, this early period would prove to be quite paradoxical as its initial narrative, which 
took comfort in the purported safety and stability “global markets,” as well as the promise of 
better access to credit would ultimately be turned on its head. And this reversal would not take 
long, which suggests that global markets are in fact as fluid as they were fickle, and thus required 
not only that the state accommodate its various demands, but also the acquiescence of its very 
customers via capital controls, bail outs, and even bail-ins. In other words, from an early onset 
there is an apparent development of a dialectical contingency to how finance was to be 
understood, at different times. Moreover, these early accounts began to frame the— at times— 
inadvertently paradoxical and even erratic press coverage, whose discourses would bounce freely 
between endogenous and exogenous factors, as well as material and normative dynamics of the 
market.  
The onset of what would become a broader “externalizing narrative” began with the 1998 
Brazilian devaluation (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007). From 
November of 1998 onwards, Scotiabank’s bearish economic forecasts began appearing in La 
Nación, which served to educate the Argentine public on matters outside of its brand and 
corporate culture. On one November article, the bank’s representatives began to lean towards 
externalizing Argentina’s economic context by emphasizing the negative effects on exports due 
to the Brazil’s devaluation. In all, Scotiabank forecasted a 1-2 billion USD decline in Argentine 
exports, the brunt of which was said to be borne by chemical and heavy industry sectors (La 




When speaking of Argentina’s high relative costs of banking, Blanco and the banks 
uncharacteristically took to focusing on the macroeconomic and systemic factors, rather than the 
banks’ own pricing strategy, which saw transaction charges at rates 5 times higher than in 
neighboring Chile and 1.5 times higher than those in the United States. Blanco’s interviews with 
several banking executives on the high costs for account holders netted responses citing various 
factors including: unaccommodating fiscal policy incentives which left out finance, the cost of 
the high capital requirements set in Basel I accords, as well as external factors, such as the 
downturns in Mexico, Asia, Brazil and Russia (1999, April 4). In the face of potential criticisms 
of its operations, the financial sector appeared to revert almost instinctively towards blaming a 
combination of external and political factors. In all, via the deployment of an externalizing 
narrative the press attempted to deflect scrutiny away from the effects of the financial sector’s 
microeconomic innovations, as well as the role of the agents within these institutions. 
Despite some ostensible tensions, the press continued to rely on the economic projections 
of foreign banks— who carried over their externalizing narrative into a discussion on the state of 
the general economy.  Additionally, 1999 would prove to be the first year wherein Argentina’s 
GDP began its downward slide. In April, as the economy appeared to stabilize—representatives 
from Scotiabank Quilmes maintained that external factors, as well as a sound fiscal policy would 
continue to drive economic growth and its own profitability (La Nación 1999, April 12). 
However, little more than a month later, Scotiabank would opt for a more restrained posture, as it 
forecasted a 5% fall in GDP for the year end (Clarín, 1999, May 23). Moreover, this particular 
Clarín article went on to squarely attribute the rise in unemployment to the Brazilian devaluation 
as well as the inability of the private sector to innovate. To combat this lack of innovation the 




namely, by reducing salaries, which in turn required the implementation of laxer labor laws— 
including cuts to unemployment benefits (Clarín, 1999, May 23). While the press’ narrative did 
look inwards, as it called on the state reform and conform to external pressures, it never question 
the unmet claims or potential of foreign banks, which had promised economies of scale and high 
technology that would lead to greater access to credit and general financial stability.  
6.1.1 De la Rua, the candidate of high finance and the press  
As the presidential elections approached, it was apparent that De la Rua had become the favorite 
of the mainstream media and even the financial sector. Blanco attributed the latter’s support to a 
well-received speech wherein he promised to not only balance the fiscal deficit, but return 
Argentina’s sovereign debt to “investment grade” status (Blanco, 1999, July 8). In this July 
Article, Blanco not only confirmed his approval of De la Rua, but also quoted executives from 
Banco Vélox, Citibank, BBVA-Francés and Scotiabank-Quilmes— all of which rallied behind 
the presidential hopeful’s economic stance (Blanco, 1999, July 8). Another article published by 
La Nación just a few days removed from his pro-business speech argued that the depressed state 
Argentine debt instruments, bonds and options alike, was temporary and actually afforded a great 
entry point for investors seeking medium and long-term gains. Their rationale being that the 
large pools of capital held by these same foreign banks along with the injection of revenue from 
the privatization of the Argentine oil firm YPF, as well as an incrementally tighter fiscal policy 
mitigated calls for greater concern (La Nación, 1999, July 12).  
During this time La Nación began to put forth a communicative discourse or narrative 
wherein the globalization effectively became an economic imperative for future economic 
growth and stability (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Schmidt, 2008). From here onwards, the press set 




political elite, which suggested that economic growth would be achieved through foreign direct 
investment, although it would require a constant courting of investors through greater fiscal 
restraint and economic liberalization. However, this ideational triumvirate between La Nación, 
top financial executives and neoliberal politicians was not deduced through inference, but was 
explicitly observed in the newspaper’s writings. Overall the content analysis of the views 
presented in each of the measured categories from 1998-2001 were pro-market. For instance, one 
article explicitly noted that that the profitability of private finance was innately tied to the 
“global perception” of Argentine solvency and thus political forces— parties and labor unions 
alike—would be required to cede to external pressures (La Nación, 1999, Sept 5). Interestingly, 
this metaphysical interpretation of “market perception” not only acknowledged the role of the 
state, but the intersubjective, social dynamics inherent to finance.  
In September of 1999, the La Nación churned out a report that read more like a public 
relations piece showcasing Scotiabank’s new plan to extend its lending services to Argentina’s 
agricultural sector. The report directly quoted the words of then Scotiabank President Peter 
Godsoe, who prematurely touted that the worst was now behind Argentine markets. 
Additionally, he went on to add that the time had come for authorities to rid the system of 
monetary and economic rigidities, which included the caps placed on credit card interest rates 
(La Nación, 1999, September 16). In the same month, Clarín interviewed Scotiabank’s CEO who 
spoke of the bank’s operations, including its various positions around Latin America, as well as 
its role in furthering the liberalization of finance by eliminating interest rate caps and Canada’s 
version of Glass-Stegall provisions. Godsoe, was also cited in this Clarín article as he sought to 
differentiate Scotia’s operations from that of its Argentine competitors. Herein Godsoe put 




by Scotia’s much more capitalized Anglo banking model, as the sector to date had not evolved 
out of the Italian financial mold, which was comprised of smaller, less consolidated banks, and 
typically domestically based (Clarín, 1999, September 26).     
Although both La Nación and Scotiabank paid a lot of lip service to the purported 
benefits of economies of scale, the Clarín chose an alternative route. In terms of its writing, the 
Clarín proved to be a bit more candid as it reported on the continued reluctance of banks to lend. 
Nevertheless, they too traced the heightened aversion back to Argentina’s current account deficit, 
which at stood at 4.5% of GDP, a quite modest deficit that pales in comparison by today’s 
standards (Clarín, 1999 November 28). The Clarín also cited Scotiabank’s Horacio Aguirre, who 
alleged that additional austerity measures could quell the growing uncertainty due to political 
factors, which was causing savers to seek the added security of the US dollar denominated 
accounts (1999 November 28). 
In September with elections less than a month away, the Clarín’s financial writers began 
to echo La Nación’s summer endorsement of De la Rua, maintaining that his success was 
primarily due to his vows to implement a zero deficit economic policy. Moreover, in the Clarín’s 
view his policies were poised to address the Standard and Poor’s recent downgrade of Argentine 
sovereign debt, which was said to be due to the lack of government initiatives to curb fiscal 
spending (1999, September 26). Nevertheless, this article did not stop at vouching for De la 
Rua’s austere fiscal policy stance, but rather pressed on for even deeper fiscal cuts, which also 
included calls for the liberalization of labor (Clarín, 1999, September 26). Ultimately, the Clarín 
would affirm that De La Rua’s pro-business message allowed the return of optimism to 




The press’ communicative discourse ticked off yet another “common policy” logic or 
truism of neoliberal globalization, when it suggested that markets would positively respond to 
gestures of fiscal discipline (Hay & Smith, 2005; Schmidt, 2008). On the eve of October’s 
presidential elections, La Nación published another article surveying the opinions of foreign 
financial executives, which positively noted that the IMF’s assurances as well as De La Rua’s 
market friendly stance should quell market pessimism (1999, October 2). Scotiabank’s chief 
economist, Pedro Rabasa aped his superior’s prior sentiments, noting that although the market 
appeared to be stabilizing, the coming quarter’s results were dependent on the incoming 
governments’ economic measures (La Nación, December 15; La Nación, 1999, December 22). In 
November, Clarín would add that the flow of FDI itself now depended on tourism, bond 
purchases and the sustainability of its external debt (1999, November 28). It appeared that both 
papers were intent on holding the newly elected De le Rua administration to his campaign 
promises. Shortly after his December inauguration, financial executives began to intensify their 
assertions, placing the responsibility for the economic recovery as well as future stock market 
gains squarely on De La Rua’s ability to follow through with a sound fiscal policy that also 
adhered to IMF conditions (Blanco, 1999, December 23; La Nación, December 28).  
The narrative presented thus far did not stray far from the point of view of financial 
executives, which effectively tethered electoral debate on economics and finance to initiatives of 
neoclassical suasion. During this election period La Nación did not once bother to question their 
apparently tautological narrative, which posited that market growth required the support of the 
state. Additionally, the public would need to be persuaded to accept further liberalization, 
privatization and austerity if the state sought to appease global markets, which paradoxically, 




appeared that the new administration would conform to what effectively equated to the 
externalizing logics of neoliberal globalization, La Nación and economists on the payroll of 
private banks voiced their optimism (2000 January 3; 2000, January 27).  
The press continued to put forth a “hyperglobalist” narrative by reinforcing the idea that 
Argentine markets were predominately driven by external forces, which in turn justified its 
liberalization agenda, as well as its support of additional fiscal cuts. Herein, La Nación tempered 
its recent optimism with its coverage of Wall Street’s equity market dip, which was also flanked 
by the more precautious tenor of Argentine financial executives (2000, Jan 27). A month later, 
Scotiabank revealed to La Nación that 7 out of 9 Wall Street banks had appeared optimistic due 
to De La Rua’s pro-market reforms, which included the passage of liberalized labor legislation 
that the financial press as well as banks had encouraged (Helft, 2000, February 13). However, 
the Clarín would go forward with a bit more skepticism. One report back from December report 
had already questioned the degree to which market swings in America could affect Argentine 
stocks. Oddly, this article appeared vexed when Wall Street’s gains failed to similarly boost 
Argentine markets— citing a .98% uptick in the Merval compared to 1.7% and 2.2% in the 
NASDAQ and Dow Jones (Clarín, 1999, Dec 19).   
During the second quarter of 2000, De la Rua attempted to assure the public that further 
fiscal retrenchment would not be necessary, however La Nación’s reporting argued the contrary. 
In addition to citing the IMF’s bearish forecasts, which stemmed from Argentina’s 3.4% GDP 
growth rate and a deficit of 4.5% of GDP, they also cited Scotiabank Quilmes’ Pedro Rabasa 
who affirmed that the government would need to make further cuts if it planned to meet its IMF 
conditionality agreements (La Nación, 2000, April 13). In July of 2000 Argentine equities 




support of the administration, but again followed up their praise by calling for deeper fiscal cuts. 
An interesting turn herein was that this article was one of the first to explicitly acknowledge the 
social dynamics and particularly the intersubjective nature of the market—as executives cited 
rumors of devaluation as one of the remaining hindrances to a full recovery (La Nación, 2000, 
July 5).  
Harkening back to the coordinative discourses of the IMF in the first empirical section, 
the summer theme of La Nación’s communicative discourse centered on monetary policy 
(Schmidt, 2008). Through its interviews with financial executives, the paper argued for greater 
liquid reserves in order to buffer both the convertibility scheme and as a way to backstop its 
external debt, which had become accustom to relying on annual rollovers.  Although La Nación 
tacitly admitted that the added reserves could by no means replace the annual rollovers of its 
debts, they noted that it brought a “perception” of stability in the eyes of creditors— which going 
forward required an even greater air of competitiveness given its susceptibility to rising interest 
rates in the United States (Blanco, 2000, July 5; La Nación, 2000, July 31). Overall, this served 
as another wrinkle in the paper’s externalizing logic, which not only coincided with the financial 
sector, but also harkened back to some of the reoccurring themes found in the IMF negotiations 
discussed in chapters 3-5. Effectively, the paper constructed a narrative that tied Argentina to 
external pressures, albeit admittedly metaphysical ones. 
In September, La Nación kept the focus on external factors by attributing the increase in 
bond values to the crisis in Brazil and stock market gains to austerity measures. Specifically, La 
Nación alleged that the rise in Argentine bonds was primarily due to debt market arbitrage, 
which had just dumped Brazilian bonds in favor of the former. This article also cited Scotiabank 




confirmation that the economic minister, Jorge Luis Machinea would remain (La Nación, 2000, 
September 7). In effect, his continuation signaled to the investor class that the De La Rua 
administration would continue to prioritize market friendly initiatives such as the reliance on 
fiscal discipline and the maintenance of reserve buffers.   
The Merval stock market index continued its upswing into October— seeing a 4% 
increase. However, La Nación’s Javier Blanco discounted the uptrend as an exogenous 
occurrence by linking the gains to an 8% rise in US stocks (Blanco, 2000, Oct 20). However 
duplicitous, these same “external factors” had routinely served to justify neoliberal policy 
initiatives, on the premise of attracting FDI.  Nevertheless, the way forward— according to La 
Nación— was via compulsory fiscal discipline in order to meet the external demands of global 
finance, as well as its much more tangible monetary constraints.  
While La Nación’s “hyperglobalist” narrative was very consistent in rationalizing its 
appeals for austerity on the basis of external factors, the markets performance itself proved much 
more erratic as stocks and bonds sank, just a month removed from the surge of optimism brought 
on by October’s rally. Interestingly enough, market perception and the importance of 
governmental support of the economy took precedent henceforth, as commentary on fiscal policy 
was absent. In the midst of a November slide in asset prices and bonds, Javier Blanco and 
Scotiabank representatives attributed the downturn to the bearish comments of the former 
president Raul Alfonsín, who forewarned that an Argentine sovereign debt default might 
eventually occur (Blanco, 2000, November 4). Once again, a follow up article turned to the 
social or psychological aspects of the downturn—focusing instead on the management of 
investor perceptions in order to soothe market sentiment (La Nación, 2000, November 4).This 




at ebbing. In contrast, like foreign finance’s initial entry, market rebounds were adorned with 
statistical analysis that showcased the gains and perhaps more importantly, the improved 
“fundamentals”.     
6.1.2 El Blindaje & lack of borrowing/savings/ liquidity – add above 
In November, Machinea and the IMF would come to terms on a massive $40 billion dollar loan 
package primarily meant to shield reserves dubbed, the Blindaje. Once again, Clarín’s reporting 
emphasized external constraints by underscoring how this loan package and the conditions it 
imposed (e.g., cutting the deficit, a fiscal spending freeze at both the national and provincial 
level, and raising of the retirement age of women to 65) would help reduce country risk. Asides 
from addressing Argentina’s external financing needs, the Clarín also hyped the Blindaje’s 
potential to reignite short-term financing (2000, November 14).  In December, the Clarín would 
also follow the narrative that the Blindaje served to reduce country risk and in turn lowering 
interest rates— which would ultimately lower the costs of borrowing (2000, December 20).  
One of the key effects of the press’ externalizing discourse on all things “global” (e.g., on 
FDI and foreign exchange rates) was that it shrouded the financial sector’s internal operations 
from scrutiny (Hay & Rosamond, 2002). For instance, the press rarely discussed the negative 
externalities of deflation, which resulted in a lack of demand for debt, particularly due to high 
interest rates, which became a chronic problem from the late nineties onward. However, the 
press had danced around this issue as early as August of 2000, wherein the Clarín story 
showcased the financial sector’s early attempts to offer more enticing consumer lending schemes 
(2000, August 24). However, the general public had no way around the high cost of borrowing 




rates at 23%, almost 10% lower than the private sector average, by their own accounts (Clarín, 
2000, Dec 14).  
In January, Clarín now looked inwards— albeit uncritically— as it reported on the ways 
banks were attempting to resolve their liquidity concerns. The purpose of this particular piece 
was not an introspective reappraisal of the domestic credit market, but rather it sought to promote 
a flexible private sector bond that encouraged long-term savings (Clarín, 2001, Jan 8).  The 
Clarín further asserted that such schemes were due in part to the success of the IMF’s Blindaje, 
which in their view, not only averted a sovereign debt default, but also reduced and stabilized 
short and long-term-term interest rates, respectively (2001, Jan 8). With interest rates tapering 
slightly, La Nación also interjected in order to credit the IMF’s 40 billion dollar “Blindaje,” as 
well as the fiscal cuts to provinces (Blanco, 2001, January 10).   
Oddly, the December rate cuts from the publicly owned Banco Nación were not factored into 
either of these optimistic analyses. Although a lot was made of the little bit of progress, the 
prospect for domestic growth continued to be weighed down by the excessively high retail 
interest rates despite of the recent gains by Argentine bonds. To their credit, a separate Clarín 
report did pick up on the fact that relative to the non-existent returns on savings, interest rates 
remained stubbornly high. However, this article fell far short of a critique of the private banking 
sector’s wide margins as it deferred the ultimate resolution of this discrepancy to the vicissitudes 
global and domestic market forces (Clarín, 2001, January 24). Several other concurring reports 
from La Nación and Ámbito Financiero not only served to reaffirm the view that the IMF 
accords as well as the reductions of provincial transfers were behind the recent turnaround, but 




president De la Rua’s fiscal stimulus proposals (La Nación, January 13; Cortina, 2001, January 
14).  
The first article stuck to the established narrative by positively crediting the Blindaje with 
turning around the economy, citing the increase in net reserves, which now stood at 27 billion 
USD, a total of 700 million dollars above where they had been a year prior (La Nación, 2001, 
January 13). The second argument dealt with the De La Rua administration’s proposed public 
works projects, which sought to build on the apparent success of the IMF deal by delving into 
policies of fiscal stimulus in order to clear out the “bad vibes” that had set into the collective 
psyche (Cortina, 2001, January 14). Coverage of this executive proposal was actually one of the 
very few times that demand side policy had been mentioned within the context of the financial 
crisis. Once again fitting with its externalizing “hyperglobalist” discourse, La Nación railed 
against the executive’s plan reminding readers that foreign investors were more interested in the 
execution of sound fiscal policies— which left no room for election season “balancing acts” 
(Cortina, 2001, January 14).  
Ámbito Financiero’s reporting similarly focused on mobilizing policy in accordance with 
“global” pressures, as they parroted Scotiabank Quilmes’ 2001 forecast, arguing that growth was 
likely to come from foreign investments, due in part to the success of the debt swap (2001, 
January 15). Moreover, they argued that the government should concentrate on changing the 
public’s attitude towards the implementation of austerity measures (2001, January 15). In other 
words, the government was once again implored to actively sell austerity as it had put forth back 






6.2 The Banamex sale: straddling the internal and external dynamics of market sentiment  
One of the earliest fissures in the ensuing private banking crisis actually occurred in January of 
2001 when Bansud— Banamex’s Argentine subsidiary— sold off its underperforming 
commercial loans portfolio. Nonetheless, La Nación’s reporting remained upbeat as it cited 
Banamex’s own bullish forecast, which presented the exit from commercial lending as well as 
estimated earnings of 68 million USD as a sign of structural improvement (La Nación, 2001, 
January 26). Similarly, in regards to liquidity concerns of Bansud’s retail operations, La 
Nación’s coverage remained optimistic, but brief as its wire-like update reported that Banamex 
had met the Central Bank’s capital requirements by injecting 80 million dollars into Bansud (La 
Nación, 2001, January 26). However, it is important to note that La Nación’s optimism once 
again rested not on the viability of the domestic economy, but rather on willingness of these 
foreign banks to invest in Argentina.  
In February, at the Blindaje’s 2-month mark, the Clarín began to question its success to 
date, noting that although it managed to bring interest rates down a bit, they remained 
significantly higher than last fall’s pre-crisis levels. Here, the Clarín finally connected the 
elevated rates to the stalled out demand for autos and home loans. Yet, even though its report put 
the onus on the banking sector, it gave the banks the final word, as it cited executives who 
argued that it was simply best to wait for markets to clear themselves (Clarín, 2001, Feb 19).   
The idea that Argentina’s economic success depended on external or “global” factors 
continued to drive the press’ communicative discourse (Schmidt, 2008).  However, the Clarín 
was first to make note of the divergence in correlation that occurred as Argentine stocks climbed 
modestly while Wall Street experienced a dip. Nevertheless, this was not a declaration of 




by noting that bonds had dipped .8 of a percent causing the country risk to climb 6 basis points 
(Clarín, 2001, January 9). This admission created a bit of a backlash as all three major papers 
took to doubling down on the idea that markets were driven by external forces in an almost 
reflexive fashion. What is more, an article published 11 days later by Nestor Restivo would 
backtrack on talk of any sort of divergence between the US and Argentina, noting New York’s 
ability to define markets as he declared it the global financial epicenter. Consequently, Restivo 
added that the Argentine economic minister Machinea and the IMF’s Teresa Minisan were 
presently in New York appealing to Wall Street bankers (Clarín, 2001, January 20).  
Returning to the idea that Argentina remained subject to external forces and constraints 
of global finance, another article argued that—at its most elemental level— Argentina’s 
economic success was contingent on the interest rate policy of the United States Federal Reserve, 
which heavily influenced not just the flow of FDI, but also the interest on its external debt. Yet, 
rather than entertaining measures that might facilitate greater economic autonomy, it argued that 
deeper coordination was needed between monetary and fiscal strategies in order to take 
advantage of periods wherein US interest rates were low. In turn, they went on to estimate that 
the reduction in interest payments would equal about half of what was saved from its fiscal 
retrenchment efforts alone (Blanco, 2001, February 1). In February, Ámbito chose to highlight 
Scotiabank's outlook on the attractiveness of Argentina for FDI. Argentina’s newfound appeal 
was said to be due in part to the economic ministries’ debt swap, as well as the improvements in 
its balance of trade, wherein the article cited a 1.1 billion dollar surplus from the year 2000 as 





Although the press’ narrative consistently, and parsimoniously linked the degree of fiscal 
discipline to its ability to attract global finance capital, achieving economic stability proved to be 
much more complex. Furthermore, the deepened retrenchment efforts not only failed to entice 
FDI, but Argentine bonds and interest rates teetered once again. One La Nación piece in late 
February explained that this new slowdown was the beginning of a “new external context”.  Here 
the focus was diverted away from the limitations of the imposed austerity measures as the report 
turned to the economic conditions in Turkey, which were said to present a rather negative, 
“Turkish effect” on bonds from emerging market nations (Blanco, 2001, Feb 21). It appeared as 
though the La Nación had taken to explaining away the inability of austerity measures to attract 
FDI by magnifying the impact of external factors. Consequently, these external factors where in 
fact a set of rather speculative, intersubjective assumptions of what— in their view— was 
currently driving market sentiment.  
The press’ focus on “global” issues, allowed it to obscure its more exigent problems, such 
as the widespread unemployment and the exorbitant interest rates that continued to preclude 
consumers from accessing credit (Schmidt, 2008). However, it also left space for interpretation. 
Herein, another La Nación article now cognizant that Wall Street’s stock market gains and its 
interest rates trends bared no correlation with the economic conditions in Argentina, attempted to 
isolate internal market sentiment as the underlying culprit. Yet, the advice from the banker’s 
within regurgitated the same message: allow the market to clear itself.  Specifically, Scotiabank 
executives awaited a novel spark from either the domestic external or markets while Merrill 
Lynch executives were ten months off when they were quoted as seeing the new lows as the 




discourse presented external factors as the dominant driver of economic growth, which 
Argentina should ultimately defer to (Schmidt, 2008).   
However, one consistent caveat or exception to the press’ communicative discourse on 
the need to defer to markets, was its active push for further austerity measures (Schmidt, 2008). 
For instance in March, Ámbito Financiero noted that the IMF, the ministry of the economy, and 
Scotiabank all agreed that the state should focus on creating greater initiatives that reinforced 
austerity measures (2001, March 16). However, Minisan, the IMF’s chief auditor, had been cited 
a month earlier, noting that the onus to invest and make strides in Argentina’s debt refinancing 
plans now fell on the private sector as the Argentine government had in fact done its part 
[referring to its efforts to curb fiscal deficits] (Clarín, 2001, Jan 20). To make matter worse, 
Ámbito Financiero would err on the side of high finance, as it posited that Argentina's stability 
depended on the confidence of financial markets. In other words, Ámbito was again making the 
suggestion that increases in FDI were contingent on how well De la Rua's administration 
continued to tighten fiscal spending (2001, March 20). Much like its position on austerity, the 
“indispensable” role, or privileged position of global finance itself continued to be treated as an 
apolitical issue.  
6.2.1 Cavallo’s second term: the beginning of the “corralito” 
In March of 2001, Machinea took the sole blame for the failure of the Blindaje to turnaround the 
downward trajectory of the economy. Interestingly, this focus on Argentina’s economic minister 
kept the focus away from the private sector and the international operations of foreign banks 
themselves. Nevertheless, his resignation lead the way for Cavallo’s reappointment, despite 
being effectively forced to step down in July of 1996 due to the double digit unemployment and 




incarnations of his transaction tax, as well as early iterations of banking restrictions that would 
eventually come to form the infamous corralito. 
Ámbito Financiero praised his first proposal, which sought to relax central bank 
regulations that barred individuals deemed credit-impaired or otherwise delinquent from holding 
or opening bank accounts (2001, March 27). However, Ámbito was not just supportive, but quite 
bullish as it suggested that bringing between 300 and 350 thousand new personal accounts online 
would only serve to bolster the financial sector (2001, March 27). Additionally, Clarín’s 
coverage reported that the finance minister’s initiatives had the broad support of banks— 
particularly of favor was the clause attached to his transaction tax (2001, March 23).
3
  
The press continued to uncritically support the role of global finance within Argentina 
despite its economic hardships brought on by the banking crisis.  Although March saw the 
financial press’ focus confined to Argentina’s domestic economic policy, in April the discourse 
shifted back to touting the strength of global finance when the rating agency Fitch published a 
positive outlook for Bansud. La Nación’s coverage turned to Bansud’s parent company, 
Banamex, noting that the positive ratings came despite of the Argentine firm’s recent losses.  As 
such it spoke more to the strong financial backing Bansud was afforded (La Nación, 2001, April 
10). In a separate article, La Nación went on to showcase Banamex’s 1
st
 quarter earnings citing 
the firm’s announcements of over 200 million in profits, a 17% increase from the 1
st
 quarter of 
2000 (La Nación, 2001 April 26). In all, La Nación’s April coverage put forward two instances 
wherein its foreign owners upstaged Bansud.  
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keeping reserves within the banking system at all times, while also forcing more accounts into retail banking— a 





Citibank’s acquisition of Banamex added a new wrinkle to the press’ positive narrative 
on global finance. As the story broke, La Nación suggested that Citi’s acquisition had broken-up 
and overtaken the near-monopoly of Latin American financial markets by Spanish Banks. In all, 
the Citibank merger was billed as the harbinger of a more competitive landscape wherein foreign 
firms would have to vie for market share by increasing the attractiveness of its offerings, thus 
bringing greater economies of scale and scope (La Nación, 2001, May 18a). Another Nación 
report not only reassured its readers of Citibank’s ability to restructure Bansud, but also took the 
time to admonish the state of domestic banks, as it put into question the efficacy of Banamex’s 
prior stewardship, which it had actually praised just a month prior (La Nación, 2001, May 18b).  
The Irony in La Nación’s perseveration on presenting foreign finance as somehow more 
desirable or beneficial than its domestic counterparts was that Bansud would be sold off to the 
Argentine bank Macro just 7 months later (Hay & Smith, 2005).  
Despite the worsening economic conditions, in May Scotiabank reported that its 
corporate profits had quadrupled. True to form, Ámbito Financiero kept its reporting in line with 
the bank’s own view by attributing its recent gains to the firm’s microeconomic efficiencies 
(2001, May 18). Despite Scotiabank’s profits, it turned out to be a tough month for the general 
economy. Moreover, Ámbito’s honeymoon period with Cavallo was all but over, as they blamed 
his policies for the 3% decline in the Argentine stock market, which was also flanked by a 4% 
increase in country risk (2001, May 1). This particular article went on to cite the financial 
sector's grievances with Domingo Cavallo's measures to implement a VAT on previously exempt 
items such as entertainment and periodicals in order to meet the IMF’s conditions for another 2.7 




where the press and high finance failed to coincide with the IMF’s position, as Horst Köhler was 
cited as being “impressed” with tax scheme (Ámbito, 2001, May 1). 
Persistently high interest rates in July served as a reminder of the disconnect that existed 
between the offshore balance sheets of global banks such as Scotiabank and its Argentine 
operations. Citing bankers wishing to remain anonymous, the Clarín declared that the upward 
trends in the already high interest rates kept most borrowers at bay, except those with such 
urgent needs that were willing to be encumbered by the high costs of debt (2001, July 11). 
Nonetheless, they also rebutted this bearish outlook with the remarks of Scotiabank’s Ricardo 
Carmona who explained that the high rates actually serve to entice savers to keep money in 
banks. As in February, the advice from this banker was for patience, as he explained that retail 
rates take time to catch up to wholesale and interbank fluxes (2001, July 11). 
In attempts to find solutions, Ámbito saw the government's implementation of tax credits 
for mortgage holders as a potentially stimulating scheme for a market whose borrowers were as 
wary as the lenders. This article by Pablo Wende went on to focus on the nuts and bolts of 
mortgage lending keeping the narrative to a technical rather than critical tract—one interesting 
note was that local floating rates were on the average, less expensive than those of the relatively 
few banks offering the international LIBOR rates (2001, July 2).  Nevertheless, this was 
admittedly a moot point as Wende was aware of Argentinian’s aversion of flexible rate loans due 
to poor experiences of the past, which he— consequently— chalked up to the failure of 
borrowers to study the terms. Additionally, he did qualify his assertions by conceding that some 
banks may not have explicitly disclosed the terms— yet he still fell short of entertaining any 




6.3 The press’ evolving discursive strategies: global markets and fiscal deficits as 
metaphysical constraints? 
In July, with economic uncertainty intensifying, La Nación returned the focus to Argentina’s 
political will (or rather lack thereof) to appease foreign investors by adhering to strict austerity 
measures (Olivera, 2001, July 9; Olivera, 2001, July 16; Blanco, 2001, July 19; Blanco, 2001, 
July 20).  As the floor of the economic slump began materialize in the eyes of financiers, La 
Nación put the onus on the administration to both immediately cut fiscal expenditures in the 
hopes that the gesture would reduce the interest on future Treasury bond notes. Quilmes 
economic analyst, Pedro Rabasa further argued that the economic conditions would indeed 
stabilize if politicians remained supportive of the administration’s efforts (Olivera, 2001, July 9). 
Another report explicitly detailed that in order to stabilize the economy, a political truce would 
be necessary in order to sell the idea of austerity to the public (Olivera, 2001, July 16). For the 
press then, the political discussion to be had was not on the efficacy of global capital within 
Argentina to-date, but rather the proficiency of the state in pacifying or convincing the public to 
accept progressively deeper bouts of austerity. 
Like Ámbito Financiero had suggested seven months prior, La Nación effectively 
concurred that austerity operated in a much more metaphysical or normative manner— as 
opposed to how it is understood within the positivist pretenses of its classical and neoclassical 
terms (2001, Jan 15). Additionally, the reporting’s sensitivity to the political implications of 
austerity tacitly acknowledged some of its more problematic facets; such as the fact that its use 




their reports remained adamant that austerity was the best way forward, the challenge now was in 
coaxing the general public as well as politicians to effectively capitulate.
4
   
 
In accord with earlier reports, the Clarín reaffirmed the importance that adjustment 
policies played in regards to strumming up market sentiment as opposed to the more material 
gains that were now admittedly less pronounced (2001, July 30). The press once again implied 
that markets were in fact socially constructed, as austerity’s potential to encourage external 
market actors to invest far outweighed its quantifiable benefits. Rather than serving to downplay 
the efficacy of austerity, the reports’ newly embraced intersubjective understanding presented a 
greater impetus for the adherence to sound policy. As such Scotiabank economist Paul Breadhard 
argued that government support of adjustment policies served to reassure investors in a time of 
crisis— this also included the IMF— whose support was, on its face, contingent on austerity 
measures being in place (Clarín, 2001, July 30).  
6.3.1 Depoliticizing austerity via the IMF and the ticker tape neurosis  
As the Argentine state began pushing through new fiscal reforms, La Nación and its financial 
pundits shifted back to a more optimistic demeanor (Olivera, 2001, July 23). A separate article 
cited representatives from both Goldman Sachs and Scotiabank who concurred that the economic 
conditions should improve with the agreements reached on fiscal cuts, as well as the G8’s voiced 
support (Aleman, 2001, July 23). Executives from JP Morgan also chimed in, adding that if the 
senate had not moved to enact a zero deficit plan, debts would have reached unsustainable levels 
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 Another cause for this newfound impetus to shape how austerity was understood may have stemmed from the 
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(Clarín, 2001, July 30). In August, one article speculated as to whether a recent visit from the 
United States undersecretary, John Taylor was a sign that additional US funds might be injected 
into the Argentine economy because of its renewed commitment to zero deficit policies. The 
reporting once again suggested that any relative gains from its orthodox measures were second to 
the potential windfall that could come from external funds that were ultimately bound to market 
perception (Olivera, 2001, August 6). Once again, the press’ communicative discourse made it 
clear that the sentiment or perception held by global capital markets effectively trumped 
Argentina’s internal dynamics (Schmidt, 2008).   
As prior reports hinged the recovery of depressed stocks on the ability to attract external 
FDI and even bilateral aid from the US, attention now turned to the need for a the Argentine state 
to come to terms with the IMF on a massive loan package, which was said to be needed in order 
to quell investor fears (Blanco, 2001, August 8). Here again, market sentiment superseded all 
fundamentals, although austerity was still seen as the way to appease external markets, 
particularly by making good with the conditional requirements of IMF lending. The task at hand 
was then to work towards softening domestic attitudes, which remained vehemently opposed to 
further fiscal cuts. Although the economic conditions were equally volatile, the capricious nature 
of La Nación’s reporting was becoming apparent as its views, were by and large an 
amalgamation of directly quoted demands of foreign bank analysts and executives— the majority 
of which simply sought the political acceptance of austerity (Olivera 54, 2001, July 23; Aleman, 
2001, July 23; La Nación, 2001, July 30). Reporting during these summer months quickly turned 
from aggressively advocating for the political support of austerity to a sort of neurotic optimism, 




In August, the Clarín wrote that rises in Argentine stocks and sovereign debt indicated 
that the forthcoming IMF loan package had already been factored into market prices (2001, Aug 
17). Essentially, the market gains were externalized as a result of the IMFs aid. Contrarily, once 
the IMF accords were reached, La Nación took its focus away from external factors and earlier 
appeals to spur market sentiment in order to highlight the technical and material aspects of the 
minor uptick (La Nación, 20001, Aug 17). Javier Blanco kept political appeals to a minimum, 
instead choosing to focus his coverage of the uptick in valuations in rather technocratic terms, 
reciting the fractional increases by rote (Blanco, 2001, August 30). However, this move to 
incorporate domestic stock market gains into this anxious, optimism that had previously focused 
on the external returns on austerity “ROA” proved to be short-lived.  
The euphoria brought on by the ticker tape quickly gave way, as less than three weeks 
later Argentine stocks plummeted in what Blanco described as the worst trading week of the 
decade (Blanco, 2001, September 22). Blanco’s column quickly reverted to prior narratives, as 
he once again sought to externalize Argentina’s economic woes— a stark about-face from his 
recent reveling in the financial sectors microeconomic conquests. Although Blanco was alluding 
to fiscal deficits when he mentioning that internal factors had contributed to the current woes, the 
record decline in stocks was said to have been catalyzed by new market fears stemming from 
Wall Street’s post September 11 crash along with the long-term uncertainty brought on by the 
prospects of a prolonged war (Blanco, 2001, September 22). With Argentine stocks falling by 
10% the week after 9/11, Ámbito concurred positing that the bearish international sentiment was 
brought on by the expectations of a large scale armed conflict, which weighed down any hopes 
of a recovery (2001, September 22). Ámbito went on to cite Scotiabank’s Pedro Rabasa who 




consequence, this making management quite difficult” (2001, September 22). Rabasa also cited 
J.P. Morgan representatives who confirmed that the elevated country risk was due to the bearish 
sentiment abroad (2001, September 22).  Again, the coordinative discourse reversion to its 
externalizing narrative, allowed it to not only obscure the private banks own role in the 
intensifying liquidity crisis, but also the ill effects of Argentina’s privatization program and the 
incremental bouts of austerity.    
6.3.2 On the precipice of collapse: the Bansud sale, bond downgrades, and an obstinate IMF  
Towards the end of October, just two months before Bansud was sold to Macro, Ámbito reported 
that Citibank executives had officially quashed rumors of a potential sale (2001, October 24). 
Clarín also reported that Galicia had denied coming to a decision on the acquisition of Bansud 
(2001, October 25). Choosing to take the ostensible highroad, La Nación’s Blanco’s skirted the 
fact-checking and speculation by accusing journalists who peddled rumors of the sale as the 
cause for the most recent market downturn. In this same article, Blanco quickly segued to the 
decline of Argentine bonds, which he blamed solely on Domingo Cavallo’s failure to impose an 
austere economic plan for the provinces (Blanco, 2001, October 25). 
From this point until the time of the eventual sale to Macro, La Nación’s coverage of 
Bansud focused on providing an explanation for its poor performance—mostly through finger 
pointing. Hereafter, the paper chose not to scrutinize Citibank/Banamex’s strategic or operational 
shortcomings, nor did it mention Bansud’s prior malinvestments. Instead, La Nación laid blame 
squarely on the decline in bond values, which they in turn traced back to the failure of the state to 
enact a sound fiscal pact with the provinces (La Nación, 2001, October 27; La Nación, 2001 
November 10). In other words, the newspaper chose to externalize the bank’s failures, despite 




The press’ trend in praising the private sector in times of booms while attributing the 
busts to the state continued, as the market faced another leg down. Specifically, La Nación 
attributed this slide to fears that the state had failed to settle its debt negotiations with the IMF. 
Once again, Javier Blanco’s kneejerk reaction was to blame the government’s inability to enforce 
austerity measures (Blanco, 2001, October 30). Pedro Rabasa, Scotiabank’s chief economist was 
quoted saying, that a reaffirmation of fiscal restraint and a cross-industry pact to deflate prices 
was the De la Rua administration’s last chance to generate both consumer and investor 
confidence (Blanco, 2001, September 22). Ámbito Financiero followed up on this story by 
lending its support to Cavallo's shock style plan to renegotiate bonds (2001, October 17).
5
  
Although the mainline financial narrative eagerly endorsed the IMF’s demands for a 
more rigorous application of fiscal retrenchment, the state was reluctant to press any harder 
given the political climate and De la Rua’s past promises to halt further cuts. In the end, the IMF 
chose to look past Argentina’s failure to meet set targets, as cutting off them off would have led 
to a default on its outstanding loans, which would in turn adversely affect the IMF’s own books. 
Although Argentina succeeded in calling the Fund’s bluff, Ámbito asserted that this did not 
lessen the need to reinstitute fiscal reforms. Herein, they specifically point to Argentina’s poor 
tax collection efforts along with the projected fiscal overruns, which would necessitate more 
foreign assistance (Ámbito, 2001, October 17).  
October also saw the press and global financial institutions deploy a discourse that sought 
to preempt any deviation from orthodox ideas and policies. Another Ámbito article tacked on to 
these fears by citing Moody’s downgrade, which the rating agency claimed was due to 
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Argentina’s poor long-term outlook, as well as the increasing likelihood that that “non-orthodox” 
solutions would be embraced. Herein, the coverage expounded on Moody’s fears, as it 
speculated that non-orthodox policies would likely come as either steep haircuts or outright 
defaults on Argentine bonds (Ámbito, 2001, October 12). Thus, the narrative now sought to warn 
against the government’s potential use of heterodox methods and more specifically the use of 
inflationary policy, which potentially involved one or more of the aforementioned, wherein 
floating the peso freely was perhaps the worst-case scenario. La Nación’s advice on the matter 
harkened back to one of its prior narratives as it sought to shore up internal confidence in the 
market, albeit through deflationary measures and of course with the broader objective 
stimulating foreign or “global” investors (La Nación, 2001, November 25). 
Despite Argentina edging closer towards collapse, Scotiabank Quilmes’ head Peter 
Godsoe remained outwardly optimistic that authorities would continue to make headway on 
plans seeking to shift tax money towards the new bond swap and of course a redoubling of 
efforts to cut fiscal expenditures (Ámbito, 2001, November 17). Godsoe noted that the swap 
itself would bode well for investors and in turn, likely lower the unsustainably high interest rates 
(Ámbito, 2001, November 17). However, this positive outlook went against a much more 
pessimistic view held by the treasurers of the major foreign banks who held a meeting at HSBC’s 
Argentine headquarters just weeks before. In this earlier report out of Ámbito, bankers expressed 
little confidence in the economic ministry’s new plan and without any new queues to pick up on, 
the meeting and the reporting quickly turned into a sort of cathartic group therapy session (2001, 
November 1).
6
 Ultimately, the bewilderment of the bankers who awaited Cavallo’s next move 
would foreshadow the mass uncertainty brought on by the banking freeze initiated on December 
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1st, dubbed “el corralito.” also coincided with the first bank to be reacquired by a domestic firm 
just weeks after, Bansud.     
On December 20, the day after Bansud’s sale, Clarín announced the unthinkable— a 
Domestic bank had reacquired a foreign held bank (Clarín 2001, December 20). Effectively, 
Macro’s acquisition of Bansud forced the Clarín to accept that Argentina’s domestic enterprises 
were likely to lead the way for future growth.  This was something that the Clarín admitted it had 
taken as “unthinkable”. Nevertheless, Clarín defended foreign finance by reiterating that 
Bansud’s failures had stemmed from its Banco Shaw acquisition, and not its short-lived foreign 
stewardship (Clarín 2001, December 20). However, the upshot herein was that the Bansud 
acquisition effectively turned Macro— whose operations had been concentrated in the northern 
regions of Argentina— into a national powerhouse. Just a month later, La Nación would follow 
up noting Marco’s successes as pesofication provided a 45% surge in Bansud’s stock value 
(Blanco, 2002, January 22). Ultimately, Macro’s acquisition of a foreign-owned institution 
provided a tangible precedent or axiom that defied the financial press’ narrative, which suggested 
that economic growth would come from global capital.  
6.4 Collating the results of the discursive analysis  
Anatol von Hahn’s first task upon entering the Argentine market focused on educating 
consumers and Scotia’s workforce. From the content analysis undertaken in this chapter it 
becomes evident that the press was a key channel for this “education process.” Nevertheless, the 
narrative set forth by both financial executives and the press was by no means focused on 
highlighting the microeconomic efficiencies offered by either Scotiabank or any other foreign 
financial institution for that matter. In fact, the reporting’s cumulative product was a narrative 




while the evermore frequent downturns were externalized or “globalized” (i.e., occurring outside 
of finance, the markets, and even the Argentine state).  However, criticism as well as potential 
solutions were not focused on reforming private finance, but rather on the state’s capacity to both 
prop it up and attract FDI via across-the-board liberalization and fiscal retrenchment aimed at 
suppressing inflation. While sustaining the 1:1 peso-dollar convertibility came at a great 
economic cost it nonetheless, allowed Argentine capital outflows to remain profitable.   
  By the close of 2001, it was clear that the appeals of the late 90s, which hailed foreign 
banks as the vehicle to financial modernization and accesses to virtually limitless pools of credit 
from global capital markets — were at best naively optimistic forecasts. What the press’ 
narrative had done was make a spurious correlation between the stability of foreign financial 
institutions and the stability of their positions within Argentine markets, as these institutions 
turned out to be even more risk averse than their domestic counterparts. Moreover, the capital 
flight that was belatedly capped off by the ‘corralito’ proved that financial firms operated on a 
different circuit than the broader economy. Furthermore, the entry of foreign finance did nothing 
to stop Argentina’s upward trajectory of interest rates— culminating in a technical cessation of 
lending.
7
 Furthermore, in the lead up to their exit what foreign finance did offer was a consistent 
message that externalized their losses, while beckoning on the state to intervene on their 
behalf— through liberalization schemes and bank rediscounts that were to be underwritten 
through the intensification of fiscal discipline.  
Overall, La Nación’s coverage of Scotiabank and Citi between 1998 and 2001 presented 
a narrative, which effectively promoted neoliberal globalization (see figure 1). Nearly all the 
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reports saw global finance itself as an external phenomenon that was by and large out of the 
control of local politics. Out of the 61 reports examined 58 concluded or were written with the 
inherent assumption that global finance and the constraints it imposed on economic and fiscal 
matters were politically inexorable. Moreover, just 3 of the 61 reports in question saw the role of 
Argentina’s internal markets as critical to its overall stability.  
 
Although the survey sought out reports, which presumably chronicled the operations and 
performance of foreign financial institutions, namely those of— Citibank and Scotiabank, the 
content therein actually focused more on the role of the state. Specifically, these reports zeroed 
in on how the state could better implement policies of the economic orthodoxy in order to attract 
external capital. At first glance figure 1 appears to exhibit a balanced bias in terms of economic 
strategy and what drove markets. However, 21 out of the 34 times that writers pressed the state 
Figure 1. Biases within La Nación’s communicative discourse (1997- 2001)  
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to actively intervene it was in order to explicitly push for neoclassical or supply-side measures, 
such as the liberalization of either finance or labor, or fiscal retrenchment.
8
  
A significant breakthrough in the communicative discourse— that coincided with or 
confirmed the social constructivist position— was that both financial executives and pundits 
explicitly acknowledged that market dynamics are not simply dominated by material factors, but 
rather that ideas or social “perceptions” are equally, if not more important (Hay, 2011; Hay & 
Rosemond, 2002; Schmidt, 2010; Smith, 2005). Specifically, La Nación’s reports appeared to be 
divided over whether the market was understood to be driven materially or through more 
intersubjective understandings (see figure 1).
9
 One report went as far as noting that any relative 
gains from its austerity itself came second to the potential windfall from global capital inflows 
from the perception of stability they conveyed (Olivera, 2001, August 6).  
Additionally, opinions as to what was the fundamental economic driver fluctuated during 
periods of boom or bust, as losses were externalized to “global” pressures, while market gains 
were chalked up to the acumen of financiers. For instance, during the faint market rallies of 
2001, La Nación’s reporting displayed a tendency to key in on material or technical aspects 
rather than market sentiment. In other words, markets rallies focused on showcasing the financial 
sector’s acumen, while minimizing the effects of political factors as well as the state’s own 
initiatives (Blanco, 2001, January 10; La Nación, 2001, Jan. 13, Cortina 2001, Jan. 14; Blanco, 
2001, Feb. 1). Conversely, during downturns La Nación’s writing took its emphasis off material 
factors and instead turned to discourses that looked for ways to stimulate market sentiment 
(Blanco, 2001, February 21; La Nación, 2001, Feb 27; 45, Rabasa, 2001, April 16; Blanco, 2001, 
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figure 1). 
9




May 9). The most popular means to shore up market confidence was via state intervention. 




Ámbito Financiero’s 2001 coverage also provided a communicative discourse wrapped 
in the logics of neoliberal globalization, which again treated global finance as politically 
inexorable and externally driven (Hay, 2004; Hay & Smith, 2005; Schmidt, 2008). In fact, out of 
the 18 reports covering the banks in question, not one proved to be critical of their operations or 
performance (see figure 2). Additionally, figure 2 shows that 14 of 18 either implied or directly 
posited that external markets played the decisive role in the direction of the Argentine economy. 
Unlike La Nación however, there was no marked preference in economic strategy as the reports 
were split between those that sought to defer to the market and those that appealed for state 
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 A regression coefficient of .7379 demonstrated a strong degree of linear correlation, as reports that were 
deferential to markets had a tendency to present markets in positivist terms, while reports that beckoned for market 
intervention appealed to market sentiment with greater frequency.   
Figure 2. Biases within Ámbito Financiero’s communicative discourse (1997- 2001)   









Politics of Finance Role of Finance Econ. Strategy Econ. Philosophy Material v Social IMF Conditions




interventions. In all, 8 of the 18 reports called on the state to intervene, albeit in 6 of these 
occasions it was in order to explicitly impose a neoliberal economic philosophy (see figure 2). 
Ámbito was also much more inclined to present the market in a much more materialist or 
mechanical form, unlike La Nación’s more nuanced writings, which straddled both positivist and 
interpretivist understandings.  
Clarín’s discourse on the operations of Scotiabank and Citi’s subsidiaries between 1997 
and 2001 maintained that these foreign firms produced a net positive impact on the Argentine 
economy, despite the country spiraling into a depression. Nevertheless, their reporting treated the 
politics of finance as a moot point. In fact, much like La Nación and Ámbito, the reports from 
Clarín demonstrably showed that writers either argued for, or began from the point of view that 
finance was both politically inexorable and externally driven. Indeed, over two thirds of the 
reports in question (17 out of 26) saw finance as politically inexorable (see figure 3). Conversely, 
3 reports entertained the political nature of finance, while another 6 reports made no mention of 
Figure 3. Biases within Clarín’s communicative discourse (1997- 2001)   
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the issue.  
Clarín’s reporting did set itself apart by displaying a slightly stronger degree of faith in 
the ability of the market to clear itself. Herein, calls for state intervention occurred 5 times within 
the four year span covered. As figure 3 illustrates, this classical or Austrian predisposition was 
also carried over into a predominantly positivist understanding of market dynamics, as 18 out of 
26 reports chose to emphasize material factors to just 5 that spoke to intersubjective or social 
understandings. Unlike like Ámbito and La Nación, the Clarín did not make any appeals for 
supply-side easing, instead their writing promoted the use of austerity and deregulation in the 
spirit of liberal, free-market principles.  
6.4.1 Conclusion 
In the three years that lead up to the December 2001 banking freeze known as “el corralito”, all 
three major periodicals put forth a communicative discourse that not only failed to call into 
question the role of global financial institutions within the Argentine liquidity crisis, but actually 
perpetuated their views and demands within the narratives it constructed (Schmidt, 2008). From 
the beginning, their writing not only welcomed the banks, but went as far as claiming that their 
entry would, both modernize Argentine finance and also stimulate the economy by allowing for 
greater access to credit. In other words, their discourse presented global finance in a neoliberal 
frame wherein it was “unambiguously positive” and thus desirable (Hay & Smith, 2005).   
When the foreign banks failed to live up to their billing and conditions began to 
deteriorate, the press took its focus off of the banks themselves by employing an externalizing 
narrative. In other words, the focus on exogenous factors allowed for the obfuscation of 




a stable level of demand. In a similar manner to how globalization has been deployed in different 
contexts, as a logic of economic compulsion, the externalizing narrative also served to 
depoliticize the use of neoliberal monetary and fiscal policy initiatives (Hay, 1999, 2004; Watson 
& Hay, 2003). Specifically, the narrative put forth effectively obliged the Argentine government 
to bailout insolvent institutions via massive Central Bank rediscounts that were to be 
underwritten by the promise of greater fiscal discipline. In all, the financial sector’s 
representatives and the cadre of embedded reporters kept their faith not in the acumen of these 





7. Discourses during the Argentine Great Depression: capital 
controls and Scotiabank’s default   
This chapter carries forward this section’s examination of the communicative discourses of the 
press on the subject of international banks operating in Argentina (Schmidt, 2008). Specifically, 
the focus herein is on analyzing the discursive constructions of the Argentine press, who served 
as the principle interlocutor between both the public and the financial executive’s calls for state 
intervention, in the form of bailouts, as well as the issues surrounding the banking freeze, known 
as the “corralito”. Again, the aim herein is to examine the communicative discourses in order to 
examine if, how, and when the logics and conditions of neoliberal globalization were deployed in 
attempts to either constrain or affect certain normative constructs (Hay & Smith, 2013).  
Interestingly, one preliminary observation was that although international banks had 
already reduced their investments and liquid holdings within Argentina, the press’ discourse 
maintained its attention on the government’s role and the subsequent shortcomings with respect 
to the banking freeze. Another observation was that in the face of illiquid international banks, the 
press’ externalizing narrative appeared to have been intermittently jettisoned, in order to make 
appeals for the application of active (albeit supply-side) policies, which saw the state 
underwriting the recapitalization of these banks who had refused to import further capital from 
abroad. Therefore depending on the matter, both the press and the financial executives they cited 
would arbitrarily shift between a narratives that externalized the economy’s locus of control to 





On December 1, 2001, the Argentine government implemented its retail banking freeze 
known as the “corralito”.
 1
 This caused banks to experience a spike in the creation of new current 
accounts as the freeze capped cash withdrawals at 250 pesos a week, forcing Argentinians to 
conduct transactions above the monthly limit with the bank as the intermediary (i.e., through 
checks, debit cards or wire transfers). With over 50,000 new current accounts opened within the 
first two days of the freeze, the Clarín began to question the efficacy and transparency of the new 
payments system, which had now come under total control of the banks (2001, December 5). 
While the Clarín’s report bared its apprehensions, Ámbito Financiero took a much more 
proactive approach by publishing the customer service numbers of all major banks amidst the 
ensuing confusion and severe bottlenecking (2001, December 10).   
The high costs of maintaining the peso’s convertibility lead to the “corralito”— a wholly 
dysfunctional currency scheme. In effect, the banking freeze was an attempt to implement a 
virtually cashless payments system. The Clarín reported that De la Rua’s week-long banking 
holiday had led to bottle necks, wherein automated tellers and debit cards were failing customers 
(2001, Dec. 28). Moreover, debts owed in US dollars, including the abovementioned dollar 
denominated mortgages, could not be paid as there was no way for Argentinians to convert their 
pesos. Reports also surfaced that banks had refused to exchange pesos for dollars outright 
(Clarín, 2001, Dec. 28).   
In an almost kneejerk reaction, international credit rating agencies further downgraded 
Argentina’s sovereign debt as well as foreign banks operating within. La Nación’s coverage 
concerning the banks’ downgrade remained free from much editorializing, although it did 
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 In theory this corralito would allow the financial sector to stave off further bank runs while shrouding its payment 
system within the opacity of electronic, fractional reserve banking, where the debit and credit system could run at an 
exponentially greater factor than that of circulating cash, which was particularly important due to the limited supply 




present the rationale of both Standard and Poor and Fitch. Here they cited the government’s 
initiative as exacerbating the poor economic conditions by forcing the payments system to work 
with even less paper in circulation, while the latter noted that these initiatives signaled an 
eventual default (La Nación, 2001, December 4). 
By narrowly framing the communicative discourse around this state initiative the press 
minimized the role of private banks within the liquidity crisis (Schmidt, 2008; Cameron & Palan, 
2004).  Specifically, the press’ coverage moved forward with cautious optimism, as it kept the 
debate tethered to the banking freeze and its “technical benefits” (La Nación, 2001, Dec 15). 
Consequently, this brief uptick was covered outside of the context of the deadly riots and the 
persistent protests. Javier Blanco went even further highlighting that the recent weeks’ rally of 
over 48% was the biggest in the past 8 years, although he qualified the optimism noting that it 
still was not enough to regain the epic losses of 2001. Nonetheless, he maintained his focus on 
the technical aspects of the economy while also posting that the materialization of further market 
gains depended on the government’s ability to stabilize its monetary policy, as well as 
restructuring its public debts and reaching accords with the IMF (Blanco, 2001, December 29).  
While coverage of the upticks citied mostly technical data, as in the previous chapter, the 
more intersubjective notion of “confidence” was again tapped— this time as a rationale for 
Argentina’s credit downgrade. Specifically, the rating agency Moody’s and La Nación blamed 
the downgrade on the lack of confidence in the new interim president, Eduardo Duhalde who 
chose to devalue the peso (La Nación, 2002, Jan 15). Again, this emphasis on how the Duhalde’s 
administration was perceived by foreign investors lent further credence to arguments posed by 
social constructivist, especially those that highlight the importance of normative understandings 




15; La Nación, 2002, Jan 16; also see Hay, 2011; Adler, 1997; Hay & Rosemond, 2002; 
Schmidt, 2010; Smith, 2005).   
Overall, what began to form was a recurring discursive tract which went as far back as 
the late nineties (see chapter 6). Herein, press writers were stuck a manic-depressive cycle of 
neurosis, wherein coverage during upticks perseverated on showcasing the microeconomic gains 
of private banks. In contrast, reports during downturns took on an intersubjective dissonance, 
which shifted attention onto how the state could instill confidence within the macroeconomy. 
This last omission in particular struck at the ontological core of neoliberal globalization’s 
positivist underpinnings (Adler, 1997). And this same ebb and flow would repeat throughout the 
crisis period.   
7.1 Chronicling the press’ deferred connection between finance and public protests 
The communicative discourse’s inability to connect foreign banks to the liquidity crisis is one 
example of how global financiers continued to be framed in the most positive manner (Cameron 
& Plan, 2004; Schmidt, 2008). In fact, it was not until the major street protests known as the 
“cacerolas” that Scotiabank or other financial institutions were mentioned alongside the crisis.
2
 
In fact, while the major protests began in December, the thesis found that it wasn’t until January 
that the Clarín admitted that the anger on the streets was directed at foreign banks. In this 
particular article, they noted that in the city of Liniers protestors’ surrounded branches in an 
attempt to impose “corral” of their own (2002, Jan. 17). The Clarín cited the protest organizer 
Eduardo Slutzky, who urged account holders to take their money to domestic banks while also 
suggesting that the 3% debit transaction fees be earmarked for Argentina’s social security system 
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 The cacerolas or cacerolazos was the name given to growing masses of working and middle-class protests known 
for banging pots and pans. The protests kicked off with the start of the banking freeze in December of 2001 and 
continued well into 2002, despite setting off a state of emergency, which culminated in 20 dead protestors on the 




(2002, Jan. 17). By citing several protestors, this article offered to contextualize some of the 
anger. Through several interviews it recounted the frustrations of the protestors who had been 
barred from accessing their current accounts and whose savings had been turned into fixed-term, 
bond like instruments— that offered no recourse outside of their 1,000 peso monthly allowance 
(Clarín, 2002, Jan. 17).  
Nevertheless, a second article from Clarín began to shy away from this more 
contextualized account, taking its focus off of the protestor’s grievances and instead highlighting 
the technical aspects of the freeze. This approach was closer to what La Nación’s coverage had 
done thus far. Moreover, this latest article not only backed off of protesters grievances, but also 
appeared to criminalize them by focusing on the potential threat to public safety and the rule of 
law. In this case, they focused on a Scotiabank branch that had been sprayed with graffiti 
reading, “We loot here from 9 to 2” (Clarín, 2002, Jan. 26). The article further reported that none 
of the 15 arrested were part of any organized group, which insinuated the existence or potential 
for organized criminal or terroristic activity in connection with demonstrators (Clarín, 2002, Jan. 
26).   
Stocks maintained their gains through the New Year perhaps because of— rather than in 
spite of— the unpopular banking freeze, which capped cash withdrawals and virtually eliminated 
the circulation of paper currency. However, Instead of examining the links between the freeze 
and the hostile public sentiment, La Nación’s financial reporting maintained its focus on the 
gains being made, as daily transactions were forced onto banking ledgers (Alconada, 2002, 
January 5; La Nación, 2002, January 5).
3 
 Nevertheless, instead of questioning the broader 
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 The banking freeze caused a systemic shift in the payment system, as the massive influx of new accounts caused an 




implications of the freeze, the article pointed to the need for banks to resolve the growing 
backlog in the clearance of checks, which was driven by the massive influx of new account 
holders. Given that La Nación’s prior writing had acknowledged the role of market sentiment, it 
is interesting that this wave of reports, despite the trends, made no mention of Fernando De la 
Rua’s abrupt abdication on December 21
st 
2001, nor the violent protests and the general anarchy 
in the streets.  
Javier Blanco took this a step further noting that one of the positive by products of the 
“corralito” was that investors piled cash into stocks in order to avoid both, the freeze and the 
coming devaluation their accounts. Although Blanco kept most of his attention on the percentage 
gains of bank stocks, he did acknowledge that the surge was due to the government’s move to 
devalue— albeit that the gains came at the expense of savers (Blanco, 2002, January 22).  
However, Blanco’s statements lead readers to a sort of naïve optimism that bordered on 
contradiction when juxtaposed with an article out of Ámbito on the 10
th
 of January—12 days 
prior— which warned that foreign banks had threatened to pull out of Argentina if the 
government failed to inject more US dollars.  Precisely, this Ámbito article alleged that two 
unnamed, but “important foreign banks” were threatening to exit if the Central Bank upheld its 
new policy that ended government funded liquidity injections. To their credit, Ámbito did note 
the state’s rebuttal, which argued that to date it had provided 8 billion USD in rediscounts (2002, 
January 10).  
A follow up article 4 days later would confirm these threats, as Scotiabank’s vice 
president was quoted urging the government to quickly enact a financial rescue package, 
otherwise a pullout would remain a viable option (Ámbito, 2002, Jan 14). In all, Ámbito’s 




exacerbate the crisis— should the state not capitulate to needs of the macroeconomy, which were 
at present, best met through the support of the financial sector. In tune with the social 
constructivist focus on normative dynamics, this unwillingness of international finance to 
recapitalize its own banks, let alone lend, speaks to the heart of Minskian understandings of the 
business cycle, wherein agents and institutions are understood to be driven foremost by factors 




The Clarín took a different turn in the midst of all the frustration as Monica Garcia wrote 
two articles on personal internet banking. The first read more like a public relations piece. It 
focused on the strides being made by banks seeking to widen their array of online services and 
accessibility. Herein, she highlighted Citicorp’s move to facilitate online, interbank transferring, 
as well as Scotiabank and BankBoston’s ability to gain online access via ATMs. In her view this 
made remote banking accessible even outside of the crowded branch offices (Garcia, 2001, 
December 19).  
The second article served as a quasi-public service announcement attempting to usher 
online, both protestors and those queuing at brick and mortar banks. Here, she went through the 
nuts and bolts of online banking and setting up an account, which back in 2002 was a relatively 
novel phenomena (Garcia, 2002, January 23). Although Garcia blithely wrote of online banking 
as a viable solution, World Bank data showed that in 2002 only 10.8% of the Argentine 
population could be considered as internet users. Either Garcia was an innovator at heart or wrote 
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 In this sense, money is not just a means to store wealth, as it also serves as a multiplier of it— causing an economy 
to grow or constrict as well as accelerate and decelerate (Keen, 2011: 344-346). Perhaps most importantly, this 
endogenous view of finance begins to uncover the behavioral dynamics, which showcases the pro-cyclical nature of 
money, and why loose monetary policy alone (i.e., low interest rates or quantitative easing) does not necessarily lead 
to recovery. This is especially the case during a “hedge phase”— that is a period of deleveraging— wherein the state 
can play a pivotal role in reigniting the economy as prudent financial actors are too risk averse to provide the 




the article from the perspective of one of the foreign the banks' parent countries, such as the US 
and Canada— where by these same World Bank measures internet users in 2002 represented 
slightly over 60% of the population (World Bank, 2016). To put this further into perspective, in 
2013 Pew research estimated that 51% of adult Americans, representing 61% of internet users 
actually use online banking services, finally breaking the majority threshold by 1% (Fox, 2013).   
7.1.1 Devaluation and inverting the protest coverage  
The Clarín remained positive in the face of the devaluation thanks in part to its byproduct— the 
massive stock market gains in the banking sector.
5
 One anonymously cited banking executive 
even admitted that the end of the dollar parity effectively saved the financial sector from a total 
collapse (Clarín, 2002, January 22). Contrarily, Ámbito noted that foreign investment had sunk, 
just as private lending, which dropped 5%. This particular Ámbito article continued its bearish 
breakdown noting that its two biggest investors— the United States and Spain made up the bulk 
of its FDI approximately 53% (2002, January 28). The article went further noting that 
Argentina’s public sector, including its state owned financial institutions, had suffered the most 
from the drop in FDI (Ámbito, 2002, January 28). Nevertheless, the key point herein is that, as 
an axiomatic matter of fact, Argentina significantly rebounded via heterodox measures and 
without the help of international investors. Ultimately, this served as an empirical refutation of 
the press’ communicative discourse, wherein the only way forward was via the logics of 
neoliberal globalization (Hay & Smith, 2013; Schmidt, 2010).  
Up to this point in the content analysis, the building pressure to devalue was something 
that the press’ discourse steadily resisted via the invocation of external consequences, which 
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 The Argentinian owned, Bank of Galicia was cited as the biggest winner with its stock surging 51%. Other notable 
mentions included Bansud— now back in Argentine hands— which gained a whopping 42% and Suquia—a 




consequently fit within the broader logics of globalization (Hay, 1999, 2004; Watson & Hay, 
2003). Specifically, its appeals for further propping up the pegged foreign exchange rate via 
austerity and state intervention in the guise of constructing a more business friendly environment 
all fit within policy logics of globalization, as well as its communicative discourse (Schmidt, 
2008). However, in January, an official devaluation plan finally emerged that the press and the 
financial sector could support (Quiroga, 2002, Jan 25). This initiative would exclusively 
“pesofy” or devalue savings and current accounts. However, bank assets— including outstanding 
claims on debt— would remain denominated in US dollars. Effectively, this plan called for an 
asymmetric devaluation that put the interest of banks and international debt holders ahead of 
Argentine savers. Thus, the primacy of this “global” space remained intact (see Peck & Tickell, 
2012, 2002; Jessop 2000, 2006). 
Although Duhalde officially devalued the peso on February 2nd, the situation on the 
ground remained tense as bank branches were operating with a shortage of paper money. On 
February 5
th
, the Clarín published an article that noted that banks were seeing shortages in the 
morning hours, however that by the afternoon cash notes had once again been restocked (2002, 
Feb. 5). In essence, this report focused on the plight of those looking for cash, from branch to 
branch— rather than the protestors themselves—who were actually chided as a hindrance to both 
banks and its struggling customers (2002, Feb. 5). In a sense then, by emphasizing the plight of 
the bank’s less vocal clients— the Clarín had found a subset of the crisis’ victims it could 
support. In turn, the press was able to characterize the protestors as not only a nuisance, but 
potentially dangerous, and even criminal.  
A separate follow-up article dedicated to covering the potential damage of private 




panels in order to keep “invaders” from damaging private property (Clarín, 2002, Feb 8). This 
shift by Clarín from covering the technical aspects of the freeze to the potential for damage to 
private property, allowed them to construct a narrative that completely sidestepped any kind of 
contextualization of the protestor’s grievances. Moreover, these protestors were not just depicted 
as a threat to private property, but they were also partially blamed for the continued failures of 
the financial system.  
La Nación’s coverage also contextualized the protests in a similar manner. Like Clarín, 
they excused the protracted operational failures, as well as its customer’s frustrations as a result 
of the persistence of cacerolazos outside of bank branches (La Nación, 2002, March 5). However 
in a conflicting twist, this same article simultaneously acknowledged the lack of public support 
for the banking sector’s practices while also questioning its efficacy. Specifically, it brought 
attention to the lack of consumer demand as well as the apparent reluctance of banks to adopt 
government initiatives to relax the banking freeze, which was evidenced by their tally of closed 
or empty branches (La Nación, 2002, March 5). Asides from the abovementioned, the article 
appeared to side with the government’s initiatives to actively intervene in bank operations, which 
was atypical of La Nación’s reporting that to date had presented an opinion that was deferential 
to private sector.  Nevertheless, this lonely piece could be surmised as too little, too late as the 
downright anarchical political economy of Argentina— which had even turned deadly during the 
December protest—was now in its fourth tumultuous month.    
In light of the unsettled economic and political dynamics, the Argentine government 
attempted to insert itself into the financial system’s operations through a subsidized lending 
scheme, which sought to stimulate demand for automobiles and home mortgages. However, the 




inquiries were on the rise, actual lending had yet to materialize. The article also elaborated on 
other complaints from borrowers who claimed that that many banks had yet to offer the 
subsidized loans (Clarín, 2002, March 5). Nevertheless, the article attempted to balance its 
negative tone by noting that the comparable private sector offerings remained available, such as 
fixed-term savings accounts known as “plazos fijos,” as well as bond swaps. Although this quick 
shift from lending to savings appears a bit illogical— especially within heterodox logics— it 
does parallel the thinking of orthodox equilibrium models wherein savings and lending are not 
exactly taken as mutually exclusive concepts (Clarín, 2002, March 5).  
As the implementation of this latest government initiative to spur demand failed to catch 
on with the private banks, the press revisited the chaos at the ground level, albeit from the point 
of view of the bank teller. The nuance and empathy found in the article’s coverage of the plight 
of bank operators was in stark juxtaposition to the unfriendly characterization of the pot-banging 
protestors— many of them bank customers and even employees— who it attempted to blame for 
the prolonged malaise. This article even linked the levels of stress being observed to those of a 
catastrophic event or warzone— essentially making the case that bankers—exclusively— had 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One peculiar wrinkle was that asides from 
the protests themselves, all of the events cited as stress triggers were government initiatives. 
Specifically, the article pointed to both iterations of the banking freeze that exponentially 
increased checking transactions as well as the added confusion, which accompanied the many 
regulatory changes within different organizational layers (La Nación, 2002, March 19). Thus for 
La Nación, the government’s policies were the cause of the financial sector’s woes rather than 
what could be more accurately described as a reflexive, yet ineffective response to the systemic 




While the narrative formed by the press included caricatured actors such as the 
overworked branch workers, the bungling heads of state, and troublesome protestors; the role of 
high net worth investors and wholesale finance— which were responsible for most of the capital 
flight— was unaccounted for (See chapter 2).  The contrast in coverage was quite dramatic as the 
press treated Argentine officials and protestors with disdain, while financial executives were not 
only extensively cited, but some were even given a broader platform via op-eds and public 
relation pieces (see Garcia, 2001, December 19; Garcia, 2002, January 23; Rabasa, 2001). 
Furthermore, although it lionized the work ethic of bank employees, it failed to cover or by and 
large acknowledge those who had joined the ranks of the protestors, mostly to fight for their jobs 
as branches continued to close down.  
7.1.2 Constitutionality in question: the press’ reaction to judicial investigations and injunctions 
In January, the Argentine courts stepped in to the Argentine financial crises with two major 
motions. The first was a sweeping criminal investigation of the heads of foreign finance on 
suspicions of fraud. The ultimate goal of this investigation was determining whether the banks 
had indeed caused or facilitated the capital exodus. The second, court action was an injunction 
on the freeze on the basis of constitutionality.  Although the press’ narrative treated them as 
occurring independently of one another, the protests themselves created much of the political 
space for the courts’ interventions. Two of the most active presiding judges were Mariano 
Bergés and Maria Servini de Cubría. 
The criminal investigation marked a major point of inflection, as it forced the press’ 
communicative discourse to entertain the legality of how foreign banks were operating (Schmidt, 
2008). Specifically, Citibank, Scotiabank Quilmes, Galicia, and Bank Boston were all suspected 




discourse was not just deferential, but offered a platform for the point of view of the banks. One 
article by La Nación provided a sort of preface to the ongoing investigations by quoting several 
financial executives. The article quoted various heads of finance who declared that the court’s 
inquiry was nothing more than “a smear campaign” or “self-destructive witch-hunt,” which only 
added further instability to the already weak financial conditions (La Nación, 2002, February 
22). Ultimately, the role, efficacy, and even the idea of global finance as an inexorable constraint 
was being forcibly challenged and politicized by the Argentine courts (Hay & Smith, 2005).   
The court ordered injunctions stemmed from legal suits that challenged the constitutionality 
of the banking freeze, as well as the ethics behind them. Essentially, elderly and infirm claimants 
pleaded for the release of their funds on the basis of the hardship imposed due to special needs, 
typically medical conditions. Ultimately, the court’s rulings, which sided with the claimants who 
could demonstrate hardships became a hot button issue better known as “amparos judiciales”. 
However the fear of those upholding the banking freeze was that by challenging its 
constitutionality, these cases had the potential to nullify the freeze across the board. Although 
this was a leading issue in the press, connections to the banks were much less pronounced. For 
instance, the Clarín kept its narrative focused on the immediate effects without much discussion 
of the banks role. Nevertheless, its coverage did acknowledge that the freeze caused hardships 
for people, whether it was those on prescription drugs whose customary co-payments were to be 
paid in cash, or families with children (2001, Dec. 5; 2001, Dec. 28; 2002, Jan. 17).  
In contrast to the Clarín’s approach, Ámbito Financiero and La Nación took a deferential 
stance that was all but in defense of the plight of finance. In terms of coverage of the initial 
rulings, the paper presented the point of view of financial sector economists who argued that 




simply did not have the cash to pay back savers (Ámbito, 2002, February 2). Banks unwilling to 
tender cash found themselves in contempt of Argentine court, which lead to court ordered raids 
of the headquarters of BankBoston and Galicia, which Ámbito covered in a brief manner. 
Although Ámbito provided many reports that presented and elaborated on the point of view of 
the financial industry in respect to the judgments, it expended exactly 179 words to cover the 
raids (2002, February 19). In all, the writing remained atomized as it failed to relate the rationale 
of the cases vis-à-vis the role of the banks and by the same token, the point of view of any the 50 
claimants, their attorneys, which lead to the judge’s ruling. Overall, the effect of the press terse 
coverage gave the judge’s orders an air of arbitrary abruptness.  
Less than a week later, Ámbito decided to weigh in on the court rulings when it published a 
piece, which proclaimed that “a logical judge [Luis Zelaya] had emerged in the case against 
bankers” (2002, February 26). The title was an obvious affront at Mariano Bergés’ rulings, 
which had come down hard on banks. The article went on to question the court’s jurisdiction on 
the matter, while further suggesting that the cases should be remanded to federal courts. 
However, the press’ criticism did not slow down Bergés as he broadened his extensive probe of 
the financial sector by ordering yet another raid, this time on the offices of the Argentine Central 
Bank. With regards to this unprecedented act, Ámbito’s coverage was again nothing more than a 
sparse wire update. However, the wire like brief did manage insert an air of triviality by re-
iterating that the court ordered raids had stemmed from a suit by a saver claiming a mere 15 
thousand US dollars (Ámbito, 2002, Feb. 28).   
When the courts barred 20 high profile banking executives from leaving the country, the 
Clarín’s coverage once again reverted to putting forth scant reports that refrained from any sort 




Scotiabank’s executives William Sutton and Alan McDonald who were now set to testify. This 
particular report consisted of exactly 80 words (2002, March 6). In like manner, Ámbito’s 
coverage also took on a minimalist style with regards to the criminal inquiry of Scotiabank’s 
executives, as well as the 20 million dollar foreign travel bond placed on Citicorp’s Peter 
Baumann, which effectively prohibited him from leaving Argentina (2002, March 11; 2002a, 
March 13).  
During the month of March, one of the few reports that did provide some context to the 
criminal investigation against the bankers actually aimed to discredit the court rulings. 
Specifically, this report by Ámbito dismissed the courts’ inquiries as an opportunistic fabrication 
that ineptly attempted to politicize the economic crisis (2002b, March 02). The article went 
further as it also attempted to debunk the theory that the banks had facilitated or played a role in 
the capital flight (Ámbito, 2002b, March 13). The report closed by emphatically opining that the 
Argentine criminal courts had no legal jurisdiction, let alone moral authority over the operation 
of finance (Ámbito, 2002b, March 13). In all the press’ coverage up to this point converged on a 
narrative that challenged not only the court’s rulings, but its jurisdiction in attempting to 
scrutinize the operations of global banks within Argentina. 
 
7.2 Duhalde’s attempt at rapprochement vis-à-vis the demands of its creditors  
By mid-March the interim Argentine president, Eduardo Duhalde appeared to be signaling for a 
truce between the government and heads of foreign capital. The Clarín covered the sit-down 
between President Duhalde and banking heads, who voiced their biggest concerns— namely, 
curbing Judicial powers, strengthening the banking freeze, and establishing an explanation for 




Duhalde’s meeting with the heads of multinational corporations as a conciliatory exchange. The 
article itself opened with a direct quote from Duhalde, wherein he argued that although there was 
a growing frustration with foreign banks and other multinationals amongst the public, 
profitmaking remained the driver of economic prosperity and thus should not be demonized 
(Clarín, 2002, March 20).  
In contrast to Duhalde’s more amenable demeanor, La Nación presented the demands of 
foreign firms in a much more authoritative manner, which reaffirmed their narrative wherein, the 
role of global finance was effectively a non-negotiable economic imperative (Hay & Rosamond, 
2002). This specific article effectively relayed finance’s demand to its readers, which were 
presented as prerequisites to an economic resurgence including: an adherence to the notion of 
legal certainty, the removal of capital export restrictions, and a subsidized monetary scheme that 
would cover the marginal losses of foreign-held liabilities due to the devaluation (La Nación, 
2002, March 14).
6
 Therefore, in contrast to La Nación’s more prescriptive discourse, the Clarín’s 
coverage— while remaining pro-business— carried a more conciliatory tenor.   
The interim government continued its courtship of international finance when the 
Argentine economic minister, Jorge Remes Lenocov met with the secretary of the US treasury, 
Paul O’Neill. While Remes met with the American delegates, Duhalde gathered with the 
premiers of Spain and Canada. The discussions— at least at an elite level— revealed the 
creeping flow back towards the reestablishment of neoclassical convention. The Clarín noted that 
much of the back and forth between the foreign heads of state involved Argentina’s reaffirmation 
of “business friendly” practices, with a particular focus on curbing judicial activism in the guise 
of protecting the interests of the foreign banks (Curia, 2002, March 22). 
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The Clarín’s communicative discourse again channeled ideas of global capital’s economic 
primacy and inexorability when it praised the Argentine government for being able to “assimilate 
to [external] pressures” (Curia, 2002, March 22). This paper also concurred with O’Neill’ who 
estimated that Argentina would likely start to see a recovery within the next three months (Curia, 
2002, March 22). Of course, the caveat for this tempered optimism was that Argentina first had 
to recommit itself to the neoclassical doctrine. Once again, the way forward was through a set of 
pro-market measures, which would require a greater resolve to curb fiscal expenditure, the 
liberalization of finance, as well as a floating rate for the peso. In an apparent Freudian slip, the 
Clarín took it upon itself to explain why the meetings failed to discuss the responsibility of 
foreign finance in the economic collapse, let alone its potential role in the recovery by simply 
noting that this was not the appropriate forum for such discussions (Curia, 2002, March 22).  
As prominent public figures began taking market friendly stances, the press could now 
throw its support behind their views rather than act as a lone critic of the growing populist 
movement and its burgeoning policies. Precisely, Ámbito took this opportunity to support this 
new offensive when Remes came out publicly against the “law of economic subversion”.
7
 The 
law itself was taken as the legal basis for the judicial investigations. Remes’ remarks were 
positively received in an article whose title roughly translated as “a bit of good news” (Ámbito 
2002, March 14). The article lent credit to Remes’ argument noting that it was not only 
convincing, but encouraging for the prospects going forward. Additionally, Ámbito agreed with 
the crux of Remes’ prescriptions, which called for a return to a more business friendly 
environment, which also required the cooperation of the courts (Ámbito 2002, March 14). 
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Ámbito’s negative coverage of the judiciary gained some traction when it reported that 
the Argentine courts of appeal had—in their view— “logically” overturned two of Judge Bergés’ 
orders. The first nullified a ruling that barred Scotiabank executive Carlos Pace from traveling 
abroad. The second effectively exempted the company’s president, Alan McDonald, from any 
prison time that might have resulted from the investigation. More broadly, the paper deemed the 
judicial investigations as “unusual” and even labeled them as an infringement on civil liberties. 
The article even went as far as citing the Magna Carta, as the reversal of the judge’s rulings was 
portrayed as a triumph for the country’s egalitarian values (Ámbito 2002, March 22).  
Both Remes’ comments as well as Duhalde’s meetings with both the banking executives 
and the heads of private finance served to telegraph their conciliatory posture ahead of their 
slated IMF meetings. The Clarín’s coverage of the negotiations relayed the IMF’s demands, 
which also coincided with those of private finance. Herein, they called on the Argentine 
authorities to put an end to the judicial exceptions to the freeze and its criminal investigations of 
financial executives (Bonelli, 2002, March 22). Taking the side of the IMF, the article 
predictably failed to offer up the court’s rationale for investigating allegations of financial 
malfeasance. Yet, it did awkwardly turn its attention to the role of domestic banks by presenting 
a conspiratorial theory, which alleged that these domestic firms sought to deepen the crisis in 
order to acquire remaining public sector assets (Bonelli, 2002, March 22). 
With state actors taking a more conciliatory and openly pro-business stance, the press 
was able to deploy a much more authoritative and ancillary discourse that was even peppered 
with derisive language. With the financial investigation remanded to federal courts, Ámbito 
ratcheted up its ad hominem attacks by first describing Judge Bergés as an  “incredible” and 




reiterated earlier assertions wherein they argued that banks were not at the root of the financial 
collapse, but rather it was the state that had imposed the banking freeze (2002, April 9). Up to 
this point, the post-crisis discourse of the press and financial executives had very little political 
support to draw own, as they were by and large alone and on the defensive as they attempted to 
stave off populist undercurrents. Yet, despite the political elite’s attempt to put forth an air of 
détente and the more authoritative tenor of the financial press, the judicial injunctions continued 
through April as the courts ruled in favor of 200 savers who were deemed to be facing undue 
hardships due to health conditions or their status as retirees. Nevertheless, the Clarín’s coverage 
refrained from editorializing on this outcome (136, April 3 2002).  
7.3 Scotiabank’s suspension: the ultimate shell game? 
On April the 18
th
 of 2002, the Argentine Central Bank issued a 30 day suspension of Scotiabank 
Quilmes. The Clarín once again reverted to a wire like updates reporting that Scotiabank would 
not make any additional capital injections into its Argentine operation. Within the brevity it did 
manage to leave open the prospect of state intervention by mentioning that negotiations with the 
Central Bank remained ongoing and that there could be a resolution on the horizon (Clarín, 2002, 
April 18). A lone opinion piece was put forth the next day now blaming Scotia’s default on the 
judicial injunctions, which they vaguely and disingenuously described the need based injunctions 
as simply leading to the “release vast amounts of capital” (Clarín, 2002, April 19). Ámbito and 
La Nación also followed similar narratives (Ámbito, 2002, April 19; La Nación, 2002, April 18). 
La Nación’s reports presented a similar wire-like posts that sided with Scotiabank. 
However, this particular cable blamed the suspension on the Central Bank’s own reluctance to 
issue a rediscount of 170 million dollars in order to compensate Scotiabank for the estimated 50 




This article puts into perspective the magnitude of Scotiabank’s own capital extraction, as both 
Clarín and La Nación blamed the suspension on 50 million dollar judgement, which was a far cry 
from the 338 million the bank had recently repatriated to its Canadian headquarters (Clarín, 
2002, April 19; La Nación, 2002, April 18). Scotiabank had veritably cashed out of the 
Argentine market, a cost of over 6 times that of the injunctions and somehow none of the major 
papers managed to connect the lack of liquidity to this massive pullout. Altogether the bank 
experienced a total capital extraction of slightly over a third of a billion dollars in just a few 
months, the bulk of it obviously coming from its own decision to divest from the Argentine 
market.  
Ámbito also sought to blame Scotia’s woes on the Argentine Central Bank’s failure to 
backstop the 50 million USD that had bled out during the week that lead up to the suspension. 
However, unlike Clarín or La Nación they acknowledged that Scotiabank had already received 
177 million in rediscounts throughout the past month (Ámbito, 2002, April 19).  Perhaps 
coincidentally, an additional 170 million dollars in Central Bank rediscounts would have put 
them at approximately 347 million— a figure just above what the bank was estimated to have 
repatriated.   
While the press urged for further assistance to foreign banks it had become explicitly 
apparent— at least to the Clarín— that these entities were taking active measures to impede the 
injunctions. One such article that evidenced this awareness cited the Central Bank, which noted 
that much of the money they provided to banks in the form of rediscounts had indeed gone to 
payout those who received injunctions. However, they noted that one American bank, which it 




frozen accounts’ value. The bank’s even threatened those still seeking full recompense with the 
possibility that their entire account could end up as 10 year bond (Clarín, 2002, April 19).
8 
  
Another report put out the day after the suspension gave Scotiabank’s chief the last word. 
His point of view closely followed the press’ narrative, while again avoiding any mention 
Scotiabank’s 338 million dollar repatriation. Instead he reasoned that the suspensions were due 
to the difficult economic environment created by the banking freeze, the subsequent devaluation, 
and the ultimate failure of the Argentine Central Bank to provide the necessary liquidity needed 
for its recapitalization (La Nación, 2002 April 19; 2002, La Nación, April 19; Blanco, 2002, 
April 19; La Nación, 2002, April 25). Two days later, Ámbito would relay Scotiabank’s press 
release wherein its executives argued that Argentina should begin to treat its foreign and 
domestic banks equally. These calls for equality were specifically in regards to access to 
additional rediscounts, which were still being extended to domestically owned institutions 
(Ámbito, 2002, April 20).  
In support of Scotiabank’s decision to pull out, Ámbito reported that its stock had risen to 
an annual high, in part due to its “prudent” refusal to inject capital into Argentina (Ámbito, 2002, 
April 20). The Clarín also vouched for Scotiabank in another wire like announcement that 
pointed to its gains in the Canadian stock market. However, this Clarín report went a step further 
than Ámbito’s when it flaunted Scotiabank’s pullout out of the 338 million during the final 
months of 2001 and January of 2002, which they credited as serving to shield its “global 
performance” (Clarín, 2002, April 20). This was quite an about-face from Ámbito’s prior 
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 2002 by Argentina’s economic minister, 
Jorge Remes Lenicov. This congressionally rejected bond exchange proposed a series of 10 year, low to no yield 
government bonds in the guise of recapitalizing illiquid banks. These government bonds would in turn, be swapped 
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writings, wherein there were no mentions connecting the 338 million repatriated to Canada to 
either Scotiabank or the suspension. A faulty journalistic logic appeared to be at play here, as 
Scotiabank was not only known to be unwilling to invest further funds, but had already unwound 
a large proportion of its exposure to the Argentine crisis. Yet despite these facts, financial writers 
called on the Argentine Central Bank to recapitalize Scotiabank’s coffers with funds that would 
ultimately come from further sovereign debt bankrolled by international creditors— namely, the 
IMF. 
7.3.1 Saving Scotiabank: The IMF and bond exchanges angles 
Ámbito put itself ahead of the curve when on the day of Scotiabank’s suspension it made a plea 
for the immediate implementation of the proposed bond exchange program known as Bonex II. 
Their rationale was that the court rulings along with the current political climate had placed 
undue pressure on illiquid, yet—by their account— solvent banks (Ámbito, 2002, April 18). The 
writers also urged the Argentine authorities to defer to Canada when it came to the resolution of 
Scotiabank’s predicament due to their presiding role in the G7, as they reasoned that an 
unfavorable outcome for the suspended bank might hinder the state’s own debt negotiations with 
the IMF (Ámbito, 2002, April 18). Altogether, Ámbito called for the immediate recapitalization 
of Scotiabank through the implementation of the proposed bond exchange program.  
The Clarín did not take long to chime in on this angle as two days later it would cite the 
words of the head of the Argentine Central Bank, Mario Blejer, who noted that although the 
bond exchange would provide some relief what the Argentine economy needed most was the 
IMF to provide “a shock of confidence” (2002, April 20). The writers posed that the solution to 
Argentina's woes ultimately boiled down to their ability to come to terms with the Fund. 




which included further efforts to cut spending and reduce inflation. Therefore the crux of the 
matter would be in how further adjustments were presented and tempered given the hostile 
political climate (Clarín, 2002, April 23). With Ámbito and the Clarín concurring that the way 
forward was via the appeasement of the IMF by adhering to its rigidly orthodox and 
“globalizing” policy demands, their message was clear— letting Scotiabank fail was out the 
question (see chapters 3-5).  
In contrast, Javier Blanco’s presented the bailout of Scotiabank as an economic 
imperative for stability, as he warned of the potential “global” or external consequences of not 
acting, which would come in the form of speculative attacks upon Argentine capital markets 
(Hay & Rosamond, 2002). Adding to the anxious narrative, he further posited that the damage to 
Scotiabank’s reputation might already be beyond repair. Like the abovementioned works, Blanco 
also praised Scotiabank’s decision not to inject added liquidity from abroad, as he speculated that 
it could perhaps be a cunning political maneuver to pressure the Argentine parliament into 
drafting some iteration of a bond exchange program, ala Bonex I, which had led the way to 
Argentina’s initial dollarization scheme (Blanco, 2002, April 19).
9
 Another La Nación article 
covered the IMF angle, citing Scotiabank’s appeals to the IMF in Washington, while also 
planting the suspicion that the suspension itself was a maneuver from the ACB to push through 
the proposed bond exchange plan (La Nación, 2002, April 25). Thus, for La Nación all roads 
lead to the only sensible resolution, a bond exchange program that would recapitalize the 
technically insolvent bank.    
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As the Scotiabank situation appeared to reach an impasse, Ámbito argued that Argentine 
law needed to be rewritten in order to curb a judiciary that it saw as intent on punishing foreign 
banks (2002, April 26).  Ámbito continued to Argue against the efficacy and fairness of the court 
injunctions against the freeze knowns as the “amparos”. Herein, the paper suggested of the 
claimants privileged nature noting that although 90% of current accounts held under 30,000 
dollars, the average account holder bringing forward a suit against banks was 38,000 USD 
(Ámbito, 2002, April 26). For Ámbito this meant that Amparo rulings were not only bad for 
finance, but also unfair.  
Overall, the press’ communicative discourse of the economic crisis made a 180-degree 
pivot as financial institutions began to feel the full force of the depression (Schmidt, 2008). No 
longer were the conditions stemming from exogenous forces, but rather the blame was laid 
squarely on the government’s actions. Moreover, the press’ discourse emphasized the idea that 
government intervention was the only viable way out of Argentina’s financial gridlock. In May, 
as negotiations neared their limit, La Nación noted that with the reluctance of the Argentine 
Central Bank to provide liquidity, the only viable option left for Scotiabank’s survival was to 
seek a diplomatic resolution that would involve Argentine and Canadian authorities, something 
the press had anticipated as early as the day of the suspension (La Nación, 2002, May 7; Ámbito, 
2002, April 18).
10
 However, the idea of once again bailing out a foreign institution— especially 
one as maligned as Scotiabank had become politically (and perhaps economically) unfeasible 
(Hay, 1999, 2004; Watson & Hay, 2003). Therefore, what had become clear was that 
communicative discourses appealing to globalization’s logics had run their course, as neither 
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Scotiabank, the Canadian government, nor global institutions wielded any real power (either 
material or ideational) within Argentina (Marsh, 2009; Schmidt, 2008).  
7.4 Collating the results 
Ámbito Financiero’s coverage of the financial failures proved quite nuanced. Nonetheless, 
figure 1 shows that 12 of 17 articles covering the banks treated global finance as an inexorable 
constraint on economic policymaking (Hay & Smith, 2005). Effectively, this served as the 
rationale for several initiatives supported by the press— namely, Scotiabank’s bailout, the end of 
banker prosecutions, and lastly the end of exemptions to the freeze, irrespective of costs borne by 
the infirm and elderly. Yet, during this period the externalizing discourse did not completely 
dominate the narrative since writers were forced to engage with internal dynamics of the 
“corralito” banking freeze and the subsequent “amparos” (i.e., need based injunctions), which 
they ultimately blamed for the poor performance of international banks. In turn, these 4 
occasions wherein the press’ favored economic strategy focused on endogenous factors were in 
connection to how the abovementioned initiatives would affect Scotiabank. Herein, Ámbito’s 
coverage cited either the state’s decision to end liquidity injections or the judicial injunctions as 
the primary cause of the financial sector’s trouble (2002, January 10; 2002, January 14; 2002, 
February 20; 2002, February 26). In other words, Ámbito perpetuated the narrative that the state 




Ámbito tended to defer to markets, however on two out of the three occasions wherein it 
proposed state intervention it was explicitly for the state to implement supply-side measures 
(2002, January 10; 2002, Jan. 14). The other occasion wherein intervention was called on, 
essentially pleaded on behalf of the banks to maintain the freeze retail accounts (Ámbito, 2002, 
February 22). In terms of economic philosophy, there was absolutely no mention of demand-side 
initiatives. Overall, Ámbito’s discourses weaved a narrative, which was not only staunchly pro-
global finance, but staunchly neoclassical.   
 
Figure 1. Policy biases within Ámbito’s communicative discourse (2001-2002) 
 








Politics of Finance Role of Finance Econ. Strategy Econ. Philosophy Material v Social IMF Conditions




When it came to Clarín’s policy biases, once again, the press treated finance as an 
inexorable constraint on Argentina’s political economy. As shown in figure 2, 16 out 25 articles 
that dealt with the existential role of international finance saw it as a precondition for economic 
stability. Interestingly, and for the first time, one of the periodicals in question put forth a 
narrative that favored internal dynamics when it came to the role of finance and future growth. 
Precisely, a total of 7 articles focused on the internal market dynamics— compared to 3 that 
externalized Argentina’s economic drivers. While 3 of these 7 predictably focused on the ill 
effects of the state’s initiatives; the other four articles were more varied, with reports covering 
the failures of Scotiabank’s and Bansud’s strategies, their operational shortcomings, and the 
subsequent protests, as well as the positive effects the devaluation had on the industry.  
 
In terms of the Clarín’s favored economic strategy, 15 articles were identified as 
explicitly deferring to markets. Comparatively, column 3 shows that the Clarín’s coverage had 
Figure 2. Policy biases within Clarín’s communicative discourse (2001-2002) 
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just two articles in support of state intervention (see figure 2).
11
 Although Clarín’s discourse 
seemed to shy away from economic logics of stimulus, 4 articles did make explicit calls for 
supply-side measures. Lastly, Clarín’s running narrative presented markets as being strictly 
driven by “fundamentals,” rather than intersubjective dynamics. In all, there were 16 instances 
where the Clarín focused on gains and losses from a strictly materialist perspective. The lone 
article explicitly citing normative, social dynamics in connection to the performance of markets 
suggested that reaching an accord with the IMF might provide a need ‘shock of confidence’ 
(Clarín, 2002m).  
Overall, the Clarín constructed a narrative that was by and large favorable to international 
finance. Not once did it politically challenge the efficacy of finance or its role within Argentina. 
Its narrative also largely excluded heterodox ideas, as it never entertained demand-side theories 
or policies, nor the social dynamics of markets. Altogether, the Clarín’s communicative 
discourse formed a quite narrow view of international finance that not only foreclosed on the 
space for heterodox policies, but promoted a hyperglobalist view of globalization via its support 
of neoliberal policies.    
Like Ámbito and Clarín— La Nación’s communicative discourse presented private 
finance as an essential, and nonnegotiable prerequisite for economic stability and future growth 
(Hay & Smith, 2005; Schmidt, 2008). Precisely, 17 of 19 articles discussing the existential role 
of global finance treated it as wholly indispensable. In terms of what was said to have propelled 
financial and economic growth— La Nación’s externalizing narrative was still very much 
present; however, domestic acquisitions from Macro along with the actions of state, including 
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those of the economics ministry, the judiciary and the Central Bank forced it to look inwards. As 
a result, in 7 out the 8 occasions wherein La Nación’s narrative considered endogenous factors it 
was in critique of the abovementioned state actions. The other sole mention was in regard to its 
acknowledgement of Macro’s growing role within Argentine banking.  
 
In terms of the economic strategy preferred by the writers, state intervention was 
surprisingly the more dominant. Three reports explicitly posited that the devaluations benefited 
the stock market, as it not only brought offsetting gains, but an influx of cash from those seeking 
to protect their savings. However, La Nación’s position waivered when Moody’s decided to 
downgrade Argentina’s sovereign debt on the basis of the devaluation and the banking freeze. 
Henceforth, the narrative shifted towards emphasizing the importance of recapitalizing 
Scotiabank with Central Bank funds, which also ticked off their support of supply-side 
Figure 3. Policy biases within La Nación’s communicative discourse (2001-2002)  
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 In terms of the market dynamics, the reporting appeared split as both material and 
intersubjective interpretations were identified. Notwithstanding, a minor trend began to 
materialize as La Nación’s rationale for the state bailout of Scotiabank began making appeals 
that factored in intersubjective factors—namely, the systemic implications a major default would 
have on “market sentiment” with respect to stocks and new FDI. This last point again showed the 
importance of ideas, which speaks to the social constructivist focus on normative and discursive 
dynamics (Adler, 1997; Hay, 2011; Schmidt, 2010; Smith, 2005). 
7.4.1 Conclusion 
Within the context of the bank failures, the communicative discourse of all 3 periodicals 
surveyed failed to challenge the role of international or “global” finance. Remaining true to form, 
the press maintained a pro-finance stance throughout its post-crisis coverage. As noted above, 
the financial press writers avoided linking protest coverage to that of finance, which produced a 
compartmentalized narrative that attempted to obscure their obvious sequential relationship. 
However, the void left from turning away from an externalizing narrative to explain the 
economic crisis— wherein economic growth and stability depended on the influx of international 
or “global” finance— lead to a much more acute focus on the failures of the state to empower or 
appease these global forces. In turn, the press now emphasized the shortcomings of the Argentine 
state, which deflected attention from the failures of private financiers to capitalize their 
institutions and also extend credit to potential borrowers.  
Ultimately, there were multiple factors, which forced the press to set aside its 
externalizing narrative of the inexorability of global finance (e.g., the protests, the judicial 
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injunctions, criminal investigations of financial executives, the calls on the state to recapitalize 
foreign banks, and even the reemergence of domestic banks seeking to acquire the now 
distressed assets of global banks) (Hay & Smith, 2005). All of the above forced the press’ 
discourse to not only look inwards, but appeal for a more active economic policy, albeit 
exclusively via supply-side initiatives, that would restore the financial system, and the balance 
sheets of foreign banks. Ultimately, this shows how “real” or tangible interests (e.g., the interests 
of the banks and financial institutions) can deploy ideas themselves to sustain their own, 
existential essence or material reality, which harkens back to the bi-directionality Marsh reading 
of constructivism alluded to (Marsh, 2009; also see Bailey, 2008; Jessop, 1991, 1997, 2000). 
In this sense, the calls for Central Bank easing were primarily concerned with the 
profitability of international banks operating within Argentina, rather than the viability of its 
domestic economy. Herein, the primacy and privileged position of international banks and their 
capital flows effectively occupies a socially constructed, “global space,” which nonetheless 
carried tangible consequences (see Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; Dicken, 2015; Peck & 
Tickell, 2012; Jessop, 2006). In this time of crisis, the communicative discourse of the press 
effectively made appeals that rationalized the use of the Argentine state’s powers, which it had 
previously downplayed— paradoxically— to materially sustain global finance’s presence within 
Argentina (Schmidt, 2008).  In other words, the externalizing constructions of the globalization 
discourse were— at least temporarily— set aside so that the state could come to the rescue of 
something that until now had been explained as beyond its purview.  
Ultimately, by identifying this fluid bi-directionality between material and ideational 
factors, this chapter in particular demonstrates the importance of Marsh’s calls for balance 




framework, which split policy constructing discourses (coordinative) from those focused on 
spreading ideas (communicative) isolates and accentuates how ideas can lead to policy change, 






8. Discourses in default: chronicling the collapse of Scotiabank and 
Crédit Agricole 
Chapter 8 is the final empirical chapter of this thesis’ second section, which analyzes the biases 
of the communicative discourses put forth by the Argentine press (Schmidt, 2008). This chapter 
focuses on the press’ discourses on the exit of foreign finance, as well as the ensuing period of 
reform (2002-2006). One of the key themes within this chapter is on how these communicative 
discourses can crowd out the space for alternative views by privileging certain issues of finance 
over others. For instance in this chapter it becomes evident that the Argentine press spent most of 
its editorializing on making appeals for the recapitalization and subsequent recompense of 
“global” financial institutions that had already proven to be all but defunct within the Argentine 
market. Moreover, these rich and very nuanced appeals were in stark contrast to the pithy wire-
like coverage, which obscured more critical issues involving foreign banks— namely, the 
divestment strategies of foreign banks vis-à-vis the growing role of public and domestic financial 
institutions, the steady stream of protests of account holders and disgruntled employees, and 
lastly, the various lawsuits and judicial investigations of foreign bankers. Ultimately, the result of 
the press’ cognitive filters or framing of the aforementioned, was the construction of a narrative 
that effectively precluded the space for ideas, theories, and policies that interfered with its own 
constructed “reality” (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Schmidt, 2010; Hay & Marsh 1999).  
As a result, the press’ communicative discourse continued to put the needs of private 
finance over that of its own clients (Schmidt, 2008). And once again, the narrative followed a 
neoliberal logic that served to rationalize the proposed recapitalizations of banks (i.e., bailouts) 
which were to be underwritten via austerity imposed on the wider publics (Hay & Smith, 2005). 




case for additional liquidity injections along with appeals for maintaining and strengthening the 
freeze on current and savings accounts.  
Although the banking freeze had paralyzed an economy that was already sputtering from 
the cessation in lending, the press subordinated these largely endogenous macroeconomic 
conditions as mere details within a narrative that kept the focus on exogenous factors, such as the 
potential loss of profits for the subsidiaries of foreign finance (Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 
2007). Perhaps the biggest contradiction or lapse within the narrative’s logic was that the failure 
of these foreign banks would lead to chaos within the Argentine economy. In fact, the banks had 
long since technically defaulted. Moreover, the political and economic steps to revive the illiquid 
banks were the root cause of the state of anarchy that had racked Argentina— beginning with the 
imposition of capital controls in December of 2001. If anything, it had become quite clear that 
just as the peso, foreign finance could not continue to be propped up at the expense of the 
Argentine economy. 
During the last few days of April, Clarín put out three consecutive blurbs expressing 
optimism that the ongoing meetings between Scotiabank and the Argentine Central Bank (ACB) 
would lead to additional rediscounts.  The posts were terse wire-like updates that clung to the 
hope that Scotiabank would remain in Argentina despite its reluctance to recapitalize its bank’s 
branches (Clarín, 2002, April 26, 2002, April 27, 2002; 2002, April 29). On May the 3
rd
, the 
Argentine Banco Galicia was recapitalized via central bank funds. Although this was perhaps 
seen as a positive sign, it turned out that Scotiabank — due to being foreign owned—would not 
receive additional Central Bank rediscounts beyond the 177 million USD it had received in 2002. 
In May, the Clarín was forced to break with its positive narrative when it reported that 




May 7). Ámbito chose to immediately blame the departure of Scotiabank on the deadlocked 
negotiations between the ACB and its Canadian headquarters (2002, May 7). Although on its 
face the report came across as a return to a more evenhanded account, it made no mention of the 
bank’s adamant refusal to cover any of the capital it had repatriated from its Argentina 
subsidiary.  
An editorial by Gustavo Bazzan in May engaged Duhalde’s plan to “thaw” the banking 
freeze. The article was very much against any relaxation in the freeze, which essentially parroted 
the position of finance, which suggested that without the capital controls in place pesos would be 
quickly diverted to forex markets in exchange for dollars (Clarín, 2002, May 8). A follow up 
article published a day later ran a headline that overtly misquoted the Argentine president, which 
translated as “Duhalde says [foreign] banks may leave.” (Clarín, 2002a, May 9). However, 
Duhalde’s actual quote translated to:  
Banks need to fulfill their obligations. As the risk for Argentina is that they might leave 
without repaying their customers. (Clarín, 2002a, May 9) 
In truth, Duhalde was not jettisoning the banks, but rather warned that banks should not be 
allowed to exit without fulfilling their obligations to its accountholders.  Interestingly, within the 
body of this article the abovementioned quote could be found in full, although it carried on as if 
Duhalde was unceremoniously throwing the banks out. Moreover, it even went as far as 
comparing his words to those of Union head, Luis Barrioneuvo who had allegedly called for 
people to vandalize bank branches (Clarín, 2002, May 9). Once again, this discourse went along 
with the narrative that global finance was not only beneficial, but must be actively 




8.1 At a loss for words: coverage of Scotiabank protests, Santander, and the collapse of 
Crédit Agricole  
As protest directed against foreign finance once again flared, the press reverted to its familiar 
pattern of keeping reports to pithy wire updates. A method that had proven effective as a means 
to keep the narrative from drawing even implicit links between the role of foreign finance and 
the economic dysfunction. Although it came in the form of a 33 word memo, the Clarín finally 
managed to provide some nuance by acknowledging that even Scotiabank employees had joined 
the protestors to voice their frustrations with the intransigence displayed by both their corporate 
executives and the ACB (Clarín, 2002, May 8). Another terse wire offered a bit more detail, 
insofar as it managed to provide some attention to the motives behind the manifestations taking 
place in front of the Spanish and Canadian embassies. Herein, the Clarín noted that bank 
employee grievances stemmed from both Scotiabank and Santander’s decision not to inject 
further capital into its Argentine branches, which they estimated as putting 20 to 30 thousand 
finance related jobs in jeopardy (Clarín, 2002b, May 9).  
On the 17
th 
of May, another news brief summarized the events leading up to the 
suspensions along with the ongoing protests, wherein account holders continued to demand 
access to frozen assets, as well as disgruntled employees who were still waiting for their April 
pay checks (Clarín, 2002, May 17). Although this newfound candidness on the part of the Clarín 
served as an ostensible as a shift in the wider narrative, it appears more as a coming to terms with 
the reality that the two banks were no longer interested in remaining in the country and thus, no 
longer defensible. Nevertheless, it appears that the narrative did not actually change, but rather 
redirected its attention to Crédit Agricole, which was now on the verge of becoming the 3
rd
 




The press’ narrative portrayed Crédit Agricole’s troubles as an unexpected shock when 
its subsidiaries Bisel and Suquia were forced to close their doors finding its branches without 
cash in the midst of a full-on bank run. La Nación’s reporting did not venture deeper than 
blaming the bank run itself for the failures (La Nación, 2002, May 11). In like manner, a follow 
up article turned its attention to the Central Bank and its palliative efforts to replenish Crédit 
Agricole’s subsidiaries with pesos (La Nación, 2002, May 11).  This article also attempted to 
rekindle hope in the passage of some iteration of the bond exchange program as it speculated that 
rumors of a bank closure could have stemmed from the executive as a means to strum up support 
for a bill. Nevertheless, they qualified their theories by noting that the most likely scenario was 
that Suquia simply closed its doors due to its lack of available cash (La Nación, 2002, May 11). 
With Scotiabank’s closure and Crédit Agricole slated to pull out on the 19
th
 of May the 
momentum for another massive bond scheme similar to that which had been implemented in the 
early 90s was all but lost. It was clear amongst the press and law makers that bankrolling the 
proposed Bonex II would require even deeper fiscal cuts, which were already acknowledged to 
be politically untenable. In a final hurrah, the reporting attempted to downplay this caveat in 
order to reemphasize the potential contagion that could result from not recapitalizing these 
illiquid banks. Herein, Ámbito warned of a potential surge in withdrawals as well as the 
possibility of the collapse of additional banks. This article also acknowledged the political 
complications that would accompany the necessary fiscal cuts that such a project required— 
albeit for a worthy cause, in Ámbito’s view (2002, May 11). Ultimately, these last-ditch appeals 
were unable to break through the political aversions to further easing.  
With the bond swap out of reach, the press attention was centered on Crédit Agricole, 




essentially waiting on the ACB to define the terms of the suspension and what would happen 
with the assets (Ámbito, 2002, May 17). Ámbito noted that Crédit Agricole’s reluctance to 
capitalize Suquia would force the Argentine authorities to move forward with the bank’s 
liquidation. However, they reluctantly admitted that the more likely scenario was that it would be 
absorbed by the public banks, Cordoba and Banco Nación (2002, May 17). The Clarín reports 
coincided with Ámbito’s, as well as the ACB’s argument, which asserted that although Bisel and 
Suquia were technically insolvent, Bersa remained relatively stable. However, Clarín reiterated 
that the underlying problem across the three institutions was Crédit Agricole’s reluctance to 
inject fresh capital (2002, May 18).   
While Ámbito and Clarín appeared to soften in terms of their staunch support of foreign 
banks, La Nación displayed its resolve as it continued to put the onus strictly on the ACB. Their 
reports carried on the anxious narrative that was used to press for Bonex II. Specifically, this 
report now raised fears that Crédit Agricole’s two illiquid branches Bisel and Suquia might set 
off an immediate contagion effect, which could take hold in a matter of days if the authorities did 
not step in (La Nación, 2002, May 18). Another La Nación article cited anonymous sources with 
links to Crédit Agricole, which alleged that the Central Bank “failed to persuade executives 
against its planned pullout” (La Nación, 2002, May 18). In other words, Crédit Agricole’s 
decision to default was blamed on the Central Bank’s reluctance to recapitalize it.  
With Crédit Agricole’s exit now etched in stone, the efficacy of its externalizing 
communicative discourse evaporated (Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007; Schmidt, 2008). 
Precisely, the press’ focus now swung towards how the ministry of the economy and the ACB 
would manage the exit. La Nación, an obstinate supporter of private finance would now eat its 




the task of absorbing the 3 illiquid institutions (La Nación, 2002, May 19). Taking a step further, 
the Clarín proclaimed that the internationalization of the financial system was effectively on trial 
(Clarín, 2002, May 19).  
However, the banking sector had already been on trial since January of 2002. Moreover, 
during this period the press including the Clarín had come down hard on the side of finance (See 
Chapter 7). In addition, this realization also came a bit late as the capital pullout had begun 
almost a full year prior to this apparent epiphany (see chapter 7). Nevertheless, this article 
brought the Clarín’s narrative full circle as it began to confront those prior claims made in the 
late 90s (including its own), wherein they touted the entry of foreign finance as a boon for 
borrowers and the long-term stability of Argentina’s financial sector (Clarín, 2002, May 19; see 
chapter 6).  
8.2 Coverage of the state’s role in default: the limits to Central Bank easing  
The liquidation of Crédit Agricole’s was handled quite differently to that of Scotiabank, whose 
remaining assets were frozen and up for sale. In Fact, on May 19
th
 all three of Crédit Agricole’s 
subsidiaries were placed into receivership under the control of Banco Nación, Argentina’s largest 
public bank. In a rare occurrence, the Clarín’s initial report praised the efforts of the ACB, as it 
explained that compared to Scotiabank, Crédit Agricole’s larger operational footprint 
necessitated the state’s active intervention. In particular, Clarín noted the importance of Banco 
Bisel, which held nearly 90% of all agricultural accounts operating out of Rosario’s port (Clarín 
2002b, May 20). Nonetheless, the Clarín quickly segued from these initial praises into a more 
familiar narrative, wherein it appeared to be piecing together both, a strong moral defense of 




Just a day after Crédit Agricole’s receivership, the Clarín put forth a piece, which 
suggested that mitigating the losses of its foreign stakeholders was the most important task for 
the Argentine authorities. However, they did recognize that this task would require the concerted 
efforts of the provincial and national governments, as well as the Central Bank (Clarín, 2002, 
May 20). An editorial by Gustavo Bazzan rationalized Crédit Agricole’s departure by positing 
that it was merely a question of the bank reaching its limit in terms of losses (Clarín, 2002a, May 
20). The Clarín again continued to find excuses, noting that foreign banks were at a considerable 
disadvantage, as they stood last in the pecking order for rediscounts— behind both public and 
private institutions owned by domestic interests (Clarín, 2002, June 6; 2002, May 18).  
Although Argentina found itself in the final throes of a massive financial unwinding, 
wherein the recovery now hinged on the state’s ability to rehabilitate the accounts of abandoned 
banks, the press’  communicative discourse continued to make appeals for the compensation of 
these estranged foreign financiers (Schmidt, 2008). Thus, the narrative began to shift from 
emphasizing the “dire consequences” external of not bailing out the banks to one that simply 
lobbied for their compensation. One unnamed editorial published by La Nación actually 
attempted to absolve bankers by putting forth the notion that the liquidity crisis was not the 
responsibility of the private sector, but of the state. Paradoxically, the article blamed the state’s 
efforts to curb the bank run as the reason for the collapse (La Nación, 2002, May 26).  
Not only was this simplistic narrative circular in its logic, but it also obscured the 
complexity of the economic collapse by omitting many of the endogenous factors that 
accelerated Argentina’s crisis— namely, the privatization projects massive unemployment, as 
well as the deflationary pressures caused by the convertibility scheme the cessation of private 




subsequent effect of the repatriation of capital by these foreign entities. Nonetheless, this 
editorial’s solution to the crisis was for authorities to repeal any and all regulatory powers at the 
state’s disposal, especially the law of economic subversion— and in its place renew its 
commitment to fiscal restraint and greater private property rights (La Nación, 2002, May 26).
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However, the irony herein was that the press was now contradicting its externalizing narrative by 
suggesting that these global banks were at actually at the mercy of the state (Widmaier, Blyth, 
Seabrooke, 2007). 
With the ACB’s reluctance to recapitalize foreign banks setting in, a Clarín article 
published at the end of May unexpectedly presented inflation as a way to keep a second wave of 
major banks (Santander, Bilbao, and BBVA-Frances) from pulling out. Citing a report by 
Solomon Smith Barney, the Clarín took to promoting inflation as a beneficial workaround to the 
liquidity crunch (Clarín, 2002, May 26). However, deliberately implementing an inflationary 
monetary policy is a characteristically Keynesian solution, which by definition would increase or 
ultimately aim to generate an excess of liquidity, which was the financial sector’s most pressing 
concern.
2
 Nevertheless, finance’s aversion to a general monetary inflation was that it would not 
only dilute their accounts receivables within Argentina, but also devalue their liquid assets, 
relative to their foreign currencies.   
On June 12
th
 Roberto Lavagna officially declared before the Argentine congress that 
there would be no more financial assistance for private banks. The Economic Ministry also 
prohibited banks from converting current accounts into bonds at their own discretion, effectively 
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 In his treatise on the gold standard, Keynes posits that an appreciation in the stock of money only benefits the 
holders of paper, which comes at the expense of not only borrowers— whose outstanding debt burden is increased— 
but also the slowdown of productive sectors of the economy since “stock and raw materials will steadily depreciate” 
(Keynes Essays 102-103). In turn, deflationary effects incentivize people to hoard cash in the hopes of garnering 




ending their ability to arbitrarily bail-in their clients. While Lavagna sought the end of this form 
of easing, Alejandra Gallo of Clarín, counter posed his congressional decree with that of the 
ACB, which remained in favor of maintaining a credit policy that allowed banks to be 
recapitalized (2002, June 13). However, in a technical sense the state’s reticence to provide 
further rediscounts to foreign institutions had already altered the financial landscape while also 
setting the precedence for this formalized change. Nonetheless, the press would now play up the 
tensions between these two important financial institutions.   
8.2.1 Disputes over the control of money: the Economic Ministry versus the ACB, and the 
financial sector’s self-professed synergies vis-à-vis criminals, thieves and confiscators. 
Irrespective of intentions, the result of Clarín’s decision to play up of the public squabble 
between Argentina’s Ministry of the Economy and the ACB was that it allowed the focus to be 
kept on the role of these institutions, which in turn deflected attention away from the externalities 
arising from the private sector. In other words, this acute focus on institutional differences kept 
the discourse away from what the protests had really been about: the mass unemployment from 
the privatization of state assets, the banks’ reluctance to lend, and their role in the repatriation of 
billions of dollars, which had culminated in a banking freeze and bail-in. In the first of such 
reports, the Clarín spent a great amount of time debating and counter posing the subtle 
differences in approach between the ACB and the Ministry of the Economy, which did nothing 
more than showcase various hues of neoclassical policy. In between, they did manage to note 
that the 17.8 billion in total rediscounts tendered to the private banks was an unprecedented 




In the ACB’s opinion, the only thing causing an increase in the circulation of capital [the 
money velocity] was the cash trickling out the banking freeze due to the judicial injunctions. In 
other words, they were all for the continuation of monetary easing for the financial sector, so 
long as the state put an end to the injunctions and other “leaks” (Clarín, 2002, June 6). However, 
in their view additional easing would require the suppression of economic activity outside of 
high finance, which was already at a veritable standstill. Mario Blejer, the head of the ACB 
would again find himself at odds with the Ministry of the Economy, when he sought judicial 
immunity for Central Bank officials in charge of providing re-discounts to the illiquid banks 
(Clarín, 2002, June 14). This move to indemnify the ACB not only further distanced the bank 
from the Economic Ministry, but showed its own fear of the potential criminality of its actions. 
In the summer, Ámbito took a bit of a retrospective turn in order to reiterate its view, 
which posited that the bank failures were in fact the product of the government’s 2001 sovereign 
debt default, the end of convertibility and the subsequent devaluation (2002, June 4). This was a 
familiar narrative that periodically reinforced the view of private financiers, which placed all 
responsibility for the crisis on the state. Like the other papers, Ámbito continued to anxiously 
appeal for the compensation of international banks, despite the possibility that the state would 
not be able to follow through, as it now faced another sovereign debt crisis (2002, June 4; 2002, 
July 18). This new leg down was amplified by the effects of the asymmetric pesofication, 
wherein bank assets and outstanding liabilities were maintained at a 1:1 parity while “pesofied” 
deposits were forced to take a haircut against the dollar, at an initial ratio of 1:1.4.  
However, Ámbito went further as it attempted to resuscitate its externalizing 
communicative discourse by questioning the integrity of the domestic banking sector citing its 




2008; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007). Although this attack leveled against domestic 
financial institutions gave the impression that they were in no position to fill the void left by the 
long-term exit international capital it was emphatically negated by the strong domestic demand 
to acquire the abandoned assets.  Ámbito continued making its own case for the appeasement of 
foreign finance. In July, it wrote another article that showcased the storied relationship between 
Argentina and Citibank, which dated back to 1914. The article argued that although its 
investments in Argentina made up less than 2% of its entire portfolio, its economic impact within 
the state was massive. Although the article itself was brief and wire like, it was mostly concerned 
with highlighting the company’s massive scale and the relative insignificance of the Argentine 
market to its global portfolio.
3
 Moreover, its timing served to heighten Citibank’s importance in 
the midst of the ongoing banking exodus, which had now lead Citibank to announce a 
downsizing of its own Argentine holdings. In other words, Ámbito presented a narrative that 
Argentines had much more to lose than Citi itself (2002, July 24). 
As the remaining foreign institutions began closing branches, Ámbito noted that only the 
state acting as an intermediary could reverse the financial sector’s unwinding (2002, July 31).
4
 
Specifically, this article by Sergio Datillo asked financial executives if the state could still act to 
reverse the damage. In response this cadre of anonymous bankers urged for the state to 
compensate for the devaluation of the peso, as well barring court orders that skirted the banking 
freeze. One anonymously quoted banker went as far as to suggest that a recent rash of thefts and 
kidnappings could encourage Argentinians to deposit much of the 8 to 10 billion dollars, which 
remained outside of the Argentine banking system in the form of cash holdings (Ámbito, 2002, 
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 This article tersely focused on presenting Citi’s Argentine operations, which included a workforce of 5,000, 6 
billion USD in outstanding loans as well as a 22% stake in its offshoot Citi Group Holdings (CEI) which 
concentrated its investment strategy in private media (Ámbito, 2002, July 24).   
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July 31). Datillo would close by adding that cash outside the banking system would return in due 
time, as he estimated that threat of be thieves and kidnappers continued to outpace Argentinians’ 
aversion of the government and at risk banks (Ámbito, 2002, July 31).The choice for 
Argentinians was a grim one, either take their chances and brave the dire conditions on the street 
or willingly surrender their cash to the banks, where the likelihood was high that these newly 
frozen assets would be subject to further devaluations.  
The abovementioned reports once again presented a skewed narrative. Firstly, Scotiabank 
was unwilling to work with the ACB to equitably recapitalize its Quilmes subsidiary, yet Ámbito 
positively spun its impetus to exit. Moreover, with international banks making a mad dash out of 
Argentina, it was more than obvious that the financial recovery would have to be led by domestic 
and state run banks. Although the press questioned the sustainability of domestic banks, less than 
a month later the very institutions it doubted would absorb Scotiabank’s abandoned assets. 
Ultimately, rather focusing on the new set of economic circumstances, Ámbito’s externalizing 
communicative discourse perseverated in its attempts to sustain the narrative that foreign banks 
needed to be compensated immediately (Schmidt, 2008; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007). 
8.2.2 towards discursive continuity Scotiabank’s liquidation highlights domestic finance 
The first mentions of the domestic banks’ (Banco Comafi and Banco Macro) negotiations to take 
over Scotiabank’s assets came in early August—just a week before the deal was finalized 
(Clarín, 2002, Aug. 10; Clarín, 2002, Aug. 14; Clarín, 2002, August 15; 2002, Aug. 16). La 
Nación was the first to report on Comafi’s initial 275 million dollar bid (La Nación, 2002, 
August 9). However, this first formal offer by Comafi was deemed as completely unacceptable, 




in protest outside the Canadian Embassy. Of note was La Nación and Clarín’s editorial silence, 
which came despite citing the numerous objections to the offer by the House of Representatives.  
Editorializing remained equally absent from protest coverage, which carried over into 
what would be the final weeks of Scotiabank’s sale. Javier Blanco’s coverage provided very few 
remarks outside of noting what was already clear— that Scotiabank would be sold.  Nevertheless 
unlike past work, his column was much more focused on the details of the horse race rather than 
opining on broader implications of the sale (La Nación, 2002, August 10). In rare form, Ámbito 
acknowledged that before word had spread of Comafi’s bid, Scotiabank employees were indeed 
protesting in front of the Canadian embassy, albeit in the hopes that the bank’s subsidiaries 
would somehow be recapitalized (197, August 10, 2002). Less than a week later, the congress 
was able to negotiate and approve a more palatable deal with Banco Macro, which stood to keep 
1,200 of the 1,700 Scotia employees. And although La Nación’s initial reaction remained 
conservative, a follow up introduced themes of nostalgia, national pride, all of which had been 
absent from prior reporting to date (2002, August 15; 2002, August 16). This move away from 
an externalizing discourse contrasted sharply with its claims from June— wherein the paper 
questioned the viability of the domestic banking sector (Ámbito, 2002, June 4; Watson & Hay, 
2003; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007). 
In September, Ámbito reported on the fraud lawsuit filed by Argentine investors in Paris 
in attempts to recover 2.2 billion dollars in losses to their current and savings accounts. The 
coverage maintained its distance as it remained descriptive and devoid of editorializing (Ámbito, 
2002, September 20). However, this would change in October when a piece in the Clarín 
showcased the headway being made by domestically owned and national banks. Surprisingly, it 




abandoned” its three Argentinian subsidiaries, while local and national banks continued 
expanding   (2002, October 9; 2002, October 20). October proved to be a busy month as the 
Italian owned, Sudameris was absorbed by another local bank, this time Banco Patagonia. 
However, the Clarín kept coverage of the acquisition brief, but did make a point to note that no 
state funds, nor ACB assistance was involved (2002, October 9). 
The discourse continued its pivot to the growing might of domestic financial institutions 
as contagion fears no longer posed a credible threat. Moreover, domestic firms began to portray 
the fallout as a golden opportunity for the burgeoning domestic banking sector, which in fact 
aggressively expanding through the acquisition of these distressed financial assets. Clarín quoted 
the head of Macro, Jorge Brito who boasted that further bank defaults simply provided an 
opportunity for the growth of the locally owned banking sector. Brito’s own institution, Macro, 
continued to aggressively expand with the acquisition of Bansud and now there were rumors that 
the bank would be making a bid for Crédit Agricole’s assets (Clarín, 2002, October 20). Clarín’s 
general disposition had indeed changed as they now lavished praise on the bullishness of 
Argentine private finance, who they credited with righting those banks abandoned by European 
and North American firms. 
With ideas and discourses of globalization in full decline, the IMF attempted to assert 
control over Argentine political economy by way of material factors, which spoke to the balance 
first brought up by Marsh (Marsh, 2009). Specifically, the IMF took exception appeared to take 
exception to the new order of Argentine finance, which was now dominated by public and 
domestic private banks. Yet, rather than siding with the Fund’s loan conditions, the Clarín voiced 




Banco Ciudad, Roberto Faletti who railed against the IMF’s new demands, which called for an 
immediate restructuring of financial system.  
Faletti argued that the IMF simply did not want state banks to lead the financial system, 
as the public banks share of total deposits grew from 39.9% in 2001 to 51.1% near the end of 
2002 (Clarín, 2002, October 30). Faletti went further, declaring that due to the reticence of 
foreign banks to inject capital it was self-evident that only public banks could be trusted as 
lenders of last resort (Clarín, 2002, October 30). Despite publishing Faletti’s strong statements, 
this Clarín article hedged itself by concluding with the World Bank's disparaging assessment of 
Banco Ciudad, which alleged that it operated with an unfair advantage as its ability to raise 




8.2.3 The Economic Ministry and the ACB’s ideological rift    
The Ministry of the Economy and the Argentine Central Bank would again butt heads on how to 
proceed with the sale of Crédit Agricole’s abandoned assets, which were now in the custody of 
the state-run Banco Nación. The Clarín’s coverage expressed its support of the Ministry’s plan to 
sell Crédit Agricole’s assets through the exchange rather than have the Central Bank broker a 
deal behind closed doors. The Clarín was keen to explain that although prior sales had been 
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 However, the Word Bank’s logic appears problematic as it did not account for the rediscounts extended to foreign, 
much of which had tapped the same fiscal funds that it claimed public banks had unfair access to.  Moreover, the 
World Bank’s account completely sidestepped the fact that in order to hedge their exposure to Argentina’s weak 
macroeconomic and monetary conditions many private banks had entered a stage of deleveraging.  This hedge phase 
not only brought about a sharp curtailment in lending, but also spurred the massive capital outflows, as well as the 
unprecedented move to simply abandon its assets (Minsky, 2008). Naturally, due to their strategic and operational 
structure the public banks were by their very nature better able to buffer the vicissitudes of the market because of 
their greater tolerance to running to either break even or a loss, as well as their geographical constraints. As noted in 
chapter 7, the public Banco Nación did lead finance with its initiatives, which allowed Argentinians access to credit 
at a time when private sector rates had priced out most customers seeking mortgages and auto loans. In all, the 
World Bank’s problematic logic at the very least reveals its bias for private sector finance, while also peering into 




handled exclusively by the ACB, the Economic Ministry now prudently insisted on taking part of 
transactions that required or requested state funds (Clarín, 2002, October 31). The article even 
concluded by citing the secretary of the Argentine stock exchange (Merval) who of course 
concurred with Lavagna’s plan to list them on the exchange, noting that such a move not only 
provided transparency, but the chance for smaller investors to also participate (Clarín, 2002, 
October 31). 
The Clarín also chronicled the disagreement on how to proceed by revealing that the 
Economic Ministry had indeed attempted to address the Central Bank’s biggest concerns, which 
was its desire to vet bidders and also shroud the sale from the broader economy. Specifically, this 
article voiced the Central Bank’s concerns, which posited that the state could not risk putting the 
banks on offer and risk receiving no bids, as this could result in another bank run (Clarín, 2002, 
November 4). However, the Clarín rebutted by citing Argentine resolution 480, which called for 
transparent transactions that were open to all investors for sales or mergers and acquisitions 
requiring state participation (Clarín, 2002, November 4). Ultimately, the Ministry and the ACB 
would compromise by jointly overseeing the liquidation of the banks, which would be handled 
directly through the state owned, Banco Nación who currently held the assets under receivership.  
In March of 2003, Ámbito wrote a retrospective piece on Crédit Agricole chronicling its 
performance during the last two years via a peculiar use of its externalizing discourse. Quite 
awkwardly, the article tried to downplay the bank’s failures in Argentina by focusing instead on 
its global position and its strong performance in France (2003, March 13). This positive piece 
failed to mention the ongoing lawsuit, nor did it discuss the French bank’s unwillingness to 
compromise with the ACB in order to recapitalize its branches— as it chose to simply abandon 




legal basis of the case without any sort of editorializing (2003, June 24). The lawsuit against 
Crédit Agricole carried on until January of 2005. Once the courts handed down its ruling against 
Argentina’s disgruntled savers, Ámbito again refrained from editorializing or expounding on the 
case, instead providing a scant 171-word wire of the unsuccessful lawsuit (2005, January 13).  
8.3 Chronicling the fate of Crédit Agricole’s assets (Suquia, Bersa, and Banco Bisel) 
The sale of Suquia was not finalized until December of 2004. And it would take Bisel another 
two years thereafter to be sold. Ultimately, both banks were absorbed by the Banco Macro, 
which became Argentina’s largest financial institution after its 2006 acquisition of Bisel. 
Compared to the rich and highly positive coverage that the international banks had received to 
date, the archives of all three major periodicals hardly even made record of the sales. In fact, La 
Nación’s archive just had one wire-update of the Suquia transaction (La Nación, 2004).  
The sole mention of Suquia’s sale on Clarín’s archive came on February 9
th
, exactly two 
months after the finalization of the sale. The article itself was focused on the rising interest from 
domestic banks in the upcoming sale of Bersa, which remained under state control (Clarín 2005, 
February 9).  Ámbito’s coverage was the most nuanced as it blithely quoted the president of 
Macro-Bansud, Jorge Brito who proclaimed that his bank’s mission was to support the growth of 
regional industries as well as meeting the needs of everyday Argentinians. Brito went on, touting 
that banks do not just exists to make mega deals, but should also be expected the demands of its 
community, whose own economic success was tied to his firm’s future growth (Ámbito, 2004, 
December 24). 
In June, La Nación reported that Banco Nación had officially offered Bersa up for sale 
and noted that seven domestically owned banks had shown interest in entering the bidding 




Estero, Santa Fe, Macro-Bansud, and Comafi (La Nación, 2005, June 8). The press kept the news 
of the actual bids brief, as it reported that 3 major banks had ultimately bid on Bersa. The highest 
bidder was reported as Enrique Eskenazi’s Bank of Santa Fe, which came in with an offer of 
approximately 172 million USD. They also mentioned that the two other competing from Bank 
of Santiago and Comafi who made respective bids of 121 and 98 million USD (La Nación, 2005, 
June 9; Ámbito, 2005, June 9). Javier Blanco’s column added that Banco Nación and the 
Economic Ministry would require approximately a week to vet the bids (La Nación, 2005, Jun 
9).   
As the vetting process moved on, La Nación made several brief updates chronicling the 
litigious bidding process as both the bank of Santiago and Comafi challenged the Eskenazi 
Group’s bid on technical grounds. However, La Nación rebuffed the allegations that Eskenazi’s 
offer failed to outline how it planned to retain Bersa’s personnel (2005, June 14; 2005, June 16). 
In an 88 word wire, La Nación confirmed that the Eskenazi group, the majority shareholder of 
the bank of Santa Fe bid had its bid for Bersa approved by the ACB (2005, August 12). A 
virtually identical wire like update published in both, La Nación and Ámbito cited the new owner 
of Bersa, Enrique Eskenazi who was quoted promising to support Argentina’s export industry as 
well as its medium and small businesses (La Nación, 2005, August 25).    
It would be another 7 months before Banco Nación along with representatives from the 
Economic Ministry and the ACB commenced the auction for Banco Bisel, which came on the 
13
th
 of March of 2006. This same day La Nación ran a piece by Javier Blanco wherein he 
announced the bank’s availability and its newfound attractiveness (2006, March 13). For La 
Nación, this quite detached and mostly objective report by Blanco would be followed up by a 




March 27; 2006, April 9; 2006, April 29; 2006, May 10; 2006, August 12; 2006, August 13).  
The Clarín noted that there were 7 parties showed interest in the bank including Macro-Bansud, 
The Eskenazi Group, Banco Hipotecario, Banco Galicia and the Macri Group (2006, March 18).
6
  
In April, Clarín and Ámbito’s reports noted that that only two out of the seven firms that 
showed interest actually followed through with a bid on Bisel. Macro-Bansud offered a bid of 
830 million while Banco Hipotecario trailed with its 608 million dollar bid (Clarín, 2006, April 
4; Ámbito, 2006, April 4). Ámbito further noted that the bids stipulated that Bisel’s 1,800 staff 
would remain employed (Ámbito, 2006, April 4). The following day, Ámbito confirmed that the 
highest bidder, Macro-Bansud would likely come away with Bisel, although the offer remained 
contingent to the pending review by both Banco Nación and the Economic Ministry. It further 
noted that the acquisition of Bisel stood to add an additional 1.3 billion USD in deposits across 
157 branches, spanning 7 of Argentina’s 23 provinces, making Macro-Bansud the largest bank in 
the country (Ámbito, 2006, April 5).  
In an article that praised Macro-Bansud’s economic strength, Javier Blanco cited an 
anonymous analyst who suggested that the economic crisis had indeed “purified” Argentine 
finance, although he argued that the apparent success of Macro-Bansud and the other banks 
making acquisitions came from the fact that their operations to date had limited exposure to 
current accounts— were much of the financial turmoil was concentrated (Blanco, 2006, April 5). 
Moreover, the anonymous source qualified Macro’s strong offer by noting that in a technical 
sense the bids did not actually represent a purchase price, as nearly all of the money would go to 
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 The sole non-banking entity was the Macri group, which saw the acquisition of Bisel as an opportunity to expand 
its payment transfer service into a full-fledged bank. Run by the family of the current Argentine president, the Macri 




recapitalize Bisel, which allowed the acquiring bank to recoup its cash once it absorbed the 
intuition (Blanco, 2006, April 5). 
On May the 9
th
 Ámbito reported that Banco Nación had approved the sale of Bisel to 
Macro-Bansud, pending the approval of the Argentine Central Bank. Asides from some making 
note of the size of the merger, this report remained conspicuously terse (Ámbito, 2006, May 9). 
Similarly, La Nación kept a low radar reporting only pithy updates on the massive acquisition 
that made Macro the largest bank operating in Argentina (2006, April 29; 2006, May 10). On 
August 11
th
, La Nación reported that Banco Nación officially transferred control of Bisel to 
Macro. Again, the minimalist trend in reporting continued (La Nación, 2006, August 11).   
8.4 Collating the discourses 
This analysis found that the press’ coverage simply refrained from editorializing the sale of both 
Scotiabank and Crédit Agricole, as its coverage reverted to one of the press’ recurring tactics of 
presenting very terse and strikingly objective updates that did away with any sort of opinion or 
broader speculation. The tactic of presenting wire-like updates was present throughout this 
section— especially with regards to the coverage of the protests, as well in minimizing the 
context of the judicial injunctions on the freeze. However, the editorials examined herein, just as 
in the aforementioned instances presented a narrative that accommodated international finance. 
Following this trend, early editorials served to herald the initial entry of foreign banks. Later, the 
press’ narratives not only appealed for deepening the liberalization of the economy, but also 
attempted to sell Argentinians on the need for incrementally deeper bouts of austerity measures 
in the guise of supporting high finance. Lastly, the need to recapitalize and recompense these 
foreign firms was also justified via the press’ communicative discourse (Schmidt, 2008). And 




their exogenous narrative in favor of a strikingly terse and objective writing style (Watson & 
Hay, 2003; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007).     
 
Overall, La Nación’s neoliberal slant continued through the foreign banking exodus. 
However as figure 1 shows, just 5 out of the 38 articles explicitly presented the politics of global 
finance as an inexorable constraint (Hay & Smith, 2005). Yet, their silence cannot be conflated 
with an actual shift in the discourse, as La Nación never outwardly refuted its longer running 
narrative on the efficacy and ultimate inexorability of global finance. This was also true in the 
post-crisis period, which now obviated the folly treating the presence of international banks as an 
indispensable component of economic growth or stability. However, the role of finance was a bit 
more nuanced, as La Nación played up the external ramifications of not bailing out both 
Scotiabank and Crédit Agricole. As column 2 illustrates, the discourse was mixed in that it 
presented a case for saving global banks in the guise of economic stability and future growth via 
Figure 1. Biases within La Nación’s communicative discourses (2002-2006) 
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FDI (see figure 1).  After the fact, reports briefly took to replacing the moot threats of a pull out 
of foreign capital and cessation international aid with other threats— namely, of political 
sanctions, which included an international economic embargo (La Nación, 2002a, June 13). 
In terms of reports that supported an interventionist economic strategy, 3 out of the 4 did 
so in the guise of carrying out neoclassical measures (see figure 1). The one outlier was an article 
that discussed how the banks would be sold, but presented no explicit mention of its economic 
inclinations. However, it is noteworthy to point out that none of the articles questioned the 
soundness of the neoliberal economic philosophy that underpinned the global financial order. 
Although this study was able to gather a significant sample of the reporting from La Nación it 
was limited insofar as many of their articles during the acquisition phase of both Scotiabank and 
Crédit Agricole’s subsidiaries chose not to editorialize or comment in their coverage. Overall, 
out of the 38 La Nación reports in this chapter 21 were wire-like briefs. 
The coverage pattern for Clarín was very similar to that of La Nación with the major 
exception that the Clarín began to outwardly challenge the narrative that global finance was 
indeed an inexorable force (Hay & Smith, 2005; also see figure 2). In this regard, the coverage 
was two articles short of drawing even. Clarín was the only periodical out of the 3 to put forth a 
counter narrative that challenged the longstanding idea that global finance posed a politically 
inexorable constraint.
7
 Another outlier that distinguished the Clarín’s coverage was that it 
actually had 1 article that offered support to heterodox solutions for the financial crisis, which 
specifically argued that inflation would not only add cash to illiquid banks, but would also 
reduce the real value of bad debts (Clarín, 2002, May 26). The Clarín’s coverage was also much 
more attuned to Argentina’s internal dynamics. Specifically, the Clarín’s coverage shed some 
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light on the drivers of the domestic economy and later on, the growing role of Argentine banks. 
As such, 12 Clarín articles were focused on these endogenous dynamics, which was nearly 
double that of La Nación’s 7, as well as Ámbito’s 8 (Figure 2; also see Widmaier, Blyth, 
Seabrooke, 2007). 
 
Like the other periodicals, the Clarín also appeared to use its editorial silence strategically. 
Out of the total sample (31 articles) covering the exit of foreign banking, 7 chose to present wire-
like briefs instead of the more usual editorial reports. Specifically, 6 out of these 7 were updates 
were either on Scotiabank’s potential sale or the protests. The remaining article was a wire on the 
slim possibility that the ACB would recapitalize Scotia. All in all, Clarín’s coverage although 
slightly less inclined to neoliberalism, remained conducive to finance and towed its line at the 
expense of heterodox polices, which nonetheless had one explicit mention.    
In terms of the content analysis on Ámbito’s bias, the first thing that stands out was that it 
did not religiously follow the trend of making appeals for the state intervene on behalf of the 
Figure 2. Biases within Clarín’s communicative discourse (2002-2006) 
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banks (figure 3). Nonetheless, their reports focused on what it saw as a failure of state policy. In 
turn, Ámbito outwardly disapproved of all of the state’s initiatives dealing with the financial 
crisis including the banking freeze, the judicial injunctions, the devaluation of the peso, and even 
the state’s decision not to recapitalize foreign banks. This latter point was the sole exception as 
they did staunchly support the bond exchange program that would finance the bailout of foreign 
finance.   
 
Wire-like reports were also a large part of their coverage. In fact, pithy updates 
represented 27% of Ámbito’s reports. Additionally, like the other two periodicals in question, 
Ámbito’s reporting also presented the economy as driven via material factors. Overall, its writing 
was very much in keeping with the global financial order— albeit couched within an ostensibly 
more classical, rather than neoclassical economic narrative.  
8.4.1 Conclusion 
Figure 3.  Biases within Ámbito Financiero’s communicative discourse (2002-2006) 
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Overall, the press’ insistence on propping up foreign banks at the expense of the macro 
economy, showed that the communicative discourse was heavily invested in supporting the idea 
that global finance was a politically inexorable and economically indispensable constraint and 
benefit (Hay & Smith, 2005; Schmidt, 2008).  Precisely, increasing austerity and deflation were 
the primary means to underwrite the press’ costly solution of bailing out the illiquid foreign 
banks, which came at a time when economic activity was already at a veritable standstill. In the 
cases of Scotiabank and Crédit Agricole, the press faithfully supported their recapitalization until 
their respective departures. However, the exit of these foreign banks did not halt their appeals for 
the earmarking of state funds, as their narrative simply turned to presenting a rationale for the 
compensation of losses incurred by those entities—who nonetheless, voluntarily abandoned their 
Argentine holdings. Although the coverage of Citibank fell in line with this narrative, its 
situation was unique as its executives instead chose to strategically downsize its operational 
footprint, rather than outright abandon its assets. Despite the fact that Citi’s losses— or rather 
strategic decision to concentrate its operational footprint in Argentina on telecommunications, 
press, and financial assets, Ámbito (although alone) somehow attempted to make a case for its 
remuneration as well.   
Remarkably, the sale of the foreign firm’s assets to domestic banks was covered with a 
lot less zeal and color, in other words the press’ communicative discourse consistently magnified 
“exogenous” factors (Schmidt, 2008; Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007). In fact, in the case of 
Marco-Bansud’s acquisition of Scotiabank just 2 out of 9 reports related to the sale editorialized 
the events. Similarly, Crédit Agricole’s asset sell off was not editorialized by the press, herein 18 
out of 22 reports were wire like updates. In all, this study found wire-updates with regards to 




Bersa. Additionally, coverage of the protests directed against foreign finance were also covered 
through pithy wire updates. Comparatively, appeals for the recapitalization and subsequent re-
compensation of these now defunct foreign institutions— covered within the body of this 
chapter— were couched within a rich, nuanced narrative that not only contextualized the use of 
austerity and bailouts, but vociferously championed this position.  
As a result, this study’s findings suggest that the press left virtually no room for 
heterodox policies, as appeals in favor of the interest’s global finance— which were imbued with 
the logics of neoliberal globalization— dominated the discourses and the overarching narratives 
(Hay & Smith, 2013).  In turn, the way in which the press framed the issues surrounding 
Argentina’s financial crisis, was more akin to a public relations campaign for image management 
than unbiased reporting, as its narratives attempted to effectively preclude the space for any 
countervailing ideas, theories, and policies that interfered with its own constructed “reality”. 
However, the results were less than what they expected, as other ideational and material 
factors— such as the foreign financial sector’s own apprehension to invest within Argentine 
markets vis-à-vis the popular backlash against the very intransigence of foreign banks opened the 
way for the abovementioned reforms and legal recourse. Ultimately, this last observation shows 







The implications of neoliberal globalization’s rigid discourses 
At the core of the constructivist understanding of globalization is the power of ideas (Blyth 2003; 
Hay & Marsh 1999; Smith, 2005). Spread via discourse, the social constructions of globalization 
and global capital analyzed (chapters 3-8) served in practice as a means to support the neoliberal 
or neoclassical model. However, for nation states, following this neoclassical path does not mean 
reducing its role in the economy, but rather redirecting (reflexively and fluidly) monetary, tax, 
fiscal, and regulatory policies to privilege supply-side initiatives (i.e., capital) in a markedly 
“variegated” or dynamic manner (see Peck, 2004). As this thesis has shown, discursive spaces 
(e.g., coordinative and communicative) were critical battle grounds, which were nonetheless 
dominated by neoliberal ideas and the material interests of capital, which they explicitly sought 
to uphold (Marsh, 2009; Schmidt, 2008).  
Schmidt’s dichotomization of coordinative and communicative discourses helped 
highlight the apparent bi-directional dialectic that existed between ideas and material factors, 
(Schmidt, 2008). Precisely, this “bi-directionality” delivered on David Marsh’s calls for an 
awareness of, or balance between, both material and ideational factors en route to explaining the 
dynamics of “stability and change” (Marsh, 2009). For example, the first set of cases (chapters 3-
5), which covered 30 years of IMF-Argentine negotiations, found a discursive trajectory that 
consistently and exclusively promoted a narrative that fell within the method’s tolerances for 
what it operationally defined as “neoliberal,” supply-side policies (see chapter 2). Thus, by 
precluding any discussion of heterodox, demand-side policies or ideas, the IMF’s coordinative 




gauged the biases within the Argentine press’ communicative discourse— specifically with 
regards to issues pertaining to international banks operating within its borders—also found it to 
fall within the thesis’ operationalized “logics of global finance” (see chapter 2). Precisely, in its 
role as an interlocutor between private financiers and the broader public, the press put forth a 
narrative that consistently emphasized the plight, policy biases, and balance sheets of foreign 
banks, which ultimately came at the expense of the domestic economy. Together, the empirical 
analysis has shown that the globalization discourse and the neoliberal policy paradigm it 
supported faced an existential crisis of its own making within Argentina. 
Economic policy options under the rubric of the IMF  
Broome and Seabrooke suggested that the IMF took an “experimentalist” approach 
within its Article IV conditionality reviews, albeit with the conspicuously implicit qualification 
that this flexibility was nonetheless, within orthodox goalposts (Broome, 2010; Broome & 
Seabrooke, 2008). However, in branding the IMF as an “experimentalist” institution in such a 
manner suggests a sort euphemistic misnomer or cognitive dissonance between their conclusions 
and their empirical findings. Ironically, these findings of a “flexible neoliberalism” tacitly 
coincide with concepts found within geographical works, which see neoliberalism as a flexible 
and/or variegated project that nonetheless seeks to privilege supply-side factors above all else 
(Brenner, Peck, Theodore, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002;  Jessop, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the difference between this thesis’ conclusion to that of Broome and 
Seabrooke’s appear to come down to how the empirical findings were interpreted. In contrast to 
Broome and Seabrooke (2007, 2008), this thesis forwent any sort of “nuanced” interpretation of 
the collated data in order to make the point that the IMF’s deliberation process encouraged and 




fiscal, and regulatory policy mix—irrespective of its flexibility within the study’s neoliberal 
markers.
114
 Precisely, it was the rigidity of the Fund in consistently supporting neoliberal, 
supply-side initiatives, as well as its inability to react to— in any flexible manner (and much less 
foresee and avert)— Argentina’s financial and monetary collapse, which calls into question what 
Broome and Seabrooke suggest as its competencies in monitoring and rating economic 
conditions, as well as its capacity to provide member states a “pool of comparative knowledge on 
experimentalist governance” (Broome & Seabrooke, 2008: 223).  
Ultimately, the results of this thesis’ historical tracing qualify any serious notion of an 
“experimentalist” IMF,” both on spatial and temporal grounds. In terms of spatiality, the 
Argentine case provides evidence that, at the very least, this Latin-American, borrower state did 
not benefit from a more flexible or “experimentalist” IMF.  Additionally, the last IMF-Argentine 
Article IV consultation took place on July 28, 2006, which— unless flexibility can be positively 
detected outside of the Argentine case— temporally situates the “experimentalist period” to 
sometime hereafter, and up until the 2008 global financial crisis (Broome, 2015; Broome & 
Seabrooke, 2008; Grabel, 2011).
115
 In sum, within the coordinative discourses of the IMF, not 
only did the study find that space for heterodox policy was virtually non-existent, but that the 
adherence to neoclassical policy was in fact treated as an inexorable precondition for Argentina’s 
good standing with the Fund. Thus, one important take-away from the empirics, including that of 
Broome and Seabrooke’s, is that one can expect neoliberalism to spread in a characteristically 
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 However, it should be noted that this thesis did quantitatively account for “policy variation” by measuring the 
average policy scores of the Article IV deliberations vis-à-vis the respective Argentine administrations, which can be 
found at the end of each chapter. Notwithstanding, the emphasis herein was on the predominance of neoliberal or 
otherwise orthodox policy prescriptions relative to orthodox, demand-side initiatives, which were all but absent.  
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 Due to its prominence and importance to the Fund, the Argentine case and Argentina itself— the IMF’s once 
model state (Camdessus, 1998) should not be seen as an outlier or “special case,” but rather representative of how 
the IMF performs its self-stated, primary function, which is acting as a lender of last resort for states traversing 




variegated manner. Thus, while an empirical analysis may detect what critical-materialists 
conceptualize as neoliberal variegation, this should not be conflated with a finding of ideational 
“flexibility,” or more specifically, space for heterodox policies.  
The communicative discourses of finance  
The neoliberal logics of globalization posit that international capital flows pose, both inexorable 
and external constraints that physically preclude states from successfully operating outside of the 
economic orthodoxy.
 
As with the prior case on the IMF, the upshot of this second section is 
that— far from being a physically inexorable maxim or naturally observable laws— these liberal 
economic logics had to be explained, lobbied for, and deliberated upon—within institutional 
setting and the public domain— which reveals their politically contingent nature. In other words, 
these economic conditions are the result of policies, which are ultimately contingent on their 
deliberative success— particularly, within coordinative and/or communicative discourses.  
 This thesis’ second empirical section also demonstrated how material interest can 
influence or privilege certain ideas and policies via its examination of the operations and 
opinions of foreign banks, which were nonetheless promoted, rationalized, and even occulted via 
the press’ communicated discourses.
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  Specifically, these discourses consistently deployed the 
logics of neoliberal globalization in order to rationalize the use of fiscal austerity, which allowed 
the state to redirect funds towards supply-side initiatives such as privatization, deregulation, and 
even the recapitalization of international financiers operating within Argentina. Altogether, the 
empirical findings found an apparent interplay or bi-directionality between the ideas 
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 Additionally, as the second empirical section showed (chapters 6-8), ideas can also originate from (or be 
promoted by) certain interested sectors, organizations, and/or individual agents. Specifically, chapters 6-8 
demonstrated that financial executives, which were directly cited as well as those who were provided editorial 
columns within Argentine periodicals, promoted their firm’s interests and positions via the ideas communicated 




communicated and the interests of international banks operating within Argentina—be it via 
policy preferences or calls for direct financial assistance.  
As a whole, the communicative discourse deployed by the Argentine press set in motion a 
reflexive, yet long-running narrative, which nonetheless emphasized— for better or worse—the 
power of globalization’s external market forces. Herein, the globalization narrative within 
Argentina itself can be broken into two parts: First, the initial thrust of the press’ discourse on 
international banks was on selling the liberal reforms that had “opened up” of the Argentine 
financial sector to global capital markets and international banks. Essentially, the press presented 
financial globalization as an economically advantageous step towards greater economic freedom 
and wider access to international pools of credit. However, as the efficiencies promised failed to 
materialize, the press deployed a second narrative wherein it began to explain these newly 
established links to global capital markets, as posing “politically inexorable constraints” on 
Argentina’s economic policy options (Hay & Smith 2005).
117
  This latter argument would form 
the logical basis for why Argentinians should endure or support unpopular, supply-side policies 
that privileged the international banks in question— namely, Citibank, Scotiabank, and Crédit 
Agricole.  
This combination of largess earmarked exclusively for select financial firms, which was 
to be underwritten by a neoliberal policy paradigm (e.g., one centered on tight monetary controls, 
austerity measures, and deregulation) not only neglected aggregate demand, but veritably 
shutdown the supply and circulation of money (Keen, 2009, 2011; Minsky, 1986, 2008; also see 
                                                          
117
 Harkening back to this thesis’ conceptual emphasis on the bi-directional dialectic between ideas and material 
factors, the discourse of the embedded Argentine press’ also shows that the concept of globalization can not only 
catalyze change, but that it can also serve to prevent change, once it has established a footing for the interests of 






 Ultimately, the empirical findings established that the Argentine press’ narratives 
were exclusively dedicated to communicating the biases and material interests of finance capital 
(irrespective of rationality).  
As in the earlier chapters on the IMF, how ideas themselves were deployed in order to 
explicitly foment change was also of importance and relevant to further establishing the concept 
of bi-directionality. Specifically, chapters 6-8 found that ideas played a large role in not only 
framing what could be deemed as appropriate policy options, but the analysis also found that— 
for financial executives— trending ideas or “market perceptions” were also critical factors in 
both forecasting and actively fomenting market fluctuations (i.e., physical gains and/or losses). 
Consequently, the frequent omissions by financial executives and the press elaborating on the 
need to bolster “market sentiment” served as evidence of their own awareness of the bi-
directionality or nexus that exists between the ideational and material. Precisely, 20.5% off all 
the articles examined explained market dynamics as a product of intersubjective understandings 
(i.e., market sentiment). In effect, the general thrust of these articles was that austerity was not 
materially effective, but rather that it created the “perception” of efficiency in the eyes of 
investors. Thus, the goal herein was not, to materially alter market conditions, but rather to 
manipulate the ideational or intersubjective understandings thereof.  
Epilogue  
Predictably, the empirical analyses within this thesis found that the discourses of both the 
IMF and the Argentine press consistently promoted neoliberal, supply-side logics, which tended 
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 This compression of economic activity due to Argentina’s monetary policy was flanked by both the reluctance of 
banks to lend, along with their disproportionate control capital, which together precipitated, or at the very least 





to see the global capital flows as tangible external constraints on economic policy. Yet, the 
paradox within the discourses in question was that they were not just deployed in order to 
passively chronicle or explain these “inexorable economic maxims,” but rather they were 
actively (and explicitly) engaged in influencing the (re)formation of economic policy within the 
closed-door sessions of the IMF and the public debates on the “globalization” of Argentine 
finance, as well as issues surrounding the subsequent Argentine Great Depression. In other 
words, these discourses show that neoliberal policies had to be implemented and sold 
endogenously, via deliberations held within ideational and policy constructing spaces. As a 
result, this neoliberal discursive construction that presented globalization as an immutable and 
inexorable external constraint, effectively occulted, both the inherently political and contingent 
nature of economic policymaking, as well as the ideational space for alternatives. This in turn 
heightens the importance of not only how policy focused discourses are deployed, but also what 
they promote, and by whom. This last point of emphasis begins to denote the potential bi-
directionality that exists between ideas and material factors or interests. 
Ultimately, this thesis’ cognizance of the bi-directionality between ideational and 
material factors drove the study towards an analysis of global financial institutions and 
international banks operating within Argentina. The logic herein was that by interrogating the 
potential role played by finance capital in the construction of these “global narratives” that the 
thesis would provide an understanding of how material factors— in this case the interests of 
international finance—can influence ideas promoted by discourses on economic policy. Going 
forward, this thesis’ contribution to debates on globalization, as well as the broader field of IPE, 
can be found in its analytical emphasis on how capital and/or private sector interests can come to 
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